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The twentieth century has witnessed the ideological and practical collapse of communism, 
a devastating intellectual attack upon metaphysical totalities (God, subject, history), and 
rapidly accelerating modes of scientific and technological advancement. Factories are 
closing down and trade unions becoming sterile while interglobal communication networks 
and new forms of transportation shrink and redefine the limits of our world. And with 
“floating” banks and virtual businesses constantly deterritorializing the economic 
configurations and movements of capital, questions concerning our existential condition 
seem to be asking after shadows, while questions concerning what we should do (how to 
politically and actively engage a shifting and unstable social field) emerge amidst the 
contemporary whirlwind of theory as impotent and hollow.
The position forwarded by some contemporary French intellectuals argues for “tactical” 
rather than strategic political engagement, fast-paced theory which locates malleable sites of 
repression or injustice and attempts to re-appropriate them in new ways, in other guises, 
before they are re-commodified and put back into the service of repression by “state-happy” 
machines animated by capitalist motors. In Foucault’s words, they attempt to drop 
theoretical bombs. Anti-Oedipus is one such political experiment, and it takes for its axis 
the intersection of the “holy family” (Oedipus, the figurehead of the new order of 
repressive capitalism, Mommy-Daddy-Me) and the schizophrenic production process. This 
dynamic, which is made to serve the project of social reconfiguration whose motor is 
control, offers insight into the way in which desire comes to turn back upon itself, the way 
in which desire comes to desire its own repression.
By re-thinking Marxist and Freudian theories in such a way that militant existence and 
non-repressive social involvement can remain operable possibilities in a post-disciplinary 
“control” society, the authors of Anti-Oedipus mount a full-scale critique of “interiority”; 
repression begins within the inner moral sphere of the self, the rampant unwillingness to 
part with outmoded theories of resistance and modes of critique, the geographically stable 
conception of social space that we hold. Oedipus animates the sedimented thinking which 
is still entrenched with this myth of the interior. Oedipus fuels fascist tendencies, 
tendencies that need to be “flushed out” of the back rooms and hazy interiors onto the 
smooth surface of the social field. The goal of such a project is to make everything, first 
and foremost desire, a productive process.
I offer here fives ways of “thinking into and out of” this complicated text. I hope, 
through my focus upon a specific political project of the kind mentioned above, that this 
essay will shed much needed light upon the general project of restructuring political theory 
in accordance with newer, decentralized conceptions of interiorities, control, capital, and 
the socius.
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INTRODUCTION
The other night at about two thirty in the morning, I 
unchained myself from my computer, cooked a cup of Earl Grey 
tea, and sat down in front of the television to mindlessly 
absorb the all-night, all-news loop sequence on NBC. Three 
things caught my eye. The first segment described a new 
"floating" academic system; "students" from all over the 
world are now taking classes from Duke, the University of 
Maryland, the University of Florida, and many other 
institutions without setting foot on campus. In fact, these 
virtual students hold virtual office hours with virtual 
professors in virtual space; by spending enough time on line, 
one can now receive a doctorate without ever going to class. 
Students can pay for these hyperclasses by authorizing money 
transfers from trust funds, credit companies, or financial 
aid services over the internet, and even download and print 
up their diplomas at the end of the degree sequence. This 
process marks the intersection, in hyperspace, of flows of 
capital, the dispersion of academic institutions, flows of 
multi-media imagery, the thorough dissemination of 
centralized research centers; it reconfigures all aspects of 
a mentor/apprentice or teacher/student relationship, it makes 
education a business, removes "people" from "places", etc.
The second segment revealed the newest technology in 
television viewing. A rectangular screen, with literally 
millions of minuscule pixilated spaces, promising to produce
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imagery sharper than the best 35 MM cameras. I was informed 
that I could experience vast and expansive terrains in what 
amounted to a nearly three-dimensional clarity. This "high- 
definition" television allows me to go places I have never 
dreamed of going, experience things I had never experienced, 
etc. The rectangular screen and digital THX sound system 
supposedly help to construct a viewing experience better than 
that offered up at the cinema. I can watch a nature video of 
Glacier National Park and see parts of the Park that I could 
never witness as clearly or as quickly as I can on this new 
contraption. Thus the space of a whole wilderness, the 
cinema, and the privatized sector of the family living room 
converge along an axis which is invested by technological 
market economy, scientific advancement, and virtual imaging. 
My living room, the cinema, a national park, the economy of 
information all being uprooted, deterritorialized, 
reorganized and improved at the site of the "high-definition" 
television.
The third segment described a new digital satellite 
information system. Conglomerates can now apparently bid 
upon everything from television sitcoms to sporting events to 
newscasts, and the highest bidder retains the rights to sell 
these programs to national networking "institutions" which 
never actually produce anything {they buy their only 
products, TV programs) and never actually sell anything (they 
serve only as a means of distribution for interglobal fiber­
optic communication). There are entire businesses which
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inhabit no physical spaces, produce no goods, employ no 
workers, and make no income. Once the satellites are in 
place and the fiber-optic networks installed, there is only a 
vast, complex and intersecting virtual machine which has the 
capacity to invest any point of the social field at any time 
and remains completely without "executive" supervision. At 
this point I turned the television off.
That all of this information regarding the rapid loss of 
technological, privatized, and social territory was delivered 
to me over the course of three one and a half minute sound- 
byte reports is not the concern. Nor was the feeling of 
nausea that overcame me spurred by some type of nostalgic 
reverie which caused me to pine for days of old, when all 
computers spoke Basic and going to the movies Was still a 
profoundly exhilarating visual and aural experience. No, the 
real problem with Such a rapid deterritorialization of 
commonly understood "spaces" (social spaces, private spaces, 
academic and research spaces, economic spaces, political 
spaces) is that theory cannot keep up. We cannot think about 
our world fast enough; it alters its agendas too quickly.
Just when an engaging theory is proposed concerning wildlife 
habitat, or family values, or the positive and negative 
effects of television viewing on children, or our political 
policies regarding foreign nations, or salary caps for 
professional athletes, or the ethical ramifications of 
cloning, all of these practices are uprooted, presented to 
the populous with thousands of different slants via
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newspapers and internet sites, network news programming and 
satellite broadcasts. We actually watched Operation Desert 
Storm happen; it was a digital war, just as the Simpson 
fiasco was a virtual trial; how could anything like the 
"truth" of such events ever surface?
It cannot, and we don't want it. What is needed is not the 
truth, but fast-paced theory and even faster action. All 
things that were understood as organized and located, such as 
the family, the penal institution, academia, people, places, 
and ideas have become malleable, shifting, flowing and 
intersecting. This is not necessarily a negative event; most 
of these institutions, as we shall see, are by their very 
nature dictatorial and oppressive. Yet while it is still to 
be determined what positive or negative or benign effects 
such shifts will generate, one thing is for sure: Theory,
particularly political theory, must keep up, and to do so, it 
must become flexible and experimental. This essay will 
examine one particular attempt to "experiment" with social 
and political theory.
Deleuze speaks of "lines of flight" that lead outward, away, 
to resistance and revolution. He speaks of philosophy. He 
distinguishes between knowing and thinking. Knowledge is 
sedimented understanding; it is the standard discourse of the 
history of ideas. The history of philosophy is the curse and 
the cure, for it situates the bounds of thinking just as it 
provides the axis for all "lines of flight". Thinking is the
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creation of new concepts, philosophy in its active form, 
lines leading elsewhere. This essay that I now write is 
composed of many of these lines, lines which I have chosen to 
lead "elsewhere". But I have cheated, for I have selected an 
"elsewhere" in advance, and this would be "rigging the game" 
according to Deleuze. None-the-less, I have chosen to follow 
philosophical, historical, conceptual and political lines in 
order to end up, of all places, at a book. I have followed 
at least five distinct lines (perhaps there are more) marked 
by five distinct chapters (there is one more) that lead to a 
text which offers nearly limitless alternative lines of 
flight. But I offer these lines, and an interpretation of 
the book (the axis upon which they converge) as a 
multiplicity of entrances, a set of distinct traces which 
lead, directly or indirectly, to a powerfully rich text.
Five ways in, many ways out.
The first five chapters of this essay are roughly these five 
lines. Needless to say, they intersect, overlap, draw upon 
and betray each other. They elaborate very general 
vicissitudes which point toward particular facets of Anti- 
Oedipus . Whether these facets are simply concepts to be 
defined, histories to be unthreaded, political agendas which 
prefigure radical thinking, or analyses of the social / 
cultural percepts which theory must grapple with, they are 
discussed here only as points of entry, ways of approaching, 
reading, and thinking, "lines" to be followed and pondered.
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Thus I offer up five ways to "enter" a text. The text is 
Anti-Oedipus , and in the final chapter of this essay I will 
offer an account of this text, as a means of putting closure 
on what might otherwise amount only to a conglomeration of 
lines.
The leveling force which Anti-Oedipus brings to bear upon 
psychoanalysis, contemporary politics, subjectivity, indeed 
everything and all that composes the "social" will certainly 
be its most important contribution to philosophy. The 
"social", described only in terms of contemporary capitalism, 
is dissected in Anti-Oedipus, and the dialectical tension 
between desire and Fascism (or better production and 
repression) is played out along the intersection of two 
interrelated lines: Capitalism and Schizophrenia.
The most immediate effect of the schizophrenic process, 
posited as universal producer, is to separate, in the 
authors' own words, desire from lack. This amounts to an 
attempt to scourge both philosophical theory and social and 
political practice of all forms of domesticating and 
repressive tendencies brought about and accelerated by 
"state-happy" mentalities. I will trace the origins and 
developments of what Deleuze and Guattari call "state-happy" 
thought, what Foucault calls domesticating thought, and what 
Nietzsche refers to as the "moralization of existence"; these 
concepts all have subtle, distinct connotations when examined 
in the light and context of each author, but what will be
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discovered is that they are all symptoms 5f and reactions to 
a certain conception of subjectivity. This model of the 
subject equates desire with lack and attributes 
responsibility to the individual at the internal level; all 
of these thinkers realize that whatever is wrong with 
thinking originates with the binary model (interior/exterior) 
of the individual.
The problem is that this "individual", what Foucault refers 
to as "Man", cannot and indeed will not think itself through 
to active, challenging, and liberating theoretical vantage 
points; its lives its own history too well. "Man" is pensive 
and reflective, enamored by belief and systems; it is the 
representation of institutional machinery at work at the 
micro-social level. Leaving "Man" behind is the first task 
of schizo-analysis; for Deleuze and Guattari, Oedipus is the 
social staying power of Man. Oedipus is the figurehead which 
causes us to desire our own repression. And Oedipus is an 
economy; it is a myth, it is a psychological concept, but it 
is much more than this. For the authors of Anti-Oedipus , 
the economy of Oedipus is a production of a 
"deterritorializing" capitalism, a global machine which 
always and everywhere outstrips the limits of individualism 
while simultaneously re-orienting and re-channeling goals and 
agendas elsewhere.
Oedipus is very real, just as all idols are. Just as the 
factory and its dialectic of production served as a model for
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the capitalism of the nineteenth century, Oedipus serves as 
the model for twentieth century capitalism. But Oedipus is 
not a "site", like the factory; it is not localizable or 
segmented, it is fluid and molecular. One leaves the factory 
and comes home to the family, or goes to the union club, or 
attends classes at a local university, or goes ice fishing on 
a lake. According to Deleuze and Guattari, one never leaves 
Oedipus. The capitalism that these authors are elaborating 
is no longer confined or restrained in any way to the 
production of goods or merchandise; Oedipus is the mass 
producer of all social bodies, and all social bodies are 
themselves transient, interchangeable, and fragmented. The 
central themes of Anti-Oedipus are discussed in my last 
section, The Anti-Oedipal Machine , and I have designed that 
chapter to be somewhat accessible on its own terms; thus it 
can be read at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end of 
the essay.
The site of the self is mapped, and this cartography is 
central to the arrangement of social spaces, political 
hierarchies, business ventures, etc. ButA Deleuze and 
Guattari understand this cartography in a very unique way; no 
longer are there plateaus and valleys and forests and oceans 
(the home, the factory, prison, family); rather all 
"territories" are usurped and borrowed. Instead of playing 
chess, where each model or "gamepiece" can move but only 
according to the strict rules of the striated space of the 
game, we are now surfing, and the trajectories which inform
our movements are themselves as vast, turbulent, and 
unpredictable as the ocean.
The final section of this essay will detail, as stated, some 
of the central tenets of Anti-Oedipus . It will serve as a 
reference guide of sorts. But the first five "lines" are of 
a different nature. Based upon the premise that theory must 
be equally deterritorialized and as plural and fragmented as 
contemporary culture, the authors of Anti-Oedipus have 
constructed a theoretical work which attempts such a project. 
What is missing is the traditional respect and rigor that is 
usually a prerequisite in informed, articulate philosophy.
My work here is not so much an attempt to "fill in the gaps" 
that Anti-Oedipus leaves, but rather an experiment with modes 
of reading the text. Over the course of an interchange with 
many different concepts and thinkers, I have attempted to 
generate nothing more than ways of working with the grade of 
theory given over to us in the book. And although in the 
title of this paper I make specific reference to reading 
politically, this notion of politics is far too expansive to 
be compared with the likes of Strauss, Rawls, Mill, etc. For 
with Deleuze and Guattari, politics is the entire mode of 
existence and reading is always a political activity.
Nietzsche haunts the pages of Anti-Oedipus like a specter.
As a critique of both Marx and Freud, the book serves as a 
deliriously unstable attempt to bring to fruition a model of 
critique fashioned by Nietzsche: A thorough revaluation of
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our most deep-seated beliefs regarding ourselves and our 
organized world. What Nietzsche might term the "reactive" 
(and what Foucault might call "fascist") elements of both 
Marx and Freud are exorcised in Anti-Oedipus through a 
lightning-fast and intoxicating tour of the socius mounted 
and led by Nietzschean critique. The first two lines that I 
will follow in this essay originate from a Nietzschean axis. 
Line One orients Nietzsche as the progenitor of the 
psychoanalytic of guilty consciousness. Line Two follows the 
manifestations of this guilty interiority directly into the 
heart of psychoanalysis. Line One leads directly into Line 
Two, and therefore they should be read consecutively.
Line Three is an attempt to piece together, from out of the 
context of our immediate intellectual history, a very general 
theory of the social order which animates Anti-Oedipus . The 
notion of a control society is unlike any other theory of 
social organization ever advanced, and therefore it serves to 
come to terms with this picture of the socius in order to 
fully examine what the project of Anti-Oedipal thinking 
denotes. While most forms of alternative thinking which 
label themselves revolutionary operate with a model of the 
social field somewhat similar to what Foucault understands as 
a disciplinary society, Deleuze and Guattari are theorizing 
in another space, a space which is accelerated and malleable, 
much like the dissociative characteristics of "virtual" 
education or inanimate business.
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Line Four treats of the "political" in an extremely explicit 
manner. It will be contended that strains of Marxism had to 
mutate into something rather close to traditional anarchy in 
order to compete with the rapid acceleration of alienating 
and decentralizing capitalist tendencies. But if anarchy is 
to be revolutionary, if it wants to have social import, it 
must forego two of its central tenets: human essentialism and 
its solely repressive view of power. We can pick up on 
something like an essence to the individual in a disciplinary 
society, and therefore we can also understand along with Marx 
the fundamentally repressive nature of such a social 
configuration. But control alters the schema and allows us 
to see, along with Foucault, that individuals are produced by 
social configurations as mechanisms of power; if individuals 
are produced by power, then power is not only suppressive but 
productive, and individuals are products, not essences. Thus 
anarchy must rethink its program if it wants to be active in 
the New World Order, and Deleuze and Guattari give us a 
version of anarchy which can do just this.
Within the context of a Nietzschean mode of critique, a 
theory of subjectivity which references itself over and 
against the conception of a society of control, and a working 
understanding of "deterritorializing" capitalism (understood 
as the entire productive surface of the social field) the 
possibilities for political theory indeed look skewed.
Deleuze and Guattari draw upon the productive process of the 
schizophrenic not only to understand the increasingly
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arbitrary technology of the modern socius, but also to stake 
a ground for a revolutionary political theory that is 
operable in light of the backdrop of a society of control. I 
will discuss the relevance of the schizophrenic process for 
social theory in light of a discussion of social "spaces" in 
the fifth section of this essay. "Space" is an all- 
encompassing locution; we use it to refer to outer space, 
virtual space, the inside of a building or institution, the 
locale that we presently inhabit, the measurable distance . 
between two or more entities, etc. Deleuze and Guattari 
extol the heed for a radically new conception of space, the 
space which both capitalism and schizophrenia create . To 
say that social space is inhabited is to conceive of the 
socius as striated and organized, mapped out and segmented 
off; effectively, it is to understand location in a way which 
allows for "viewing from a distance", for desire to envision 
that which it does not have, to crave alterity. To say that 
social space is created is to posit desire as productive and 
to flush all repressive inferiorities out onto the smooth, 
flowing space of the social field. I will begin a discussion 
of the schizophrenic process in Line Five and it will carry 
over into the conclusion of this essay.
LINE ONE: NIETZSCHE AND INTERIORITY
In the Introduction to Jean-Francois Lyotard's Libidinal 
Economy , translator Iain Hamilton Grant eloquently states 
the most widely accepted and proto-reductionist response to a 
handful of essays which compose "a series of responses to the 
demise of Structuralism": "[A] somewhat naive anti-
philosophical expressionism, an aestheticizing trend hung 
over from a renewed interest in Nietzsche prevalent in the 
late 1960s." Continuing: "It is further held to be the
philosophical expression of the political situationism 
experienced throughout Europe during that same period, just
as short-lived, and just as much a 'dead end' "! . These
statements express, in cozy fashion, the method behind much 
of the contemporary philosophical madness: Contemporary
continental philosophy is radical, anarchic, blindingly fast 
and sometimes altogether unintelligible. It says nothing, or 
when it does, it appears to be saying nothing of any 
interest. And for many, it was short-lived; even many of 
the current heavies in Parisian universities are opting for a 
sounder, liberalistic philosophical axiomatic.
Whether or not the relevance of the work begun by Derrida, 
Foucault, Lyotard, Irigaray, and Deleuze can be or has been 
properly assessed is not yet known; I will make a claim in 
this essay that at least the political and cultural facets of 
Deleuze's co-authored theoretical experiments with
1 Jean-Francois Lyotard, Libidinal Economy, trans. lain Hamilton Grant (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1993 ) p, xvii.
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activist/anti-psychiatrist Felix Guattari cannot be ignored 
by philosophy or any other discipline which seeks to make 
sense of contemporary mass culture and political ideology. 
What can be asserted with respect to Grant's assessment of 
the developmental and current state of contemporary non- 
Anglo-American thought is that its homage to Nietzsche is 
warranted. We cannot imagine the direction thinking took in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s in France without correctly 
assigning to Nietzsche the role of instigator.
This presents an entire field of problems, however, for 
literally everyone seems to have different Nietzsches. Nine 
out of ten books written on Nietzsche begin with the 
obligatory disclaimer regarding the manner in which one is to 
read Nietzsche, the ever-extending possibilities for new 
interpretations of his thought, the assertions regarding 
which schools of thought can claim him for their own (was he 
a philosopher, a poet, an historian, a psychologist, an 
exceptionally astute social critic, etc.?). Nietzsches pop 
up everywhere, and what is most intriguing about his 
appearances is that they are united by a proper name and 
little else. The difference, for example, between Heidegger 
and Foucault's Nietzsche is immense; as is that between the 
interpretations of Nietzsche offered by Alasdair MacIntyre, 
Walter Kaufmann, Karl Jaspers, Jacques Derrida, and Georges 
Bataille. A very specific Nietzsche, one which will be 
discussed in this chapter, will belong to this text, and he 
will be counted among the ranks of philosophy.
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Heidegger's work on Nietzsche inaugurated the conceptual 
approaches to Nietzschean studies in the fields of 
phenomenology, existentialism, and ontology. In fact, 
Heidegger's four volume lecture series/research project on 
Nietzsche, which he introduced to the public nearly fifty 
years after Thus Spake Zarathrustra was written, arguably 
marks the moment of Nietzsche's inception into philosophy; 
Heidegger made sure that we took Nietzsche seriously. In 
France, however, Nietzsche remained an implicit influence on 
phenomenological existentialism and Structuralism; thinkers 
like Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Levi-Strauss all acknowledged 
their debt to Nietzsche, but rarely took him to task, offered 
interpretations of his work, or included him in their general 
projects. It was not until 1962, when Deleuze published his 
slim volume Nietzsche et la Philosophie , that the members of 
the French intellectual world began to acknowledge the far 
reaching implications of Nietzsche's thought for their 
respective enterprises.
The point is not that thinkers like Foucault and Derrida, who 
were already publishing work at this time, did not recognize 
their indebtedness to Nietzsche's thought; what Deleuze 
offered to French intellectuals was their first 
comprehensive, systematic, and explicitly respectful 
interpretation of the Nietzschean program. Deleuze's book 
has been widely overlooked by American scholars; even in 
circles where Nietzsche is well-preserved, Deleuze's work is 
attended to as a footnote to better known and more
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constrained interpretations of Nietzsche's work. But one 
point must be made extremely clear: Nietzsche et la
Philosophie is the work which made it possible for France to 
take Nietzsche seriously as a philosopher, because it is, for 
all of its ambiguity and extremely chewy discourse, the first 
offering in France of a systematization of Nietzsche's 
thought. The system Deleuze presents is intentionally loose 
and unstable, but Deleuze recognized that unless someone gave 
to Nietzsche a relationship with philosophical systems, it 
would be impossible for philosophers to look upon his work as 
philosophically meritorious. As it turns out, this effort by 
Deleuze to bring Nietzsche into the fold of philosophy 
spurred an aesthetic liberation from rigorous analysis and 
philosophic transcendentalism (these methods of inquiry were 
wrapped up in Structuralism at the time Deleuze's book came 
out) on all fronts.
It should not be surprising then that exactly ten years after 
his critical study on Nietzsche, Deleuze teamed up with Felix 
Guattari to write Anti-Oedipus, a text which marks for 
critics both the furthest extension of "radical post­
structuralism" and one of the last great moments of an 
anarchic, irrational aesthetic expressionism. This book is 
remarkable for many reasons, and one of the most outstanding 
is that it offers to anyone interested in Nietzschean studies 
the opportunity to experience the true radicality of 
Nietzsche's thought as it can be played out among the orders 
of contemporary politics, culture, and psychoanalysis. Anti-
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Oedipus is a Nietzschean undertaking; it owes more to 
Nietzsche than even Foucault does. But before discussing the 
intricacies of Anti-Oedipus , we need to examine the 
Nietzsche that it uses, manufactures, exploits; in short, the 
Nietzsche that it offers us.
Oedipus Rex is a Greek tragedy. Oedipus emerges on the 
historical scene as one of the primary myths of the first 
civilized society. And Nietzsche, aside from a few short 
essays, began his prolific writing career with a book on
Greek tragedy.2 we tend to historicize ancient Greek
culture as advanced both intellectually and socially, for out 
of the well-spring of culture that gave us Plato, Sophocles, 
Euripides and Aristotle also came an organized record of 
distinct social classes, a proto-democratic governing body 
and legislature, etc. (of course Egypt had developed, in a 
much earlier era, similarly complex social configurations; 
the point is not that Greece was primary but that it was of 
fundamental significance to Western Philosophy). Two 
elements of The Birth of Tragedy will be relevant to this 
discussion:
1. Nietzsche's psychological analysis of Greek gods and 
their functional purposes in society.
2. The figure of Dionysus as a necessary manifestation of 
delirium.
2 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of Wagner, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New 
York: Random House, 1967).
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1. In The Birth of Tragedy , Nietzsche describes the 
instantiation of the gods of Mount Olympus: "[T]here is
nothing here that suggests asceticism, spirituality, or duty. 
We hear nothing but the accents of an exuberant, triumphant 
life in which all things, whether good or evil, are deified. 
And so the spectator may stand quite bewildered before this 
fantastic excess of life, asking himself by virtue of what 
magic potion these high-spirited men could have found life so 
enjoyable that, wherever they turned, their eyes beheld the 
smile of Helen, the ideal picture of their own existence,
'floating in sweet sensuality'".3 Superficially, it looks
as if Nietzsche is granting to the Greeks an ability to 
appreciate all facets of life unconditionally; that they had 
no need of responsibility while at the same time thrived on 
disaster and fortune alike. Nietzsche recognizes, however, 
that something deeply integral to psychological well-being 
formed the roots of the "Olympian magic mountain": "It was
in order to be able to live that the Greeks had to create
these gods from a most profound need."4 It is here that
Nietzsche begins to formulate the grounds for what will 
become his fundamental critique of guilty consciousness: 
Nietzsche recognizes that the uncertainty of life is indeed 
cause for celebration, but he also envisions the need to 
explain the tragic and the capacity man has for imposing 
blame upon himself.
3 Ibid., p. 41.
4 ibid., p. 42.
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Guilt manifests itself in the Western historico-cultural 
domain in various forms: Adam is guilty of transgression in 
the Garden of Eden, thus mankind is forever guilty in the 
eyes of God; later, Paul and his cohorts place an 
unconquerable guilt upon humankind for the murder of Christ, 
the son of God; Nietzsche proposes that we as a people are 
guilty of the death of God, and asks us to consider the 
weight of our deed in light of our own potentiality to become 
gods ourselves; we repress the innate desires of the id, for 
they are shameful, unhealthy, animalistic, our whole 
unconscious is unconscionable, and thereby we understand our 
psychological malfunctions. One might even surmise that much 
of our recent intellectual effort (from Kierkegaard to 
Nietzsche to Heidegger to Sartre) has been constructed in the 
wake of "existential" guilt. And there are ever new events 
to hold oneself and one's race accountable for: The Black
Death,"the Crusades, the Holocaust, Stalin's Soviet onslaught 
in the Ukraine, urban poverty, the national debt. As a 
reflective people, we simply cannot avoid the capacity for 
becoming-guilty that necessarily emerges when we seek to 
locate the source of our ailments. Nietzsche notes that the 
Greeks used their gods in a peculiar fashion; they used them 
to relieve guilt.
Nietzsche contends that the Greek Gods served at least two 
interconnected purposes: First, these gods lived out the
vibrant, adventurous lives that the Greek people could not. 
Men invented the immortal gods who could bear and even enjoy
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the absurdity of their own existence. Thus the drama serves 
a cathartic purpose for the Greek citizen: He is privy to
the irrational, intoxicated and fully liberated element of 
life, while he remains shielded from its full effects through 
the media of the structured lyrical or dramatic performance. 
Of course, we still see this trend today; in the movie 
houses, in novels, in the theatre, we lose ourselves in 
worlds of significance wherein we experience high adventure, 
tragic loss, perversions of all shapes and sizes without 
having to bear out the consequences of involving ourselves in 
destructive activities.
Second, the Greek Gods relieve a specific form of existential 
guilt. It is a fairly common anthropological assumption that 
the religion of a people can reveal a tremendous amount of 
information about their psychical well-being. It does not 
take a lot of mental footwork to recognize that using one's 
gods to relieve guilt is a psychologically healthier practice 
than using them to impose it.
Nietzsche takes careful note of the differences between the 
gods of antiquity and the Christian God. While many would 
contend that the Greeks cannot be held responsible for their 
paganistic tendencies and naive theology due to their 
"infantile" situatedness in the saga of developing humanity, 
Nietzsche wants something else from the Greeks than a 
precursor or a prolegomena to a future mode of thinking on 
the Divine. Nietzsche is a psychologist; his philology
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reflects this tendency. Let us take, by way of contrast, the 
myth of Prometheus and the myth of Eden.
Prometheus, feeling pity for humanity, goes directly against 
the explicit orders of Zeus and brings fire to the ancient 
Greeks. One can hypothesize what this metaphorical fire 
really meant to the Greeks: It was none other than the word,
knowledge of good and evil, life and death; at once it was 
the power to communicate and to revel in shameless desire, 
Prometheus brought them the Logos. And we recognize that his 
gift is empowering; this transgression of Prometheus gave 
power to the Greeks, allowed them to organize, civilize, and 
striate their territory. Now in possession of that which 
Zeus had strictly forbidden them, the Greek people are 
likened unto gods. And Prometheus is sentenced to live out 
his days strapped to a rock whereupon an eagle appears once 
daily to eat out his liver. He is to bear the iniquity of 
this deed. The true price of knowledge is to be paid only by 
him; Prometheus is guilty, not humanity.
The myth of Eden offers the psychological antithesis of the 
myth of Prometheus. Adam is seduced by Eve into eating of 
the Tree of Knowledge, the only tree in the Garden from which 
they are forbidden to taste fruit. The serpent tempts them; 
they fall. Once they obtain the word of God, the knowledge 
of good and evil, they are immediately embarrassed by their 
immodesty. They hide their nakedness from God, who seeks 
them out and exiles them from the Garden. Not only that, but
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their heirs are doomed to live forever under the weight of 
inescapable guilt which such knowledge brings. Here it is 
all of humankind that bears the guilt which necessarily 
accompanies the acquisition of knowledge.
So it runs that both myths relay how humanity acquires the 
capacity to understand and contemplate its activities; the 
Greek myth removes the anxiety inherent in such an awakening, 
the Christian myth drills it into the very core of our 
existential state; Nietzsche was attuned to such differences 
and puzzled over a history which would not only accept but 
internalize its guilt, the Christian lineage, in a later work 
entitled On the Genealogy of Morals. Nietzsche's Judeo- 
Christian history of guilty consciousness marks, for all 
intensive purposes, the beginning of the psycho-analysis of 
repression, the birth of the realization that something is 
fundamentally wrong with the way we have come to organize and 
understand ourselves.
2. The figure of Dionysus, although a terrifying and 
menacing embodiment of the dark, delirious, and irrational in 
man, was deified and in fact recognized by the Greeks as an 
integral facet of the world that they inhabited. In the 
sublime, comic medium of Greek tragedy, the transgressions of 
all boundaries of the ego and the ethical were played out. 
Nietzsche recognizes the comfortable distance established 
between total peril and the audience as made manifest by the 
"Apollonian" format of the dramatic performance. There is a
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need to explore, to recognize, to even enjoy the dark side of 
our souls, but it must be kept in check by a certain "pathos 
of distance". The chorus "dreams" the tragedy, which is 
presented on the stage as Dionysian reality. The audience 
dreams with the chorus; an insight is gained by experiencing 
the breakdowns of tragic figures, but this chaotic, 
excessive, even libidinal will (see, for example, Antigone ) 
is still veiled by the distance of the dream and spectating.
When Freud uses dream life to uncover what will eventually be 
in his mature work the entire field of the unconscious, we 
are once again reminded that the dream provides a way in, a 
milieu where it is possible to elaborate the trappings of 
that which does not belong to either immediate experience or 
conscious reflection, the irrational Dionysian pagan play or 
the unconscious libido. While Nietzsche later abandons this 
viewpoint in favor of an aesthetic brought about by intensely 
lived artistic experience, it is important to note that here 
Nietzsche seems to be asserting that existence itself is 
justified through the filter of an Apollonian drama, but is 
in fact constructed by the schizophrenic paganism of the 
artist, Dionysius. Nietzsche saw the collective "dream of 
death" of an entire culture expressed in its dramatic 
sensibilities.
While Greek gods served to stave off the guilt imposed by the 
dialectical tension between the rational and the irrational 
(conscious life and uninhibited desire, Apollo and Dionysus),
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the divine figure of Christianity, as touched on briefly 
above, intensifies this guilt and internalizes it. Nietzsche 
will later, in his work on morality, introduce the notions of 
active and reactive to characterize activities or "codes" of 
existence which exhibit psychologically healthy or 
psychologically damaging tendencies respectfully. When 
George Morgan describes Nietzsche's meditation on the 
"moralization of existence" ( "[M]en mistook the sequences of
guilt and punishment for those of cause and effect"5 ), we
sense he is very close to a central theme that will run 
throughout the course of this essay: the "internalization" of 
Man by man, the "individuation" and becoming-social that 
Freud describes, Foucault's analysis of the concept of Man as 
tool of power and axis of repression. Essentially, Nietzsche 
is asking Reich's elusive and infamous question: "What could
cause the masses to desire their own repression?"
We recognize that Reich was speaking about Fascism, about a 
state of civilization so deplorable that it would elect an 
autocratic, genocidal, power-mongering institution such as 
the Third Reich as its fundamental organizing and controlling 
mechanism. But Nietzsche saw the seeds of Fascism in the 
"moralization of existence": Fascism as expressed and made 
manifest in the figurehead of the god of Christianity. Thus 
the concept of Fascism has a much larger scope than the 
governing form of the Fascist State: It will refer to all 
practices and modes of experience where lack is replaced or
5 George Morgan, What Nietzsche M eans , (London: Oxford University Press, 1943) p. 147.
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exploited by one form of power or another, from the 
internalization of the guilty consciousness and the birth of 
"Man" to the radically unsound hyper-structures of 
contemporary capitalism which create vicissitudes with the 
media, mass culture, education, etc., and which force feed 
the contemporary individual its desires. The analytic of 
internalized and inflicted psychological repression begins 
with Nietzsche, with the analysis of a form of consciousness 
that emerges as a result of a guilt-laden value system. 
Nietzsche is the catalyst for thinking about what looks to be 
an almost innate and certainly destructive tendency to 
internalize domesticating forms of power.
In an early essay entitled On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral 
Sense , Nietzsche begins to formulate his most devastating 
question: "What is the value of truth for life?" This
question will come to inform all of his subsequent work on 
morality. Whatever truth is or may be, it should be noted 
that up until this point in the history of philosophy the 
value of truth had never been called into question. That 
is, every thinker from Plato to Hegel offers a conception of 
what truth is ; it is Nietzsche who tries to tell us what it 
is worth.
Against Plato, who desires an "unchanging account of 
unchanging being", and in a somewhat dizzying spiral out of 
Kant, Nietzsche assures us that "[t]he 'thing in itself' (for 
that is what pure truth, without consequences, would be) is
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quite incomprehensible to the creators of language and not at
all worth aiming for."6 The role language plays in
instituting the internal aspect of Man is another theme that 
will traverse the Nietzschean landscape; indeed, it must be 
noted that the entirety of the Genealogy is little more than 
a critique of ethical language. Of course, Kant already had 
told us that the "thing in itself" cannot be known, that the 
"true" state of reality is hidden from us and that the 
"phenomenal" world of experience is all we can hope for. But 
unlike Kant, Nietzsche will accede no possibility of 
distinction between reason and its objects; he only describes 
a reckless forgetfulness and a play of metaphor.
What he intends by this notion of forgetfulness is simply 
that our language draws us into deception, or better, attunes 
us to the deception that composes reality. It is only by 
forgetting that all frogs exist in different spaces and times 
and are of different shapes and sizes and move differently 
and so forth that we could ever Come to understand the 
concept "frog". Thus the "truth" is gained by forgetting 
that we are false before ourselves. This may seem 
inconsequential until we recognize that here we have a 
definition of truth which stands in contradistinction to the 
Platonic Ideal: Rather than privileging the formal concept
of "frog" and understanding each manifestation of the concept 
in reality (each actual frog) as an imperfect replica of such
6 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann ( New York: Penguin Books, 
1954) P. 45.
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a concept, Nietzsche confronts us with the painful 
observation that concepts are nothing more than the implicit 
agreement to lie to and among ourselves. And this counters 
even Kant, who developed his entire systematic around the 
imposition of the faculties of reason upon reality, which for 
him was the precondition for anything at all like experience 
to take place. Long before the Logical Positivists declared 
that all deductive (i.e., a priori) truth is either 
contradictory or tautological, Nietzsche informs us of man 
that:
"If he does not wish to be satisfied with truth in the form of a 
tautology - that is, with empty shells - then he will forever buy 
illusions for truths. What is a word? The image of a nerve stimulus in 
sounds. But to infer from the nerve stimulus, a cause outside us, that 
is already the result of a false and unjustified application of the 
principle of reason..."7
Nietzsche asks why we act honestly and champion truth. His 
answer is simply that we have internalized the concept of 
honesty as a highest goal; it has become a structural 
component of the way we define ourselves, our legislature, 
our social responsibilities. But a concept internalized 
becomes a concept immune to critique. On the Genealogy of 
Morals is Nietzsche's most profound discussion of the 
capacity for internalization.
We ask ourselves what internalization means. How does man 
gain the "capacity" to internalize morals, desires, an image 
and a dogma of himself ? He must first understand that he
7 Ibid, p. 45.
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has an interior; a soul, perhaps, something extra-physical. 
With this comes an odd sense of responsibility, of guilt, of 
the capability to remember and regret.
Nietzsche begins his polemic with a claim regarding the 
psychologists of his day: "These English psychologists - 
what do they really want? One always discovers them 
voluntarily or involuntarily at the same task, namely at 
dragging the partie honteuse [shame] of our inner world into 
the foreground and seeking the truly effective and directing
agent, that which has been decisive in its evolution."® The
question "What does it want?" is the force and flow of 
Nietzschean critique. Nietzsche examines every event 
according to the intentions and wills involved; he is 
determined to know what each participant (being an 
individual, a locale, a political organization, a religious 
history, a text, etc.) wants ; this is the crux of genealogy, 
and is the approach that, for Nietzsche, allows the surest 
access to underlying or implicit values. Nietzsche is in 
many ways the first structuralist. But his jibe at 
psychology rings through with truth; he saw that much of what 
he knew as modernity had adopted a certain crude model of the 
individual and that many of our practices (psychology, 
religion, legislature, discipline) presupposed an interiority 
of man, one which informs and causes his actions. The 
psychologist does not evaluate an action; he judges the
8 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Hom o , trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. 
Hollingdale ( New York: Random House, Inc.) p. 24.
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distraught or disturbed individual who intentionally caused 
this action to occur. Nietzsche thinks that we are too 
comfortable with this model, the inner or animated element of 
man (his "true" self) as the purveyor and instigator of all 
activities. He therefore inquires into how it came to be the 
case that this "inner" depth was acquired.
Nietzsche again looks to the civilizations of antiquity, but 
this time he has a different agenda. The dichotomy of "good" 
and "bad", as manifest in Ancient Greece, is a distinction 
which, if eyed carefully, looks very foreign to modern man.
In such a civilization, the power to judge was acquired by 
those who could physically claim it; that is, the concept of 
"good" and everything which came to be understood as such, 
was determined out of the distance between the aristocratic 
warrior class and the plebeian peasantry. The aristocrats 
had dominant political power, thus they had the correct 
values; this was not a correlation, simply a self-evident 
mode of life. The values of the warrior class were the 
"good" values; since these folks were jubilant, vain, and 
decadent, jubilance, vanity, and decadence came to be "high" 
values; whatever enhanced the sensation of life was "good". 
The concept of "goodness" owed its value to a class 
distinction; the values of the warrior aristocracy (luck, 
risk, danger, power, cunning, art, war) were all high values; 
those of the plebeians (humility, patience, meekness, piety) 
were, only by way of contradistinction, "bad" values, low- 
minded values.
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Nietzsche contrasts this value system with one which develops 
as the result of an instantiation of the ascetic mentality, 
made manifest in the priestly class, whereby reaction and 
revenge work in tandem to subvert the dichotomy of "good" and 
"bad". Nietzsche does not intend for us to think that one 
develops as a result of the other, nor that there is some 
form of causal linkage which constitutes both as value 
systems; he intends only to point out the radically different 
origins which seem to surface when we approach various 
dominating mentalities. In all fairness, it should be 
pointed out that Nietzsche appears, throughout the text, to 
favor what he refers to as the "life-affirming" values of 
antiquity over the "slave morality" of the priestly class. 
Nietzsche does recognize, however, along with Kierkegaard, 
that once we have gained the capacity for moral depth, there 
is no going back; to attempt to do so would be beastly. And 
thus we are to read his interpretation of the evolution of 
the guilty consciousness as merely a stifling movement in the 
lineage of value systems.
Nietzsche attributes to the priestly class a certain 
cleverness which is actually closer to cunning (he admires 
Paul for being one of the shrewdest psychologists of all 
time). So the priestly mentality is clever; it forces regret 
and reflection upon the high-minded. A new model of life and 
existential purpose arises; no longer is the human cause one 
of life-affirmation and acquiring wealth, power, and 
prestige. Now the very values which once allowed one to rule
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and live vigorously have become shameful and base, in fact 
"evil". "Good" itself has become "evil". A "doctrine of 
love" (behind which stands the figurehead of a judgmental God 
who favors patience, humility, piety, meekness, passivity, 
and peace) inverts the rules; man is given a soul which is 
accountable to a God who admonishes love and sanctity and 
humility. One may speculate that the Jews defeated the 
Romans by making them reflectively attentive to a moral 
"inner" sense. Once man is convinced that he has a soul, he 
can also become convinced that there is a judgable facet 
behind his every act and deed. While the lower classes are 
exploited or even abused, they acquire a smug sense of 
superiority from this doctrine of the soul.
What emerges is a reversal of values (the "high-minded" 
aristocratic values are now acts of evil by which all 
oppressors will be judged) and, more importantly, a depth 
to mankind:
"For the priests everything becomes dangerous, not only cures and 
remedies, but also arrogance, revenge, acuteness, profligacy, love, lust 
to rule, virtue, disease - but it is only fair to add that it was on the 
soil of this essentially dangerous form of human existence, the priestly 
form, that man first became an interesting animal, that only here did he 
acquire depth and become evil...One will have divined how easily the 
priestly mode of valuation can branch off from the knightly-aristocratic 
and then develop into its opposite; this is particularly likely when the 
priestly caste and the warrior caste are in jealous opposition to one 
another and are unwilling to come to terms. The knightly-aristocratic 
value judgements presupposed a powerful physicality, a flourishing, 
abundant, even overflowing health, together with that which serves to 
preserve it: war, adventure, hunting, dancing, war games, and in
general all that involves vigorous, free, joyful activity...The truly 
great haters in world history have always been priests; likewise the 
most ingenuous haters: other kinds of spirit hardly come into
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consideration when compared with the spirit of priestly vengefulness."9
So we are brought to bear with a politically charged reversal 
of values, and indeed it works: we note that by the middle
ages, the Roman Catholic Church had replaced the Holy Roman 
Empire as the world's most powerful institution. A priestly 
aristocracy had emerged to replace the warrior aristocracy; 
and it prevailed due to cunning. To borrow Nietzsche's 
metaphor, the bird of prey was made to feel bad for 
slaughtering the innocent lamb.
An important side note: Nietzsche feels that this reversion
was a calculated manifestation of the will turning against 
life . The knightly-aristocratic values affirmed the 
physicality, the struggle, of existence. The new order of 
values, where human dignity, peace, passivity, dominate as 
proper values, represents a turning of the will against the 
physical towards the "spiritual", the "moral". Certainly, 
man becomes interesting, but he is irreparably altered to the 
point where reflection and repentance, benevolence and 
generosity can not now be scrutinized as dangerous or anti­
human. These priestly values have actually become man; the 
inner sense, the capacity to do evil and to feel bad about 
it, slowly becomes inseparable from our political and social 
modes of existence.
Nietzsche intimates that the aforementioned reversal of 
values, born of ressentiment (the low-minded will turning
9 Ibid, p. 32-33.
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against life), grants to man the possibility for 
internalizing guilt. The soul is judged by God according to 
its purity, its goodness and its justness. Nietzsche notes 
that purity originated as a ritualistic, body oriented 
practice akin to that of physical cleanliness; with the sense 
of a spiritual interiority also comes an internalization of 
purity; man is now accountable for being spiritually pure. 
Once internal and external purity are equated, so also do we 
equate unjust acts and sexual frivolity with rotten meat and 
physical uncleanliness; as one is bad for the body, so the 
other is decadent for the soul.
This God which serves as a monitoring device for the moral 
sphere in man is the hyperbolic example of guilt-ridden 
consciousness. God is all-powerful, the word of law and the 
force of justice; when Jesus, the son of God, died for our 
sins, we were not saved by divine providence; we were 
infected with the most pervasive and unconquerable guilt that 
mankind has ever known. The son of God has to die to save us 
from our deplorable state of sinfulness, and we are suddenly 
aware that we are morally regrettable. Humanity is weak, 
unable to overcome its basest desires, and thus we require, 
for spiritual healing, the death of the highest power 
hitherto. This is the mark of repentance; we are invested 
with a sense of guilt upon which we can never make good, a 
permanent, unconquerable moral lack. The only thing that can 
fill our spiritual lacunae is the death of the holiest being 
conceivable. The ascetic mentality feels spiritually vacuous
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and permanently guilty. Obviously, as we saw above with the 
Greeks, gods do not have to be the constant reminders of 
existential guilt; they do not need to serve only a profound 
neurosis. Nietzsche, in his most telling and acute 
recognition of cultural anxiety, notes that the priestly 
mentality and the moral sphere as monitored by the Christian 
God are symptoms of mental sickness in the Western mind. The 
social unconscious is neurotic.
In the final section of On the Genealogy of Morals ,
Nietzsche touches upon the Protestant work ethic. He 
analyzes the industrious attitudes that emerged from dwelling 
in the shadow of a condition of guilt. We begin to believe 
that hard work and prosperity are in fact God's plan, ann 
Nietzsche notes that work in fact takes the mind far from its 
meditation upon life's seeming lack of purpose. He notes 
that like sheep, mindless ascetics gather into a herd and 
thereby acquire a diluted sense of strength. It sounds as 
though the stage is set for mercantilism and, eventually, 
capitalism. But to link the encroachment of capitalism to a 
very general discussion of a value-laden social framework is 
without question to underestimate the pervasiveness of the 
contemporary world order. I will touch upon the forces and 
connections that lend to the social sector the possibility 
for a worker based economic and political system in Line 
Three.
As a parting shot, it should be noted that until the time of
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Constantine (roughly 300 A.D.), Christianity had no real 
purchase among the powerful. Between the time of Paul (who 
effectually paved the way for an intellectual revolt in 
morality) and Freud, the self became a privatized 
interiority. We know that Socrates talked of knowledge of 
the self as a virtuous and important acquisition; but he 
understood the self as inextricably linked to the activities 
and habits that it took up with. Although we rarely speak of 
God as judge anymore, we have little trouble making the 
analogical jump from the exterior legislation imposed by the 
figurehead of God to the internalization of the legislative 
machines monitored by the figurehead Man; our courtrooms 
fester with remnants of the priestly mentality ("Who is 
responsible for this illicit act?") and the legal system 
teams up with the psychologists in order to determine, 
according to "mental state", where and how guilt is to be 
ascertained ("Can she be held legally responsible for her 
actions? Is she sane or not?").
So it remains that while we do not pander to God any longer 
for forgiveness, nor pay indulgences to the church for sins 
committed, we still operate according to a certain 
hierarchical and bipolar model of the individual left over 
from the sickly mentality of the priestly class. We have not 
abandoned the notion that man's actions are the physical 
manifestations of his inner desire to act a certain way, his 
lack of self-restraint, etc.
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It would be premature, however, to assume that we can mount a 
critique of capitalist culture and psycho-speak ideology from 
a few assumptions about shifting historical values. In 
section three of this essay, I will take up with Foucault and 
his analysis of modern institutions as a way of coming to 
terms with value-patterns in a social rubric inundated with 
accelerated technological advancements and barren of the 
assuredness provided by a super-terrestrial, authoritarian 
Deity. Both Foucault and Deleuze argue that certain 
scientific, legislative, and psychological patterns have 
allowed for a renunciation of the guilty consciousness 
attributable to an inner moral sphere but have simultaneously 
allowed it to be replaced by an infinitely more complicated 
and pervasive figurehead of Man; thus the plague of humanism 
(the belief that man holds in himself and his own innate 
goodness) will be addressed below in Lines Three and Four.
But first, I should like to approach this "myth of the 
interior" from a more contemporary perspective, that of 
Freudian Psychoanalysis. Line Two outlines the connections 
between Nietzschean suggestions regarding the role of 
psychology in cultural repression and the explicit attack on 
psychoanalysis as a domesticating avatar of Fascism brought 
out in Anti-Oedipus.
LINE TWO: CULTURAL OEDIPALIZATION
"I continue to hear messages in the environment... I'm angry over the 
fact that these messages seem to occur everywhere...I can only hope to 
respond imaginatively and appropriately to the significance contained 
herein...In the daytime I become someone else...Only as I wait for sleep 
do I perceive reality as a tangible presence. There is no substance in 
my waking life, no truth...I have been having thoughts I can't 
decipher...Does this make my perception of reality more thorough? is it 
significant that I wish to retain my private conception of reality?..."1
Edward, a schizophrenic
Anti-Oedipal thought is a thinking outside, a thinking 
outside of belonging. Why must we think the subject? Why 
are we indebted to the history which presents, in direct and 
precedented mannerisms, our most intricate and inescapable 
distractions and problematics? It is not the over-coming of 
the Platonic Ideal which will a t  last grant philosophy its 
true place. For we have, always and everywhere, misplaced, 
displaced, and overturned the Platonic. We have no enemy in 
the history of thought; nor do we have a friend. It is 
thinking itself which has become null, domesticated. No one 
knows this more than Deleuze. We are in a position, at the 
end of the twentieth century, to once again begin again. We 
have never had an Objective; thought was never dialectical or 
progressive. The acceleration towards truth is a fantastical 
nightmare, a life-negating manifestation of the repression of 
desire* A culture of religious, political, and theoretical 
neuroses; thus we staple our blood-mark onto the organism of 
history. All possible avenues of acceleration, of speed and 
depth and cunning have been marked off and delineated; civil
1 Michael Robbins, Experiences of Schizophrenia ( New York: The Guilford Press, 1993) p.86.
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thinking is stagnant. Nietzsche gives us away, the ultimate 
psychologist. A snide and sophisticated bastard he is, 
revealing the sated truth of modernity. We strive forward in 
our wretched and docile bliss, appeasing ourselves and our 
neurotic ends with over-production and easily inhabitable 
psycho-speak. The new god is upon us; let us pray that we 
not suffocate under the weight of his mediocrity.
That is what lies before us; wasteland, the visibility of the 
truant, the absent, the loss of possibility for thought. But 
escape is a myth; culture represses, owns, controls, 
formulates the there, the how, the when. We eat and breathe 
our own waste, only to expel and regurgitate the bile of 
humanity in a new and interesting form. We then proceed to 
feast again. Time has called us here, and we must pay heed; 
a new order is upon us, the call of thinking beckons; rancid 
passivity and appeals to authority be gone; the time of 
thinking is at hand. Stop. Listen. It can be heard and 
realized.
The attitude of the penitent: Who cares? A sour disposition
is all that will penetrate the fog* We see the intoxication 
of the multiple. Not the Last Man; not even the Ubermensch . 
We seek to lose our foundation, thereby we are saved. The 
history of philosophy has been an engagement with the history 
of philosophy. Thought comes neatly packaged and 
diametrically opposed to life; we suck our own blood, eat our 
own fat, and drink from the stagnant pool of our own
39
recesses. Thinking knows its bounds; how did this ever come 
to be the case?
It plays out as such: Nietzsche has done a fine thing in
attempting to loose us from our repressed, prudish, eclectic 
cultural stigmas, and much of modern thought is gravely 
indebted to him for this. In Anti-Oedipus , Deleuze and 
Guattari ride Nietzsche through the bowels of psychoanalysis 
in order to exceed forms of domesticating fascism, to expose 
ours as a culture of repression and neurosis. They attribute 
much of our complex social dysfunction to the repression of 
elements of desire found in contemporary psychoanalytic 
thought; residuals of certain conceptions of the self which 
suppress and direct our thinking about ourselves are nothing 
more than stains on the psychoanalyst's couch.
One wants to extol the impact of the death of God upon modern 
man; what new existential roles are we to adopt in light of 
the absence of a foundation? In the process of becoming- 
Gods, are we in fact limited by residuals of moral and 
metaphysical values, what Deleuze, in Nietzsche and 
Philosophy, has christened "avatars of the dialectic"? The 
project of Anti-Oedipus , in fact the entirety of the work 
set forth by Deleuze and Guattari, might be assessed simply 
as an attempt to uncover any and all remaining embodiments of 
repressive, limiting thought in order to give them a proper 
burial.
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What begins in Nietzsche and is to some extent realized with 
Deleuze is a new and unconventional means of construing the 
"self"; if the self is understood as multiplicities which 
participate always and everywhere in desiring-production, as 
Deleuze and Guattari assert, then we are at a point in 
history where it becomes possible to inaugurate, map and 
explore a selfless self . Not even; we are purely selfless; 
the site of the self is vacant, with the absence of any 
autonomous core, the self can only be employed through a 
radical phenomenology of desire, a very physical and 
liberated philosophy of will; this was Nietzsche's ephemeral 
dream.
But most importantly, we are now confronted with a new way of 
thinking desire: without the subject, it is not possible to 
situate desire as a lack. Desire can only be seen as a lack 
when it is repressed under totalizing categories such as 
"self", "sanity", "whole", "normal" and "ego"; it can only be 
seen as a lack once it has been molded into that which it is 
not. "I am me and not you, I am I and want you". This is 
the crux of the matter. Nietzsche's relentless attempts to 
free thinking from crushing guilt complexes and definitive 
individual categorizations are the footholds of Anti-Oedipal 
schizo-analysis; it is only through the rigorous 
deconstruction of all totalities (God, state, mommy, daddy, 
me) that desire can be seen for what it truly is: Expression
and art, overflow and energy. This leads to a stark 
confrontation between psychoanalysis and schizoanalysis. The
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Deleuzian/Guattarian conception of desire mimics and 
modulates Nietzsche's will ; this will be the starting point, 
our plane of departure into the nebulous of anti-oedipal 
desire, an anti-metaphysic of will. As the will is tamed 
and forced to reflectively understand itself in constant 
reference to a "moral sphere" by an historically impotent 
priestly mentality, so desire is domesticated and instilled 
as a lack by the contemporary psychoanalytic church. We 
cannot imagine desire as productive, as anything but divested 
from its object.
In the Genealogy , Nietzsche plays shrink. The curtain 
rises, and the stage reveals a consciousness in chains, 
thought in bondage. We are guiltyI There is no need to 
recite our crimes, but we shall, because it makes us feel 
better: we have executed the son of God, and we have done so 
because we ourselves are not worthy of his goodness. We had 
need of redemption, and this we achieved, though only at a 
price higher than any of us can afford. I do not want this 
guilt; thus speaks the agnostic (more on this point below). 
But there is good news: As a means of covering up this
heinous crime, some of the more ingenious among us set out to 
murder Dad; thus we killed the son and the father. This last 
deed was a whopper; we have not yet begun to come to terms 
with it. The death of God reveals the absence of all sense 
of security; the "bare manifold" has never looked more bare. 
But the murder of God frees us from all forms of existential 
guilt...there is now no hierarchy, no stipulative rule for
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the correct procession of human affairs: We are free. Let us
set to paint the canvas in all the fantastical colors of 
springtime, let us ride our ideas into the sun, let us "give 
birth to a dancing star"...
Unfortunately, as we all-too-clearly realize, the impact of 
this superb, indeed superior, deed has not and perhaps will 
not be fully assessed. For Dad is not really dead; 
vanquished, perhaps, from the realm of intellectual theology, 
and even from a majority of our metaphysical models; but Dad 
is tricky, shifty, and he crops up again and again in forms 
that are hard to recognize, even harder to pinpoint for 
extermination; He forms the backbone of psychoanalysis, the 
crux of deontological ethics; he appears, strangely enough, 
as us, as what we think we are, as the "self"; he infiltrates 
the life-force and modifies thinking, he tames us, 
domesticates us, and makes us afraid of our own desires; as 
if our desires could belong to us in the first place. He is 
God, Dad, Oedipus, Me, State, Other, (your name here). 
Deleuze, speaking of the Dialectic and the insidious manner 
by which it creeps into twentieth century humanist thought, 
notes the "incapacity of this philosophy to end in anything 
but the ego, man, or phantasms of the human".2
"What a mistake it was to have ever said the id. Everywhere 
it is machines.. History of Moralization and
2 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson ( New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1983) p. 162.
3 Anti-Oedipus , p. 1.
43
Dismoralizatiom Evolution of the antithesis ego/non-ego:
"It seems evident that the value of the single ego could lie 
only in relating itself to the tremendous "non-ego", being 
subject to it and existing for its sake". Proceeding on: 
"[I]n what actions does man affirm himself most strongly? 
Around these (sexuality, avarice, lust to rule, cruelty, 
etc.) prohibition, hatred, and contempt were heaped: one 
believed there were unselfish drives, one condemned all the 
selfish ones, one demanded the unselfish".4 Both Nietzsche 
and Deleuze acknowledge that the starting point of repression 
is the subject. Without it, responsibility cannot be affixed 
to action, "moral choice" cannot be a structure of 
consciousness/unconsciousness, and there can quite literally 
be no such thing as "repressed", "unhealthy", or otherwise 
immoral desires, i.e. manifestations of the will. Thinking 
stops abruptly at the inauguration of the subject; it breaks 
down right at the border of the self . We ask how this could 
be the case; the traditional paradox, roughly stated, is as 
follows: The self (subject, individual) is the origin, 
protector, and expressive vessel for thought; there is no 
thought without the thinking self. Thus it is not possible, 
probable, nor even theoretically practical to attempt to 
"think" the subject away, to eliminate its dictatorial 
status.
But in order to answer this tricky construction of the 
"subject-as-thinker", we must do some backtracking. In On
4 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Waiter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale ( New York:
Random House, Inc. 1967) p. 414.
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The Genealogy of Morals , Nietzsche comments upon the abusive 
structure of the "moral self". Nietzsche notes how 
interesting man became once a soul was attributed to him; 
suddenly a man of depth, of great spiritual complexity; a man 
with the capacity to do evil , and a consciousness with the 
capacity to feel bad about it.5 The metaphysical tendency 
to deny the physical or phenomenal in lieu of a "higher" 
abstract Purity had struck at the core of our existence; the 
body, the physical, the will, was subjugated to the soul, 
thereby erecting a dialectical antithesis at the level of the 
individual from which we are still wont to escape. Here the 
reactive forces triumph, for the framework of reality 
experiences an inversion. Indeed the whole grid of knowledge 
shifts: "What do I need and how will I get it?" becomes "Are 
my actions in accordance with the Rule of Law?" and "What can 
I know absolutely?" The unchanging, absolute world of which 
we only experience "decadent" parts can be known by the 
eternal soul, for which our physical bodies are only fleshy 
containers. Our bodies will pass, our souls will move on; 
death is not for us. But it remains that we are indeed 
physical (therefore imperfect, decadent, weak, inferior).
What saving grace is there for us, a civilization of 
failures; how are we to be redeemed when we fall victim to 
the temptations of the flesh, the beckonings of the earth?
The death of the most high, the eternally righteous; sent to 
lead us down the path to salvation, we murder him. His blood
5 On the Genealogy of Morals, p. 33.
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is substituted for our sins. We are indeed responsible at 
the moral level for all the sins we commit; our 
transgressions so evil that the holiest of holies, 
righteousness par excellence, must be slain by our own 
hands; and now out with the metaphors: We are washed in the
blood (ughi), redeemed by the lamb, saved by amazing grace 
and divine providence. We are so bad that we cannot be 
reconciled even to ourselves without sacrificing the epitome 
of goodness. Thus we are indebted, from the beginning. 
Existential guilt has never been more concrete: "The son of 
God was crucified so that your puny pathetic life could have 
some stitch of meaning". The cries of the blasphemous: "I do 
not want the burden of the death of God on my souli" It is 
an all-encompassing, permanent, unconquerable guilt, a debt 
of guilt which one can never make good on. For the goodness 
and purity of God is now evident, evident only in contrast to 
the weakness, banality, and degradation of humanity.
Remember, Nietzsche notes that while Greek cultures used 
their Gods to relieve them of guilt (Homeric heroes blamed 
the gods for misfortune and gave themselves credit for all of 
their accomplishments, i.e. Odysseus), we have used ours to 
shower us with guilt; we are subject to the inferiority of 
the physical and the immorality of unhealthy desires, and the 
absolute goodness of our progenitor constantly reminds us of 
this, our heavy human penance (our penance for being human). 
As stated in Line One, using gods to relieve guilt rather 
than using them to instill guilt is psychologically a 
healthier practice.
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But the interiority attributed to the human self soon begins 
to crumble, and not long after the death of God. The creator 
and protector of the soul is absent; the "moral interior" of 
the self comes under fire. Yet while the notion of an 
eternal spiritual self loses its luster, the foundations of 
consciousness are strengthened. The psychological replaces 
the theological, for example. And it is no surprise that 
after existing for centuries in a state of constant 
existential neurosis, we might look for something to 
supplement or replace the confines of a guilty conscious, now 
without focus. As Foucault notably realizes, there is a 
little bit of fascism in all of us; the desire to be 
dominated, mandated, repressed. The cause of guilt removed, 
the guilt still remains. The question then becomes; "To 
what level of organization can I now commit my 'existence' in 
order to understand myself in a comfortable hierarchy?" The 
answer: Daddy, mommy, me; the triangle of repressed desire.6
Oedipus, the new God, awakens everywhere. And the level of 
the nuclear family is not the beginning or the end of 
oedipalization: it occurs everywhere, in all activity, the
manifestations of unconscious desire here repressed, there 
contextualized, here expressed, there forbidden. "It is 
obvious that when traditional psychoanalysis explains that 
the instructor is the father, and that the colonel too is the 
father, and that the mother is nonetheless the father too, it 
reduces all of desire to a familial determination that no 
longer has anything to do with the social field actually
6 Anti-Oedipus, pp. 1-50.
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invested by the libido."7 it is the lust for the mother, 
the hatred of the father which first informs structures of 
desire; everything becoming threat, everything becoming 
other, everything becoming father, becoming Oedipal...Deleuze 
and Guattari make no mistake: Desire does not first find its 
object in the form of the separate-mother, nor does it stake 
its opposition in the guise of the father; rather the figure 
of the always-already Oedipalized paranoiac father, the 
dictatorial oppressor, establishes the rules of play for 
desire: guilt is re-routed, re-organized; it shifts from a 
guilt of transcendental proportions to a guilt of 
unconscious/libidinal proportions, but the devastating 
effects remain.
Thus the morally accountable subject is theologically 
reproached for its spiritual inferiority, and the 
psychological atomistic subject is analytically reproached 
for harboring unmentionable and unacceptable desires. Once 
again the ascetic reactivist triumphs; our condition remains 
one of unconquerable guilt. What this really amounts to is a 
harnessing of the will, in Nietzsche's terms, or an 
Oedipalizing of desire, within the framework of Anti-Oedipus. 
We attribute the will to the subject, in order to encapsulate 
it, to give it visible and relatively static bounds, and 
evaluate the condition of "want" from the vantage point of 
this subject. When Nietzsche claims that there is no such 
thing as a "will", we take him to mean that there is no will
7 Ibid., p. 62.
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for the illusory a-historical subject, there is no will which 
serves repression. The subject, as useful illusion, is 
convenient; it serves to locate and define us within a nexus 
of activities. But it has a dangerous capacity to overtake 
these subtle contextual bounds and stand forth as the final 
triumph of Absolutism. If we think of will as a particular 
element of the self, as that which originates and takes form 
within the self, then we are not thinking about will. Is it 
really the case that "I" control "my" will? Not at all; one 
will overtakes and dominates another; "I" am nothing but a 
convenient and locutionary residue of a conflict of wills.
will is a transitional process, a life-dynamic, not a 
"within", not a manifestation of the "interior", of 
consciousness. Will is expressive, not repressive; it 
reaches out and promotes change; Nietzsche loves change. 
Change for change's sake, never for the utilitarian good and 
never for the betterment of the socius, simply for the sake 
of differentiation. There is never a thesis, an antithesis, 
or a synthesis, for each of these is many, multiple, a 
complexity of values, conditions, stimuli, etc. We never 
evolve, we are always becoming. Will never wants, it always 
exceeds. Will is the force of flux which abets becoming; and 
becoming is a chaotic tendency towards difference. Becoming 
is without end, without object. We don't "become older" or 
"become author" in the sense of a teleological fixed end; 
becoming is process, not product, what we were before is 
still ahead of us and what we will be is already gone; change
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for change's sake. Our highest values are simply 
manifestations of will. Truth is "the will to be master over 
the multiplicity of sensations."8
Desire has traditional value as a lack; it seeks what it is 
not or does not have. Thus the first realization by the 
child that the mother is separate, detached, other, is 
accompanied by the desire to re-possess the mbther/other, to 
once again be unified with her. Of course the father steps 
in here and re-affirms the element of difference, smashing 
the crux of identity into the subject-box. "I am I and not 
my mother"; only here, after this fundamental degree of 
separation, is desire given any credence; subject desires 
object. Desire can therefore only come after the fact, only 
come too late, and it is always perverse. Anti-Oedipus 
seeks a new formulation of desire, one which is not dependent 
upon the subject for context. "Desire does not lack 
anything; it does not lack its object. It is, rather, the 
subject that is missing in desire, or desire that lacks a 
fixed subject; there is no fixed subject unless there is 
repression".9 That the unconscious is not productive but 
expressive; that it only dabbles in representation, in 
expressing its own repressed tendencies; this is the meager 
and impotent picture of the unconscious given to us by the 
psychoanalyst. What would it mean to say that desire is 
productive, that it is a creative force? If desire first
8 The Will to Power, Section 517.
9 Anti-Oedipus, p.26.
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establishes its object as other, and then determines that 
there is a capacity for union or rejoinder therewith, then 
desire is reactive . It reacts to oppositional stimuli.
This is not the picture of desire we obtain when we vanquish 
the subject. Desire now becomes active, productive? it 
"plugs-in" everywhere, forming and breaking apart machines of 
desire-production.
Let us think about this another way. Nietzsche went mad; we 
should not make too much of this. Nietzsche does not care 
for truth; Is there an "I"? Lets say no; what new thoughts 
can we think, what can we now do? Encapsulating structures 
limit the flight of thinking, do not allow thinking to play, 
to progress, to create. Rather, boundaries for thought are 
erected at the site of the subject, of truth, of God, of 
history. Thinking occurs within the confines of such 
limiting structures, and yet we persuade ourselves that 
thinking is free, that it knows no bounds; we say things 
like: "Anything is logically possible, just not empirically
provable". This is a gross subordination of thinking to its 
own creations; thought is confined to think the subject, to 
think in hierarchies and orders, to establish categories for 
understanding and divisions between objects. The self is 
related in such and such a way to the state, the apple is 
related in such and such a way to the tree, etc. We think 
only in terms of identity and difference, of unity of Being 
and separation of beings. We never have thought and now 
cannot think in multiplicities. Thought cannot be creative
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because it knows its bounds, it cannot be artistic because it 
knows only the ancient medium of metaphysics.
But what does a psychological ordering give us? A standard. 
Yet another standard for evaluation. What some might call a 
healthy mentality can now be witnessed as a severe criterion 
for normalcy. The neurotic is so because of an early absence 
of affection; the neurotic is a lack. The obsessive is so 
because she has never compensated for her lack of a penis; 
the obsessive is a lack. The schizophrenic is so 
because,..ah, wait. The schizophrenic is an enigma; there is 
no cause for such a severe dysfunction. Schizophrenia has 
not yet fully become an object of knowledge. It is a call 
for thinking which cannot yet be answered.
Yet we have already answered it; the answer is to Oedipalize. 
We know what "normal" is; we know that the schizo is not. 
Through the use of drugs and within the context of 
psychoanalysis we can attempt to "cure" him/her. Again the 
fixed subject rears its ugly head; there is a definitive mark 
( the mentally stable self, the "I" which understands itself 
as such ) for which to aim. The human condition is one of 
certain forms of understanding and not of other forms. The 
schizophrenic is not merely different; we construe the schizo 
as sick at the basest level. There is no "I" for many 
schizophrenics; there are pluralities and variable "Is", 
shifting and slipping "Is" which transgress the boundaries of 
any limiting sphere. Thus the first task of the analyst is
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to instill the "I", to fix identity. It is not the schizo 
who admits to a condition of abnormality (which hints at a 
condition of inferiority). Or rather, it may be the schizo 
who admits this condition, but only when the construction of 
identity fails, only after the shrink has confronted the 
schizo as other, as incapable of handling "reality". This 
brings up two points.
First, that this shrink no longer need be a licensed 
practitioner of psychology; the shrink-image is now 
internalized ; we have little or no need of psychologists to 
confirm our idiosyncracies. We have internalized the 
formula, and are now perfectly capable of mentally policing 
ourselves. Thus we all know the basic problem of 
schizophrenia; there is no fixed "I" there. What we fail to 
account for is that there is no fixed "I" anywhere; we easily 
mask our own schizophrenia with tightly spun pronouns and 
traditional locutions. Non-schizophrenics create the only 
possible means of diagnosing schizophrenia.
Second, if a schizophrenic is incapable of handling reality, 
it is only a reality that he or she cannot work within. 
Nietzsche is the first to recognize that reality itself is a 
useful illusion, born of our deepest values and acquisitions 
of forms of knowledge. Contemporary schizophrenics cannot 
assimilate with contemporary reality; that is all. 
Schizophrenics cannot succeed at higher education because 
educational boundaries are determined within the horizon of
53
values which they do not possess. Schizophrenics cannot be 
integral members of the state because the state begins with 
the presupposition of the individual; it builds its order 
around the rights or duties or activities of the "subject"; 
the schizo has abandoned the subject, and with it the State.
Deleuze and Guattari advocate schizo-analysis; what is 
interesting about such an attempt to think outside is that 
the schizophrenic is granted a privileged position; the 
schizophrenic survives as hero. This point deserves to be 
considered. (For a detailed account of the importance of 
schizophrenia for Anti-Oedipal political theory, see Line 
Five. For an explication of the methodology of Anti-Oedipal 
thought, refer to the conclusion).
It is a madman who brings us the news of the death of God.i° 
It is the schizophrenic who brings us the news of the death 
of Oedipus. In both cases the voice of iconoclasm comes from 
without, has always already exceeded the perimeter. He who 
stands outside always gains the best perspective. The camel, 
lion and child overflow from the excesses of madness; not as 
separate entities, not as a succession of evolutionary 
metamorphoses, but all at once, as one, together. Production 
is the core activity of unrepressed desire. What is it that 
the schizophrenic will wants? What it is free for? This is 
what Anti-Oedipus is about, bottom line. Schizoanalysis 
would be a revolution of the psyche, a revolution which makes
10 The Portable Nietzsche, pp. 95-6.
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possible entirely new spheres of thought and thought- 
production. For thought is a very material, realistic 
production process. Always extending its field, always 
flittering about construing and re-construing the world. 
Thinking does more than this; it invents the world, changes 
the world, makes worldliness possible.
So we accost psychoanalysis: "Your frantic Oedipalization of
the whole psychical field has deftly bound the imagination; 
thinking can not create or employ or produce, it can only 
think the structure: again, thinking knows its bounds".
What schizoanalysis seeks is to cast off the self; there is 
no self, no moral agent, no neurotic son or daughter, no 
illegitimate sexual tendencies, no Father. To lose the 
Father is to lose the self; to be free for production, for 
plugging-in .
In Thus Spake Zarathrustra, Nietzsche recounts the Three 
Metamorphoses of the spirit.n Becoming is a lived 
condition; it is the process of always and everywhere 
overcoming, never being sated, ever intoxicated and never 
patient. It is in fact the life condition of the overman.
But becoming should never be confused with a teleological 
process, for it is precisely in this construction of the 
becoming process that Nietzsche falls prey to the reformist. 
Becoming is not a striving-for, but a revolutionary activity 
which despises any culmination. A flux. The camel is the
11 Ibid., pp. 137-140.
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burdened spirit; this stage is nothing new to any thinking 
person, indeed, it is the birthplace of philosophy. This 
stage is thoughtful and ruminative; it takes into account the 
existential situation from which it arises. The camel is the 
manifestation of dissatisfied oedipalization; its trudge 
into the dessert is heavily burdened by State-God-Mommy- 
Daddy-Me. It knows this burden all-too-well; for all of its 
friends are camels. And revolution is only successful when 
one knows one's enemies.
The lion wants to be a nomad but is not. A reckless 
revolutionary, he steps into the manifold with fire-red eyes 
and intent to do harm. The dragon cowers; "thou shalt" is 
overturned by "I will". The lion speaks the sacred No; an 
entire history is shedded, renounced, discarded at the 
instant of this utterance. The lion says No to Oedipus, who 
shudders in disbelief; No to himself, to the abysmal membrane 
of consciousness shrouded in the iron bars of normalization; 
and No to the Father, who has inserted his erect monument 
into the state, into the church, into the family, into Mommy, 
into the very tenets of desire; all desire is beaten back by 
the Father's erection. To this acrid old fool the lion says 
No, and thereby sparks the revolution. Thereby he becomes 
free.
But this freedom is wildly incompetent; it does not know 
itself, it does not know its artifice. This freedom must be 
channeled into productiive/creative energies; it is not enough
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to be free-from; Nietzsche requires us to justify this 
freedom by taking advantage of all that it affords. Deleuze 
and Guattari would have us do the same. Are we free from 
Oedipus, free to adopt an even more sinister model of 
restraint, of repression? What will the self now become that 
it has lost itself? The death of God brought an onslaught of 
chaos, which was resolved by the instantiation of newer, more 
subtle, but equally benign deities. And it happened before 
most of us knew that God had died. We can pray the same does 
not happen with the collapse of Oedipus. The child steps up 
to the plate.
The child represents the creative Yes-saying, the limitless 
loss of stale tradition and festering values coupled with the 
loss of the self; an expressive force, free from all, free 
for all. The child can construct and work, can plug in 
everywhere and explore vast terrains. The child is naive; it 
lacks the necessity of constraint and is puzzled by the 
furious exaltations of all fellows. The child is the very 
possibility for revolution at the deepest level; the child is 
the paradigm for the loss of the individual, the loss of 
control and restraint; the child feeds on autonomy and shits 
personae; it turns us back upon ourselves in an arbitrary 
assault on the senses; the child must needs be 
institutionalized. The child is a madman. For only the 
madman and the child have been loosed from the history of 
repression so completely that a re-pression is not possible; 
only the schizophrenic and the naive child stand beyond
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Oedipus, shirk Oedipus in all his insidious forms. 
Consequently it happens that children and lunatics are 
subjected to intentional Oedipalization; we force the stout 
Oedipus down the throat of the hapless schizo, frantically 
trying to re-associate identity, to organize all spheres of 
consciousness around the centralizing Oedipal shaft.
Edward only feels Oedipalized at night; "In the daytime I 
become someone else...Only as I wait for sleep do I perceive 
reality as a tangible presence. There is no substance in my 
waking life, no truth...". Edward does not want to "perceive 
reality as a tangible presence", or if he does it is only 
because he has been told for so long that he should. The 
schizophrenic sees no substance, no truth to waking life; 
waking life is a myriad of rich deceptions. Edward simply 
wants to play; he receives messages from outer space and from 
nature, from trees and rocks and birds and fish; always from 
the exterior, always from outside, never from within. Edward 
becomes someone else during the day; he walks into and out of 
personae, experiencing shifting reality in a very material, 
very real way. Yet he retains his own private conception of 
reality; why? Out of convenience, nothing more. "Also 
because its nice to talk like everybody else, to say the sun 
rises, when everybody knows its only a manner of speaking.
To reach, not the point where one no longer says I, but the 
point where it is no longer of any importance whether one 
says I".12
12 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari Capitalism and Schizophrenia: A Thousand Plateaus , vol. 2, trans.
Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987) p. 3.
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Nietzsche pleads with us to listen to the madman, to hear his 
words and reflect upon their importance. There is prophecy 
in madness, there is freedom in madness. Deleuze and 
Guattari are after this freedom, this child who playfully 
lurks behind the guise of insanity. Our society Oedipalizes 
the child and incarcerates the schizophrenic, for in the 
matrix where permission still matters, it cannot be permitted 
to step so far away from the center, or to go further and 
disregard the center altogether. Oedipalization is 
normalization, structured obedience to the state, fascism at 
the conscious level; thus the madman is a heretic, the child 
simple and useless. And there is little doubt that if the 
death of Oedipus is in any way as magnificent as the death of 
God, it will not be long before the footfalls of a new idol 
are heard just beyond the vale, the shadows of another 
immanent figure-head darkening the horizon. The lesson is 
there, and begging to be learned; let us be lunatics and 
children, let us not go gently under; let us go kicking and 
screaming and crying and laughing into the great beyond; 
beyond the Savior, beyond the Father, beyond state philosophy 
and metaphysical orders. Let us madly go where no man can 
go...beyond Man...beyond Oedipus.
LINE THREE: DISCIPLINE AND CONTROL
It is imperative to note that the discussion of Nietzsche 
offered up should serve only as a way of historically 
orienting and elaborating the capacity for locating ourselves 
morally and socially., this depth, our interiority. What 
slips in and how it influences the whole of the socius will 
be the vector of this line; Nietzsche is useful only as a 
powerful way to open a discussion of the interiority of the 
self. We should also note that this interiority, for all 
thinkers involved, is nothing more than a tool of power . In 
the end, the major theoretical task will be to force this 
interiority out, to extinguish lack altogether, and to make 
everything productive.
The "structure" of the interior is in a state of flux; this 
is because it has no claim to ontological grounding and 
exists solely as convention; it remains a convenient and 
productive means of organizing people. I have suggested that 
one cannot become guilty unless one takes some stock in the 
gravity of the interior; the interior has to matter at the 
social level in order for it to serve its organizational 
function. With Nietzsche, the "capacity" for internalization 
is wrought out; this capacity is man's interiority. Man was 
somehow made to internalize guilt, and this guilty 
consciousness enabled a revolution in morality, historically 
speaking. We recognize the vacant site that the Divine once 
occupied and note that we still feel guilty; the judge is
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gone, but the sentence remains. It will be suggested in this 
chapter, and throughout the rest of the essay, that the judge 
is certainly not gone, that whatever stands as the impetus 
for guilt continuously metamorphosizes into new, insidious, 
and interesting forms. And it is for this reason that simply 
uncovering the idol of the day and recognizing it as such 
will never be enough; the true militant recognizes that he 
cannot sit still, ever.
Before the topic of anarchy can be broached, we must assess 
why it is necessary in the first place. Anarchy is the 
absence of State; no rule, no law, no subservient subjects. 
The first anarchists saw in the State the same totalitarian 
and repressive tendencies that were represented in the 
figurehead of God; thus Bakunin asserts that "[i]f God really 
existed it would be necessary to abolish him." The State 
really does exist; and we shall see that it cannot help but 
be repressive. But under State regimes, especially modern or 
capitalist state regimes, the enemy is decentralized and 
cannot be assessed as merely the "oppressor"; one of the 
fatal flaws of Marxism is that it organizes itself against an 
enemy that is all too easily delineated; it thinks it is 
fighting an organization, when it is really taking on the 
entire productive surface of the social field, in order to 
assess the differences, then, between the instantiations of 
God and government, we need an intermediary. The theories of 
political power elaborated by Deleuze and Foucault are of 
central interest to us here; they both understand power to be
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utterly deterritorialized, and adopt a Nietzschean 
methodology to uncover its traces in all realms of the 
socius.
Negotiations, a series of articles and interviews by and with 
Deleuze, marks the most straightforward account of his 
political critique of repression. The book is framed by 
discussions of schizophrenia and politics; the first three 
pieces directly treat both volumes of Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia; the last two are the most concise statements 
Deleuze has given us regarding a political theory. Deleuze's 
thought is inextricably linked to an awareness of Foucault's 
work; it is for this reason that elements of both thinkers 
can and should be discussed simultaneously.
In his Letter to a Harsh Critic i , Deleuze explains his 
relationship with the history of philosophy:
"I belong to a generation, one of the last generations, that was more or 
less bludgeoned to death with the history of philosophy. The history of 
philosophy plays a patently repressive role in philosophy, it's 
philosophy's own version of the Oedipus complex: 'You can't seriously
consider saying what you yourself think until you've read this and that, 
and that on this, and this on that.' Many members of my generation 
never broke free of this; others did, by inventing their own particular 
methods and new rules, a new approach."2
He continues on to describe this new approach, his own 
engagement with his immediate intellectual history, as a type 
of sodomizing creativity:
1 Letter to a Harsh Critic in Gilles Deleuze Negotiations: 1972-1990 , trans. Martin Joughin ( New York: 
Columbia University Press 1994) pps. 3-12.
2 Ibid., pps. 5-6.
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"I suppose the main way I coped with it at the time was to see the
history of philosophy as a sort of buggery or ( it comes to the same
thing ) immaculate conception. I saw myself as taking an author from 
behind and giving him a child that would be his own offspring, yet 
monstrous. It was really important for it to be his child, because the
author had to actually say all I had him saying. But the child was
bound to be monstrous, too, because it resulted from all sorts of 
shifting, slipping, dislocations, and hidden emissions that I really 
enjoyed."3
What Deleuze appreciates about Nietzsche, the grand 
inquisitor of the moral sphere, is that he has a strange 
capacity to bugger his own readership:
"It was Nietzsche, who I read only later, who extricated me from all 
this. Because you can't just deal with him in the same sort of way. He 
gets up to all sorts of things behind your back. He gives you a 
perverse taste - certainly something Marx or Freud never gave anyone - 
for saying simple things in your own way, in affects, intensities, 
experiences, experiments. It's a strange business, speaking for 
yourself, in your own name, because it doesn't at all come with seeing 
yourself as an ego or a person or a subject. Individuals find a real 
name for themselves, rather, only through the harshest exercise in 
depersonalization, by opening themselves up to the multiplicities 
everywhere within them, to the intensities running through them, A name 
as the direct awareness of such intensive multiplicity is the opposite
of the depersonalization effected by the history of philosophy..."^
Deleuze means that the history of philosophy, as it 
represents and articulates a certain intellectual history of 
western culture, always already presents its own problems:
It gives us both preconceived problems and the conceptual 
apparatus to work them through. Logic is highly idealistic; 
it organizes the field of philosophy systematically according 
to variant causes and effects, problems and solutions, etc. 
What needs to be addressed is the assertion that the history
3 Ibid., p. 6.
4 Ibid., pps. 6-7.
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of philosophy is philosophy's own Oedipus complex. How does 
a structural framework which serves to striate and organize 
social or theoretical space come to be understood as the 
operative force which produces that space? That is, how does 
the history of philosophy come to be the re-generative power 
for contemporary thinking, how does it come to be the case 
that the "structure" of Oedipus is mistakenly taken to be the 
progenitor of the social field of desire?
"We're not saying psychoanalysis invented the Oedipus complex. It gives 
people what they want, they bring their Oedipus complex along with them. 
Psychoanalysis simply turns the complex back on itself, oedipalizes 
transference, oedipalizes the complex itself on the couch, its mucky 
little kingdom. But whether in its domestic or analytic form, the 
Oedipus complex is basically an apparatus for repressing desiring
machines, and in no sense a formation of the unconscious itself."5 
Continuing:
"Foucault said psychoanalysis remains deaf to the voice of unreason. 
Indeed, it neuroticizes everything, and through this neuroticization 
contributes not only to producing neurotics whose treatment never ends
but also psychotics in the form of anyone resisting oedipalization."5
Deleuze and Guattari assert that "a schizophrenic is someone 
who's been decoded, deterritorialized."7 They then shun all 
responsibility for their work or its implications: "As for
being responsible or irresponsible, we don't recognize these 
notions, they're for policemen and courtroom psychiatrists."8
5 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari on Anti-Oedipus in Negotiations, p. 17.
5 Ibid., p. 18.
7 Ibid., p. 23.
8 Ibid., p. 24.
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What is a "decoded" or "deterritorialized" individual? How 
does Oedipus become the model for the entirety of social 
orders, i.e., desire? How does thinking internalize its own 
linear rational history, how does the socius internalize 
Oedipus, and how does one discuss theory free from all 
responsibility? (That is, how can we say that the very 
notion of responsibility is limiting, controlling, 
repressive, in short the manifestation of "policemen and 
courtroom psychiatrists ?")
These questions will be worked out throughout the course of 
the rest of this essay. We have seen that man has the 
capacity to internalize conceptual orders and moral or 
ethical imperatives, we have further seen that this process 
of internalization writes the very code of what is 
internalized into the corpus of mankind; man understands 
himself according to what has become his "inner sphere".
This sphere is protected in many ways from the realm of 
criticism; philosophy can work with it, but cannot 
systematically unravel it. What we are after is a way to 
understand internalization politically; how is it that 
Oedipus, that the history of philosophy, that social 
institutions and judiciary operations come to light as 
fundamentally repressive ?
In Discipline and Punish , Foucault elaborates the history of 
punitive measures. His attention is captured not by the 
causal or linear links between forms of punishment over the
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course of the last few centuries, but rather with the 
differences that emerge when history is cast in a 
genealogical light; What he uncovers are various orders of 
legislature and punishment, judicial tactics and prosecution 
techniques, which both shape and organize what will come to 
be known as "Man". This concept of Man is fading from the 
modern social order, according to both Foucault and Deleuze, 
and I will deal with that issue later. I want to elaborate 
only some of the central themes of Discipline and Punish ; 
this text offers a developmental picture of individual 
political subjects internalizing social norms and codes. It 
will be shown that we already police ourselves and divine our 
own limitations and possibilities from the investment of 
politically charged disciplinary tactics and psychologically 
heirarchized orders which delineate the criteria for the 
contemporary individual.
Foucault analyzes an arbitrary assimilation of societal 
structures (including politico-punitive measures, 
psychological evaluations, and a host of other "normalizing" 
and categorizing methodologies), each driven by an underlying 
weave of power threads, that have infiltrated every micro­
area of our existence, establishing the criteria by which we 
discern the contemporary "individual". The initial stages of 
this radical shift were characterized by the birth of 
ideological punitive measures and a categorical localizing of 
individuals within society. These changes marked the onset 
of the classical age. Foucault sees this development as one
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particularly dangerous stage in the historical movements of 
power.
Foucault's book begins with a nightmarish depiction of a 
public execution. A regicide, after confessing to his crime 
and publicly asking both God and man for forgiveness, is 
literally torn to pieces upon a scaffold in front of an 
assembled audience. We cannot help but realize that what was 
commonplace practice three hundred years ago now manifests 
itself as an abomination of justice. At the order of the 
judge, the thief's hand was cut off, or the blasphemer 
executed. Power has shifted; we are subject to very 
different tactical disciplinary procedures now than we ever 
have been. Legislation is now not only less visible and 
sectionalized, it also appears in micro areas of our 
existence, as the way we govern and organize ourselves.
The punishment dealt out upon the scaffold was a politics of 
fear-tactics. Its effects were by no means far reaching, and 
it left many crimes unpunished. But its object was the 
crime; the judge measured and assessed the crime committed 
and extolled what he determined to be proper punishment upon 
the body of the condemned. Foucault claims that in such a 
setting, where the crime is looked upon as a direct offense 
upon the body of the sovereign, power is isolated, 
constricted; it is played out in one discourse and one alone. 
Power for Foucault is manifested in whatever social systems 
or institutions are dominant at any given time; it functions
under the guise of governmental order.
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But we recognize that in a such a system where the sovereign 
occupies the physical and metaphorical site of the rule of 
law, the socius cannot achieve a complex order (for example, 
a bureaucracy). In order to ensure a further reaching 
control, power had to be dispersed; divisions had to be made. 
At this juncture, Foucault describes a web of power 
discourses which permeated society, all distinct but 
intertwining, within which the individual came to light as an 
ethical, responsible subject capable of judging himself or 
being judged by others over and against certain established 
normative criteria.
Foucault contends that the age of enlightenment brought about 
fundamental changes in the power relations which constituted 
the governing aspects of society. For instance, the 
incorporation of medical analyses of the criminal into 
judicial systems (i.e., a psychological profile) enabled the 
judge to judge the criminal rather than the crime itself, and 
punishment moved from a public exhibition of physical torture 
to an economic suspension of the rights of the prisoner via 
the prison sentence. Time tables were inaugurated to ensure 
strict adherence to rules in institutions such as the 
military and the educational system, while obedience and 
active allegiance to standards were rewarded with medals, 
privileged status in the class, etc. The insane, who had 
freely walked the streets in medieval society, were shipped
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off to asylums, while the sick were removed from their 
families and treated in clinics. All of these instances 
represent for Foucault the dispersion of power into micro- 
areas of our lives. This type of dialectical ordering 
(sick/well, right/wrong, authority/individual, 
brave/cowardly) fosters a self-regulating imperative in the 
individual. It "makes each individual a case...(t)he case is 
no longer...a set of circumstances defining an act and 
capable of modifying the application of a rule; it is the 
individual as he may be described, judged, measured, compared 
with others, in his very individuality." 9 . This is what 
Foucault understands as a "disciplinary" society; a social 
Configuration in which the onset of particular political 
power-wielding machines, dispersed throughout societal 
institutions, creates the capacity for judgment of the 
individual using the criteria of a normative valuation.
The shift of emphasis upon the crime to emphasis upon the 
individual was an economic movement; if a judge assesses the 
character of the criminal and not merely his or her crime, 
this trend festers outside of the judicial establishment, or 
rather the judicial establishment extends outward into 
society, causing a regulative effect. Everyone now has the 
capacity to act as judges for themselves and others. The 
application of disciplinary measures within secured prisons, 
such as regulated time tables and a strict work regime, 
provided a means for the first time by which the criminal
9 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, trans. Alan Sheridan ( New York: Random House, Inc. 1977)
p. 191.
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could be reformed as opposed to merely punished. This 
represents for Foucault a critical moment in the development 
of repressive measures; "the moment where it became 
understood that it was more efficient and profitable in terms 
of the economy of power to place people under surveillance 
than to subject them to some exemplary penalty." i° .
Foucault is of the opinion that society utilizes a popular 
scapegoat which allows for a retrospective reinstantiation of 
certain functional ideals when the ostracized are juxtaposed 
to the normative. For example, in Madness and Civilization 
he addresses the fact that after the downsurge in occurrences 
of leprosy on the medieval Continent, there was a calculated 
grouping of the foolish, the criminally inclined, the 
hysterical, etc.; they were labeled and separated off from 
the boundaries of social order via institutions such as the 
asylum, the prison, the hospital; boundaries were drawn 
between the normal and the abnormal which established a kind 
of normative criteria. The disciplinary tactics of the 
modern prison represent a tighter grip in the development of 
the scapegoat politics. Not only do contemporary penal 
institutions confine the "criminally inclined" to 
institutions which safeguard society from them, they also 
create what are known as delinquents, thereby perpetuating 
the scapegoat class under the adopted label of reformation.
Foucault discusses the panoptic model of the prison as the
10 Michel Foucault, Prison Talk in Power /  Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-
1977 ,  ed. Colin Gordon ( New York: Pantheon Books 1980) p. 38 .
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apex of the disciplinary institution. The division of the 
cells is such that each captive is simultaneously isolated 
and perpetually watched, giving them time to think out their 
predicament under the always and constant watchful eye of the 
unnamed superior. This model extends outward into all realms 
of society. For example, hospitals develop methods by which 
patients can be isolated in their own beds while constantly 
being looked after by nurse and doctors; roll call becomes 
commonplace to ensure that schoolchildren are present in the 
classroom.
And such practices have a way of ensuring their own 
continuation, for these structures follow the criminal out 
into the work force long after he is released in various 
ways. He has only associated with criminals while 
incarcerated, hence his only friends are of a delinquent 
mindset. Upon being arrested, a black mark goes on his 
permanent record, allowing for public access to knowledge of 
his criminal past and ensuring that he will not be elevated 
to the upper tiers of society. This type of forced 
categorization is a breeding ground for recidivism. It is in 
this way that our system perpetuates itself; it labels 
delinquents and keeps them organized and categorized as such.
We should be careful about ascribing a certain lineage to the 
development of punitive and disciplinary measures; Foucault 
wants to trace power, not historicize an economy of 
legislation. But at the same time, we recognize that the
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shifts in the way society slates its internments occupy a 
unique and somewhat consequential dispersion of power 
throughout the entire social field. Initially, we have a 
system of judicial order where a large group of citizens are 
ruled by a single monarch, who embodies the function of 
government. Under this design, the means of judicial 
sovereignty meet at the scaffold; judges are appointed to 
assess criminal actions and to punish with due vengeance 
those accused of perpetrating said law in a public spectacle. 
This tyrannical form of rule cannot efficiently govern the 
entirety of the masses, however, and by pitting the governed 
populace directly against the sovereign, it provides the 
basis for revolutionary ideas and uprisings. "In these 
ceremonies...one sees the intersection of the excess of armed 
justice and the anger of the threatened people."ii . This 
ultimately ineffective system hence gave way to subtler 
tactics, which amounted to an ideological model of 
surveillance.
This model was the first to utilize the idea, discussed in 
Line One, that there was indeed an individual lurking behind 
criminal actions, and the need for punishment without torture 
or public display arose. The ideological method brought 
about such novelties as roughly assembled policing units, and 
civilians began to discern a general over-arching 
surveillance which monitored them instead of their actions. 
This played itself out into a neurotic culture where the
11 Discipline and Punish, p. 73.
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masses adopted the ideals of the rulers and slowly pinpointed 
methods by which they could utilize surveillance methods in a 
local fashion; the family and similar social structures began 
to govern themselves.
As repression became organized, institutions formed. The 
school, the hospital, the asylum, and the factory all 
benefited from these newly domesticated subjects. Within 
such institutions it was possible to extend the means of 
control present in the ideological method into micro-facets 
of the individual’s life; by incorporating rigorous time 
tables, work ethics, and the strategic organization of 
utilized space into the common agenda, schools, hospitals, 
prisons, and factories realized a true upgrade in the economy 
of control. Each subject, operating under a learned 
disciplinary mentally, could be positioned in each of these 
institutions to attain his highest possibility for output and 
production, thereby rapidly enhancing technology, politics, 
and education. It is here that power is recognized as having 
its firmest hold upon the individual. But this disciplinary 
system could also be applied by the individual herself, not 
merely by the unseen eye of the supervisor, and power had to 
insure its investment. This came about through the evolution 
of normalizing criteria and the formation of groups of 
societal illegalities.
Standardized examinations are manifestations of the way in 
which cultural values codify certain norms. "Norms" should
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be understood as criteria by which abilities and individual 
achievements can by measured. The appropriation of rank or 
status to those who perform exceptionally well in any given 
discipline, modeled after the military, ensures a 
"performance and reward" type mentality. In this way every 
individual has determinate criteria for establishing his or 
her own status in relation to the norm. At the same time, 
labels are affixed to those who perform in a non-satisfactory 
fashion with regards to the criteria, labels such as 
"delinquent", or in the school setting, "failure". This 
makes it possible for individuals to distinguish their own 
position in society. In this way, type-casts of certain 
people "prone" to illegal behavior are played out by those 
who do not fit the mold, and society finds use for the neat 
categorization of hooligans just as it had done with the more 
domesticated subjects.
It is important to note that the major element in all of the 
aforementioned models is primarily political. Foucault's 
objective is to expose the historical weave of power as a 
fundamental element of truth; better to expose this weave as 
our grounds for truth. "Power manifests itself in a discourse 
through which it arbitrarily and for its own purposes engages 
in the invention of truth."12 Since power is manifested 
strictly in the political (that is, in institutions and 
legislation, academies and courtrooms), Foucault's discussion 
of power technologies grants immediate and absolute primacy
12 Alan Megill, Prophets of Extremity, (Berkeley: University of California Press 1985) p. 192.
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to the role of politics and political theory within society; 
everything, truth not excluded, becomes part ahd parcel of a 
political machine.
Since government in general has its locus around control, in 
areas such as judicial practice, economical monitoring, and 
education and its offspring, it is not surprising that the 
vehicle of power is politics. If we concede with Foucault 
that political structures themselves are in the business of 
manufacturing efficient and domesticated individuals, then we 
forego any possibility of grounding ourselves with respect to 
absolute truth or structured existence. A shift in the 
domain of power will sufficiently re-route the social order 
along varying lines of judgment and responsibility. Indeed, 
what we consider in the present age to be the status of an 
individual (his academic aptitude, her ability to succeed at 
sporting events, etc.) represents for Foucault only an 
adherence to the rules of certain arbitrary discourses, which 
are at once molding and controlling subjectivities. 
Furthermore, the general validity of any such discourse 
remains unintelligible, for an adherence to the established 
rules of tantamount discourses (semantics, economy, science, 
etc.) will always manifest itself in the utilization of any 
criteria. It would seem, then, that we are subjugated 
victims to the rules of science and politics, language and 
economics> medicine and education. And all of these facets 
would represent the calculated assimilation of individuals 
into the service of power.
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What we have come to terms with here is a model of a 
disciplinary society. This model is what much of political 
theory, particularly revolutionary political theory, takes as 
its conception of the social field. It is assumed that, 
regardless of how and when they are constituted, there are 
individual subjects in society, that they demand certain 
things (rights-speak), and that government is in place to 
ensure that order is preserved (that the political subjects 
are satisfied with the current state of affairs, and that no 
individuals or groups are infringing upon the rights of 
others in an unjustified fashion). Note also that 
revolutionary thinking appears only when a certain group of 
individuals envision their rights to be severely overlooked 
or trampled underfoot by the governing order, the State.
This, of course, is where Marx set up his camp. But with 
Foucault's analytic of the history of certain institutions, 
something is happening in a different sphere; "individuals" 
are not merely repressed by singular oppressive discourses or 
power substantiated institutions. Rather, the individual 
becomes a product of control. The subject who can police 
himself, who understands himself as a micro version of macro 
state mentality has internalized the entire apparatus of the 
State.
Thus power is not only a repressive force but a productive 
force. While it can be asserted that power is oppressive, 
and numerous examples of abusive usury of power are 
available, we note that power is also artistic, creative, and
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in every way productive .
Power is the ultimate investor of the social field (the 
manipulating and organizing postulate which appropriates 
social apparatuses for its use: The factory, the school, the
hospital, the prison are all sites of confinement within 
which power operates). Yet it is the force and flow of the 
socius as well, not only appropriating these institutions and 
modulating their capacities for repression but also acting as 
the productive pseudo-metaphysical underlying mechanism which 
constructs not only the political subject but also writes the 
discourses of sites of confinement. Is Foucault asserting 
that power constructs its own social models and malleable 
subjects so- that it can turn around and repress whatever non­
power-serving desires emanate from the social field? That 
is, does power create and repress its own subjects? There 
is a sense in Foucault's work that he thinks this might be 
the case. In describing the organization of power in penal 
system in the nineteenth century, Foucault states that 
"procedures were being elaborated for distributing 
individuals, fixing them in space, classifying them, 
extracting from them the maximum in time and forces, training 
their bodies, coding their continuous behavior, maintaining 
them in perfect visibility, forming around them an apparatus 
of observation, registration and recording, constituting on 
them a body of knowledge that is accumulated and 
centralized. "I3 From such talk we certainly get the sense
13 Discipline and Punish, p. 231.
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that power constructs both repressed subject and oppressive 
social institutions. In his afterword to Michel Foucault: 
Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics by Hubert Dreyfuss and 
Paul Rabinow, Foucault describes his entire project: "My
objective...has been to create a history of the different 
modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made 
subjects...[t]hus it is not power, but the subject, which is 
the general theme of my research."i*
The obvious paradox, one that cannot be avoided, is that any 
survey of power's movements, any analysis of power at all, 
must necessarily take shape within the field of play 
elaborated by power itself. If power inscribes the 
organization of the social field, and if then in turn the 
model of such an apparatus is internalized, becomes man's 
interiority, and thus allows for anything at all like a 
contemporary subject to emerge, how are we to know that all 
this clap-trap regarding repressive tendencies and sites of 
confinement isn't simply another product of power?
Deleuze and Foucault both answer this seeming contradiction 
by distinguishing between knowledge (which amounts to the 
matrix of discursive social practices that indoctrinate the 
social field with habitual locutions like law, school, self, 
parents, God, history, communication) and thought (which, in 
contradistinction to knowledge, is a "line of flight" that 
announces alternatives for action and existence that are
14 Hubert Dreyfuss and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics,
(Chicago: University of Chicago P ress 1983) pps. 208-9.
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unattainable under a disciplinary model of society). "The 
difference between thought and knowledge is that knowledge is 
a set of sedimented practices that devolve upon relations of 
force, while thought is the subversion of that sedimentation 
through the process of articulating the relations of force 
that constitute it."is This does not mean that thought is an 
entirely liberating or fundamentally noble activity which 
always stands over and against sedimentary knowledge.
Indeed, thought is simply the vehicle to "new set[s] of 
beliefs that in turn will become sedimented and in need of 
new thought."is
Take, for example, a project like Marx's, which established 
itself upon the sedimented capitalistic practices of exchange 
and usury but attempted to think its way through to a new 
form of social and political activity free from the 
repressive aspects of a dichotomizing, rigid economic 
repressive structure. Variations on Communism and Socialism, 
once incorporated into the organism of the social field, 
become newly sedimentary practices which thought once again 
strives to outstrip. Marx organized his revolutionary 
philosophy around a reductionist economic theory 
(emancipation can only be thought in relation to a revolt 
against the existing structures of economic exchange in 
capitalist society). See Line Four for a discussion of 
strategic Marxist thought; here let me simply say that most
15 Todd May, The Political Philosophy of Post-Structuralist Anarchism, (University Park: The
Pennsylvania State University P ress 1994) p. 69.
16 Ibid.
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forms of Marxism, from Lenin to Althusser, operate by 
positing as a specific oppressive enemy the regime of 
capitalism. The body of Capital as it is dispersed unevenly 
throughout the realm of the socius serves as the locus of 
power and the fueling apparatus of repression.
But this apparatus cannot be strategically opposed, for it 
is, as we shall see, "deterritorialized", institutions of 
power are no longer merely separate, analyzable, structured 
organizations, as Marx thought (all oppression for Marx 
arises out of the economic tension between base and 
superstructure). They are transient, changing, indeed 
interconnecting. It cannot be feasible, using a realistic 
picture of the modern capitalist order, to imagine an "us 
against them" scenario. The organized and striated field of 
the whole social body, which is invested and fueled by wide 
market economies, institutional hierarchies and the like, is 
simply dissected semantically, and thereby the modern subject 
is constituted. We come to understand who we are, what 
sociological spaces we as individuals occupy, where and how 
we should act; in other words, we envision the whole social 
field as a massive, dilated body, a "body without organs"17 . 
It is anorganic because it is wholly smooth and without 
depth; the social field is the flat surface of desire.
Certain intensities (institutions, individuals, theories, 
etc.) appear in a sort of moldable plasticity upon this flat
17 For a  treatment of the "body without organs”, which is a  concept of central importance in Anti-Oedipus,
se e  my conclusion to this essay.
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surface. Of course, the body of the socius allows for long 
transversal movements in multiple directions (as witnessed by 
the movement of another flat body, for example the bodies of 
capital or of religious faith, intersecting on the surface of 
the socius). We can envision, by employing such a model, a 
new form of social repression, inextricably linked to the 
movement of the body of capital and extremely more insidious 
in nature than that employed by a disciplinary society: We
here begin to come to terms with the hyper-real authority of 
a Baudrillardesque "Disneyland" mentality, what Deleuze 
refers to as a control society .
In his Postscript on Control Societies 18' Deleuze offers a 
reading of Foucault which also lends insight into his own 
political theory. He distinguishes between three different 
organizations of the social field: the sovereign society,
the disciplinary society, and the control society. In 
Discipline and Punish, Foucault charted the movements which 
disassembled sovereign society and recontextualized the 
social order according to "sites of confinement", the model 
of organization for a disciplinary society.
Both thinkers set as a historical marker for the onset of the 
society of discipline the end of the classical age; the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are the representative 
time periods for such a social schemata. Deleuze describes 
disciplinary societies as such:
18 Postscript on Control Societies in Negotiations, pps. 177-182.
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"They operate by organizing major sites of confinement. Individuals are 
always going from one closed site to another, each with its own laws: 
first of all the family, then the school ('you're not at home, you 
know'), then the barracks ('you're not at school, you know'), then the 
factory, the hospital from time to time, maybe prison, the model site of 
confinement...Foucault has thoroughly analyzed the ideal behind sites of 
confinement, clearly seen in the factory: bringing everything together,
giving each thing its place, organizing time, setting up in this space­
time a force of production greater than the sum of component forces."19
What Deleuze is describing here is the model of the socius 
that we have traced in this chapter. But both Deleuze and 
Foucault contend that this disciplinary society, against 
which revolutionary thinking has mounted its attack for at 
least the past hundred years, has begun to give way. It is
being effaced and supplanted by a new form of social
organization. Deleuze calls this new form of capitalism
"control". He claims that "[w]e're in the midst of a general
breakdown of all sites of confinement - prisons, hospitals, 
factories, schools, the family. The family is an interior 
that's breaking down like all other interiors - educational, 
professional, and so on."2o interiority is fast becoming a 
myth, an antique. Everything is exterior, pushed outside, 
evident, transversal and productive. But if it is in fact 
the case that sites of confinement and discursive 
institutions are breaking down, logically political theory 
must alter its approach: Contemporary ideology can serve no
function if it takes for its conception of the social field 
an outdated model.
19 Ibid., p. 177.
20 Ibid., p. 178.
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Deleuze writes that "confinements are molds...while controls 
are a modulation. "21 What he means by this is that a site 
such as a factory, where production occurs, has its own 
territory or geography. It is physically situated in a 
certain state or province, acquires its revenue .from other 
localizable institutions (wholesalers and retailers) and 
generates specific product to which a certain value is 
affixed. These social territories which the factory and its 
products and revenues (as well as other territories such as 
family, nursery school, hospice shelters, department stores) 
occupy are the "sites" through which the disciplined citizen 
moves.
"Factories formed individuals into a body of men for the joint 
convenience of a management that could monitor each component in this 
mass, and trade unions that could mobilize mass resistance; but 
businesses are constantly introducing an inexorable rivalry presented as 
healthy competition, a wonderful motivation that sets individuals 
against one another and sets itself up in each of them, dividing each 
within himself."22
Businesses are replacing factories as workplaces. We can go 
to school at home or in cyberspace; home health care, 
improved pharmaceuticals, and "community psychiatry" are ever 
extending the boundaries of hospitals and institutions. With 
ankle-bracelets, work release, suspended sentences and parole 
officers the panoptic model of reform and discipline is past 
history. And as these interiors, these closed sites, become 
ever extended across the surface of the social field, they 
intersect with one another at certain points, creating newly
21 Ibid.
22 ibid., p. 179.
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emerging control mechanisms. When Foucault describes the 
intersection of psychology and the judicial system in order 
to elaborate how a psychological profile ever became relevant 
to punitive institutions, we sense he is glimpsing ahead 
towards the emergence of control.
Production - the creation of a product by a mechanism 
(automaton, individual, assembly line) intended for that 
purpose - is now a Third World activity. Businesses are not 
sites of production; they buy production. As Deleuze puts 
it, they are "directed towards metaproduction." What we see 
is endless administration, a bureaucratic world-wide market. 
All the "closed sites" of disciplinary societies (factory, 
family, armed forces, school, church, asylum, prison) are 
split wide open and available for use via networking, 
technological advancements, media interventions, information 
technology, cybernetics, continuing education, training and 
advancement incentives, etc. we literally watch all sites of 
confinement opened up, laid bare, dissected and reconstructed 
in new and interesting forms on television every night at 
six. "Sites" are in motion; as Deleuze says, they modulate. 
They have no territory, they are floating, ungrounded, 
malleable,and subject to drift. They are deterritorialized.
As modes of exchange shift toward a state of perpetual 
continuation (virtual spending), capital modifies itself.
"Money, perhaps, best expresses the difference between the two kinds of 
society, since discipline was always related to molded currencies 
containing gold as a numerical standard, whereas control is based on 
floating exchange rates, modulations depending on a code setting sample
84
percentages for various currencies...Disciplinary man produced energy in 
discrete amounts, while control man undulates, moving among a continuous 
range of different orbits. Surfing has taken over from all the old 
sports . "23
Capitalism, which has previously been understood as an 
economic ordering of the means of production, has mutated:
"Markets are won by taking control rather than by establishing a 
discipline, by fixing rates rather than reducing costs, by transforming 
products rather than by specializing production. Corruption here takes 
on a new power....Marketing is now the instrument of social control and 
produces the arrogant breed who are our masters. Control is short-term 
and rapidly shifting, but at the same time continuous and unbounded, 
whereas discipline was long-term, infinite, and discontinuous. A man is 
no longer a man confined but a man in debt."24
If marketing (via telecommunications, complex networking 
systems, demographic advertising which exploits every aspect 
of our lifeworld from sexual drives to penchants for game- 
show mentality trivia) is indeed the instrument for social 
control, then business has, in a very literal sense, the 
world at its fingertips.
"The key thing is that we're at the beginning of something new. In the 
prison system : the attempt to find 'alternatives' to custody, at least
for minor offenses, and the use of electronic tagging to force offenders 
to stay at home between certain hours. In the school system : forms of
continuous assessment, the impact of continuing education on schools, 
and the related move away from any research in universities, 'business' 
being brought into education at every level. In the hospital system: 
the new medicine 'without doctors or patients' that identifies potential 
cases and subjects at risk and is nothing to do with any progress 
towards individualizing treatment, which is how its presented, but is 
the substitution for individual or numbered bodies of coded 'dividual' 
matter to be controlled. In the business system: new ways of
manipulating money, products, and men, no longer channeled through the 
old factory system. This is a fairly limited range of examples, but 
enough to convey what it means to talk of institutions breaking down: 
the widespread progressive introduction of a new system of
23 ibid., p. 180.
24 ibid., p. 181.
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domination."25
Some of the most striking examples that I can think of 
concerning the onset of control strategies occur on
university campuses. I was a student at a small college in
Ohio where a series of rapes had occurred. Those students 
who lived on campus were given a general dormitory key and a 
key to their respective rooms. When this was deemed 
unsuitable for security purposes, an electronic system was 
installed. Students were issued bar coded cards which slid 
through a processing unit at the entrance to each dorm.
Those students who lived in a certain dorm had cards that 
would open the doors at all times. Those who lived in other
dorms had cards that would allow them to enter different
dormitories until eleven o'clock at night, and then their 
access was restricted. Those who lived off campus had cards 
that would work for food in the mess hall if one purchased a 
meal plan package, but would allow no access to dormitories. 
All cards were meal plan cards, but it was possible to not 
pay for campus meals, in which case access to the cafeteria 
was restricted when the user swiped his card. There were 
various meal plans as well, such as the "week-day only" plan, 
which afforded a student access to the cafeteria Monday 
through Friday but not on Saturday and Sunday, or the "lunch 
and dinner plan", which restricted the card holder from 
eating breakfast. Thus a digital configuration, read by a 
computer, served to regulate our eating habits and ensure 
that we stayed out of restricted areas.
25 ibid., p. 182.
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If we take this conception of a control society as the 
starting point for thinking about politics, old methodology 
and traditional logic are rendered impotent. I will explore 
throughout the rest of this essay some various suggestions 
regarding why revolutionary thinking is so difficult in 
relation to what Felix Guattari calls "Integrated Global 
Capitalism", and I will attempt to delineate some possible 
ways of thinking politically in such an accelerated 
environment. ± will examine, in Line Five, the idea that the 
deterritorializing fluid movements of contemporary capitalism 
resemble in many ways the disjointed anti-logic of the 
schizophrenic process, and the specific relation between 
schizophrenia and capitalism that serves as the basis for a 
Deleuzoguattarian (to borrow from Ronald Bogue) politics.
If we maintain that specific territories of the state such as 
the university, the factory, the prison, etc. have in fact 
broken down or become mobilized and have mutated, we are not 
in any way viewing this as a shift toward an open, more 
liberated social sphere. If the subject has internalized and 
in fact become a micro-instantiation of the mechanisms of 
order and discipline, and if those mechanisms have gone 
south, then the interiority of the subject, which had for so 
long served as a tool of power, is now fractured, 
externalized and spread across the field of the socius as 
well. In fact all interiors (the interior of the factory, 
the closed space of academia, the autonomy of the self) are 
now being ripped out and laid bare upon the shifting surface
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of the social field. But this is not to say that repression 
has ceased to occur at many levels, not the least of which is 
thinking. As suggested in Line Two, thinking knows its 
bounds, struggles under its own organization. When Deleuze 
christens the history of philosophy "philosophy's own Oedipus 
complex", he means that the history of philosophy operates as 
a neuroticizing and repressive force upon thinking. We need 
only look at Plato, Kant, Nietzsche to realize that 
philosophy wasn't always a pure research project. There are 
more footnotes in any ten page article in Philosophy Today 
than there are in the entirety of The Critique of Pure 
Reason.
But note that, even with a rapidly accelerated and 
deterritorialized social framework, capital still, perhaps 
more than ever, is the force and flow of market economy. We 
will see that in much the same way, Oedipus is the force and 
flow of libidinal (or "subjective") economy. Schizophrenia 
vanquishes Oedipus, and mimics and apes capitalism. And 
therefore it will be integral to the re-thinking of political 
philosophy that fuels Anti-Oedipus.
LINE FOUR: MARXISM AND ANARCHY
Anarchism is a mixed bag. In the terminology of the 
layperson, it acquires an affectation of disorderliness at 
best and complete and total lawless debauchery at worst. 
Modern anarchism has origins in political theory; it began 
with the likes of Bakunin and Proudhon for whom Marxism 
simply wasn't a viable political solution to the social 
problems inaugurated by an encroaching Capitalist framework 
in Europe in the mid 1800's. Originally a radical branch of 
socialist thought, anarchy gained its autonomy when Bakunin 
was ousted from what was later to be known as the First 
International by Marx and his followers in 1872.
I will examine some key tenets of anarchist thought via the 
proliferation and eventual downslide of Marxist thought. I 
will briefly touch upon some pivotal moments in the history 
of Marxist ideology in order to trace the changes which 
bespoke revolutionary theory from Marx to the fall of the 
Berlin Wall. I will discuss anarchy and elaborate at least 
two central problems of anarchist thought that hinder its 
political potency in light of the encroachment of societies 
of control: the anarchist view that power is always 
suppressive, never productive, and the presupposition that 
human beings have an innate and benign essence which is 
corrupted by centralized power. And, finally, I will return 
to Foucault and Deleuze, because these thinkers offer a new 
vision for anarchist thinking which forgoes these two
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problems.
Before I begin, however, I wish to make a few clarifying 
statements. Over the course of this essay I have begun to 
use the terms "capitalism" and the "socius" almost 
interchangeably. It should become apparent in this chapter 
why capitalism now no longer refers to a specifically 
economic state of affairs, but rather to the whole social 
field. One of the reasons that such terms have become 
interchangeable was discussed in the last chapter, and is 
directly caught up in the notion of a society of control.
When all localizable social, economic, political, religious, 
disciplinary sites begin to break down and infinitely mutate 
and combine with each other, the geography of social life 
becomes virtual and malleable. Capitalism no longer refers 
simply to the economic conditions of a country just as the 
"social" no longer refers simply to the public sector of 
life. The divisions between public and private, just as the 
divisions between the social, the political, and the economic 
have broken down. As Deleuze states in his introduction to 
Jacques Donzelot's brilliant work The Policing of Families, 
"it is along the same line that the points of 
authoritarianism, the points of reform, the points of 
resistance and revolution come face to face around this new 
stake, 'the social'...in several, sometimes opposing, ways 
that invest and reorganize the family, "i Thus all points 
of resistance and of authority meet to invest what will be
1 Gilles Deleuze, The Rise of the Social, Forward in Jacques Donzelot, The Policing of Families, trans.
Robert Hurley ( New York: Pantheon Books 1979).
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referred to as the social. The role that the familial model 
plays in this equation will be discussed below.
This concept of the social field is global. It refers not 
only to first world economies, but also to the goods and 
services which these economies appropriate and which make up 
the economies of third world orders. Thus the "social" and 
the locution which describes it , "capitalism", are global 
effects of the deterritorialization which reconfigures all 
lived space in a Society of control.
Marxism understands itself to have an organized and easily 
delineated enemy: the economic substructure and the
capitalists who appropriate it to repress the workers. But 
as we have seen, contemporary society is not so easily 
mapped. If we examine the history of Marxism, we find that 
it constantly and consistently re-mobilizes itself; this is 
due to the fact that it has never appropriately estimated the 
ever-extending nature of deterritorializing capitalism.
Todd May, in his work on post-structuralist anarchism, 
outlines what he calls the "failure of Marxism"2 . I will 
examine a few of his key points here because such an event as 
the end of "Marxist Ideology" puts closure on nearly two 
centuries of revolutionary thought. A few things should be 
kept in mind. First, this discussion is not centered around 
Marx, but Marxism, and it proceeds in a way which certainly
2 The Political Philosophy of Post-Structuralist Anarchism, pps. 17-44.
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does no service to the tremendously rich political and 
intellectual history that Marx's works have fostered. This 
is because what is at issue here is not the failure of a 
specific program, but some general presuppositions about the 
nature of capital and the social that much of revolutionary 
thinking takes as its foothold. Second, one does not have to 
look far to notice that aspects of Marxist ideology, from the 
dialectical conception of history to the economic analysis of 
labor, still persist not only in academia, but in grass roots 
politics, third-world revolutions, etc. Thus what is 
referred to as the failure of Marxism should be taken to mean 
the end of a legacy of political practice with global import. 
Communist parties are mostly gone, socialist organizations 
occupy only the margins of the political sphere, and with the 
demise of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, Marxist politics appear to be 
in their death throes.
May asks why this is the case. Versions or mutations of 
Marxism were implemented in many countries; why did none take 
permanent hold? The common answer, of course, is that 
Marxism has a global agenda in mind, and that it will always 
fail at the national level because of pressures from other 
non-sympathetic or Democratic economies. But May is after a 
different answer. He argues that Marxism, through all of its 
mutations, "kept reformulating itself in ways that edged ever 
closer to - but never entirely coincided with - the
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perspective embraced by anarchism."3 in order to accurately 
assess the import of the work of Deleuze and Foucault, it 
will be necessary to explore first how Marxism began to model 
itself after anarchism, and second what facets of anarchist 
thought are viable and which are outmoded or impotent.
May reminds us that when Lenin set up the three defining 
truths of Marxist politics, he set the stage for all of 
twentieth century Marxism. These three truths are as 
follows: "[t]here can be only one struggle, there can be
only one theory; there can be only one leadership."4 The 
singular struggle between the working class and capitalist 
oppression leads to a categorical analysis of theory:
"either it helps the class struggle progress toward 
revolution or it helps the bourgeoisie forestall the 
possibility of revolution and thus maintain its domination."5 
The singular leadership (a vanguard communist party) is the 
third component of Leninist strategy and assumes that the 
party is the one which both knows the "true interests" of the 
proletariat and is forwarded by advanced theory.
According to Lenin, the workers must be taught their true 
interests. He does not mean that they do not know what is 
good for them; he means that the pervasive and dominant 
repressive structure of the capitalist/worker dialectic has 
sufficiently shielded the working class from understanding
3 Ibid., p. 18.
4 ibid., p. 20.
5 Ibid.
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the thorough-going nature of their alienation and has kept 
them from knowing how to revolt. This they must be taught.
Based upon such a dialectic, power is seen as repressive and 
lies solely with the bourgeoisie, while the capacity for 
revolution is understood as active and lies solely with the 
proletariat. This capacity simply needs to be channeled, 
organized, and awakened by a vanguard party which recognizes 
one struggle, one theory, and which sees itself as the only 
true administration of economic justice.
Throughout the courses of Soviet Marxism, Western Marxism, 
Existentialist and Structuralist Marxism this dichotomy was 
not only accepted but pre-supposed. Indeed, the major 
project of the Critical Theorists was to assess why the 
working class had not recognized its revolutionary 
capabilities. According to May, the Critical Theorists 
identified a "cultural capitalism" as the major repressive 
force, thus they differ from Lenin in their assessment of the 
limits and pervasiveness of capitalist repression. However, 
"[f]or both, there is a single enemy: capitalism. While
Lenin saw capitalism primarily in economic terms, the turn to 
'cultural capitalism' by the Critical Theorists does not 
change the analysis of capitalism; it merely spreads it 
across the entire social space."6 The line from Lenin to 
Habermas is infested with subtle shifts and differing 
agendas, but what is important is that the central tenets of
6 Ibid., p. 26.
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the Leninist Dialectic (Capitalism is the enemy and utilizes 
repressive power; the working class is revolutionary and 
fundamentally alienated) remain. Indeed, what we see is a 
movement toward a conception of the social field which 
envisions it as thoroughly invested by repressive mechanisms, 
a conception that is shared by the anarchists.
But May traces another line of Marxist thought, one that can 
be seen somewhat nascently in the work of the Leninist 
thinker Louis Althusser, which appears in virgin form with 
Antonio Negri and the Italian autonomia movement, and which 
is most fully manifest in the political philosophy of 
Cornelius Castoriadis.
What Althusser offered was a looser Marxism which viewed 
theory as a "practice in a contingent histbrical context."? 
This is important because it allows for multiple "true" 
theories regarding the social field, not simply one. while 
such a strategy of course associates its own theoretical hold 
with whichever struggle it wishes to support, it opens the 
door for what Guattari will later call "micropolitics". If 
several different accounts of the procession or evolution of 
repression are possible, then revolt can take place on 
several different fronts. It no longer remains the case 
that only "one struggle" can bring about true social change; 
multiple struggles are now sanctioned, and the social field
7 Ibid., p. 35.
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comes to be understood as multiple and fragmentary.s
While remaining under a a general Marxist framework 
("Capitalism develops as the separation and mutual antagonism 
of the two classes? as the development proceeds, the 
antagonism deepens"9), thinkers like Negri offer a theory of 
the "social factory", which insinuates that in a capitalist 
society, all social life "tends toward becoming a factory in 
which the capitalist requirement - the exploitation of 
surplus value - is most perfectly met."10 What is perhaps 
most important about a movement like autonomia is that it 
strove to break up the intense homogenation that capitalism 
generates. It did this not by way of a singular attack or 
total worker uprising, rather it attempted to recognize the 
diverse needs of all people, the multiplicity of interests 
which subsist in housewives, firemen, factory workers, etc. 
And the revolt was not intended to come from a vanguard 
party: "It must arise at the level of people's daily lives.
What autonomia proposed was a refusal of all attempts to 
extract surplus value, whether that refusal involved work 
slowdowns, demands for wages by students and housewives, or
8 As sites of confinement begin to break down, causing the whole social field to appear as a  melting pot of 
control, notions of the multiple and the fragmentary will play a  pronounced role in political thinking. This 
seem ing contradiction ( the notion that all previously autonomous sites are now freely intersecting in an 
almost hom ogeneous space  referred to as  the socius contrasted with the assertion that political theory 
and practice can no longer be, as Lenin would have it, singular but must be multiple and diversified) 
vanishes when the distinction between the linguistic determination “capitalism” and its actual activities 
becom e apparent. True, the term capitalism, when linked to with the conception for a  control society, 
appears to describe something global and perhaps even universal. We will see, in Line Five and in the 
conclusion below , that this is certainly not the case, and that deterritorializing capitalism causes the social 
field to not only consistently mutate but also to consistently fragment.
9 The Political Philosophy of Post-structuralist Anarchism , p. 36.
10 ibid.
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noncooperation with the rituals of capitalism. Capitalism 
would be subverted 'from below' or not at all."ii
The general idea then is that the notion of representation at 
some type of governmental level is vanquished. There is no 
need for democracy, or vanguard communism, for each 
individual is understood as having the autonomy to assert his 
or her subjective interests directly. This notion is 
complicit with perhaps the central theme of anarchy. For 
his part, Castoriadis offered perhaps the closest variation 
of Marxism to anarchy: He replaced the definitively economic
dichotomy of oppressed worker/oppressive capitalist with the 
infinitely more inclusive categorizations of 
director/executant 12 . For Castoriadis, then, alienation is 
not the result of economic exploitation of the working class 
by capitalists, but rather the loss of self-management (self- 
government) at all levels of social interaction. Capitalism, 
while still the enemy, has with this newest strain of Marxism 
become so loose and shifting a term that it almost ceases to 
function, and the possibilities for revolution against both 
repression and political representation crop up everywhere 
across the social spectrum. 13 Of course, while this 
theoretical move borders on anarchy, one would hesitate to 
continue to refer to it as Marxism.
11 Ibid., p. 37.
12 ibid., p. 43.
13 In Anti-Oedipus, it is suggested that we are now facing perhaps the most insidious form of 
representation, political or otherwise, in the figure of Oedipus. This notion was touched upon in Line Two 
and will come up again in the conclusion.
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Thus while manifestations of Marxism in both theory and 
practice began to crumble, certain Marxist theoreticians 
began to approach some central anarchist themes. What is 
significant about this fact is that revolutionary theory (for 
which Marxism must be taken as the milestone) either 
collapses due to the infringing and tantalizing auspices of 
bureaucracy and democratic capitalism, or it retreats to a 
full scale theoretical annihilation of all governmental 
structures in order to keep its head above water. But 
perhaps the goals of anarchy (a totally liberated social 
sphere with no governmental intervention) were always nascent 
in the programs of Marxism. The ideals are sympatico to an 
extent; the difference lies in the strategic methodology 
employed to bring an end to State rule. Keep in mind that 
both Marxism and traditional anarchism are reactions to 
disciplinary societies. I will suggest that anarchy offers a 
better tactical approach but that it must alter its course in 
order to remain relevant in an era pre-configured by control.
Anarchy is actually considered a form of socialism. It 
differs from what has come to be known as "authoritarian 
socialism" on several key points. While Lenin and his 
successors saw power as emanating from one source (a 
monopolizing capitalist economic superstructure), the 
original anarchists (Bakunin and Proudhon, and later 
Kropotkin) extended power to all aspects of the social field. 
Government in all its insidious forms, no matter how 
minuscule, is responsible for not only all repression within
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the social sector but also for contaminating and severely 
limiting individual possibilities. For the anarchists, the 
State is the source of power, power is everywhere and always 
suppressive, and both are the incubus for corrupting human 
essence and shackling subjective human liberty. "Bakunin 
sees the State as an 'abstraction devouring the life of the 
people', an 'immense cemetery where all the real aspirations 
and living forces of a country generously and blissfully 
allow themselves to be buried in the name of that 
abstraction.'" 14
The State is the figurehead of what the anarchists call 
"centralization": a top-down procedure which both organizes
and strengthens controlling hierarchies while repressing the 
generally benign will ("I want only to be left alone") of 
individuals within the populace. Thus the anarchist refuses 
all sorts of State fostered intervention, including, and 
perhaps especially, a "representative" vanguard party which 
teaches to the working class their interests. All forms of 
representation (of exchanging the will of one person or group 
for the multiple wills, interests, and desires of counties, 
towns, states) are reproached by the anarchist. We see the 
connections between anarchy and the Italian autonomia 
movement: All individuals are capable of directly asserting
their subjective interests against State orders. "What 
motivates the critique of political representation is the 
idea that in giving people images of who they are and what
14 Daniel Guerin Anarchism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970) p. 16.
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they desire, one wrests from them the ability to decide those 
matters for themselvesis Revolt happens within tactical, 
intensely charged micropolitical resistances, not in 
widesweeping, singular struggles or by figurehead political 
parties claiming to represent the interests of all repressed 
parties within the social network^ .
What is lacking in anarchism is a cold, calculated logic, a 
"strategy". In Arthur Koestler's novel Darkness at Noon , we 
find the main character, Rubashov, struggling with the only 
important question for all communists: "How can my actions,
even in the face of death , further the interests of the 
party?" Rubashov is slated to die for crimes against the 
party, and his single consideration is how to make his death 
an occasion which strengthens party interests. Revolution is 
simply not logical or programmatic for the anarchist. While 
Marx strategically operated within the orders of the First 
International, seeking a position of political superiority 
with which he could oversee the organization of the 
revolution, "Bakunin used his charismatic personality in 
traveling around to different groups in different counties,
15 The Political Philosophy of Post-Structuralist Anarchism , p. 48.
16 It should be noted here that thinkers such as  Habermas have suggested resistance strategies that 
might be confused with this position. Habermas seeks “points of resistance” which for him are 
synonymous with social milieus that have not yet been contaminated by the scourge of ever-extending 
capitalism. These spaces are supposed to be buttresses where resistance can stave off the 
encroachment of capitalist tendencies. But H aberm as, in looking for these spaces, appears as a  tired 
soldier, simply looking for a  place to hide from the overpowering advances of the enemy. An anarchism 
like the one Deleuze forwards se es  no such spaces, for the “social” is synonymous with contemporary 
capitalism. There are no spaces or “points of resistance” left “uncontaminated”. Also, an understanding 
of power as productive as well as repressive allows the militant active choices for reform, resistance, even 
revolt everywhere across the surfaoe of the social sphere, and not just, as Habermas would have it, safe 
places to hide.
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more interested in roiling them to action than in determining 
the proper vehicle for that action. Bakunin felt that action 
would create its own proper vehicles."17
Anarchists are humanists. As Daniel Guerin points out, 
"[t]he anarchist sets two sources of revolutionary energy 
against the constraints and hierarchies of authoritarian 
socialisms the individual and the spontaneity of the masses. 
Some anarchists are more individualistic than social, some 
more social than individualistic. However, one cannot 
conceive of a libertarian who is not an individualist."is 
Deleuze, Guattari, and Foucault do in fact conceive an 
anarchism that is not individualistic. We will come to this 
later. In order to more clearly elaborate what the anarchist 
wants, we must take up with at least two angles of anarchist 
thinking: this notion of humanism at the core of anarchist 
theory and the anarchist conception of power.
First, anarchists understand human beings as essential, even- 
keeled organisms capable of structuring their own existence. 
Transgressions against oneself and others are thought to be 
the obvious reactions to dilemmas like poverty, overabundance 
of legislation (which leads to individual political 
impotence), etc. These problems stem directly from the 
aforementioned "centralization" of state power. With 
Leninists, we witness a "top-down" political theory, where
17 The Political Philosophy of Post-Structuralist Anarchism, p. 46
18 Anarchism, p. 27.
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control of the state is to be seized by a vanguard 
representative party in order to eventually demolish state 
oppression. Anarchy, from the beginning, advocates a 
"bottom-up" political philosophy: rights begin and end with
the self-decided interests of the individual. Anarchy seeks 
only to incite the masses to action: they already know what 
to do.
But because of this belief inherent in anarchism that the 
individual has a natural essence which is corrupted and then 
repressed by the state, the conception of power forwarded by 
traditional anarchy is thwarted. While the anarchists 
believe that power is indeed dispersed across the whole 
social field and that it emerges as "intersecting networks... 
rather than a hierarchy"is , power is still seen to be solely 
repressive, a function of the centralization of the State. 
They thus elaborate a conception of social space very similar 
to Foucault's analysis of disciplinary societies in 
Discipline and Punish. While no single source can be said to 
animate power (remember that for Bakunin the State is only an 
"abstraction"), all of the sites where power emerges are 
sites that serve repression. Power, for the anarchist, is 
always suppressive, never productive. This contradicts 
Foucault's contention that power produces individuals. And 
this notion provides an argument against the possibility of 
human beings ever having anything remotely resembling an 
"essence", benign or otherwise. If, as Foucault hints and
19 The Political Philosophy of Post-Structuralist Anarchism, p. 51.
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Deleuze asserts, in disciplinary societies individuals are 
the composite sites which reflect small-scale representations 
of the domesticating organization of sites of confinement, 
then these thinkers directly contest two central themes of 
anarchy: First, power is not merely repressive, it is also
productive. Second, there is no such thing as a localizable 
individual outside of the sets of practices and social 
organizations that produce that individual.
It is true that contemporary anarchists such as Murray 
Bookchin and Colin Ward recognize that power and its 
oppressive tendencies are decentralized, but the notion that 
power serves only repression and can only be resisted through 
a humanist theoretical reduction to the ontological level of 
the individual remains. What Foucault and Deleuze offer, and 
what composes the crux of Anti-Oedipus , is a model of power 
that is productive and a conception of the individual that is 
loose and unstable, "deterritorialized". "Just as power and 
oppression are decentralized, so must resistance be."20
This brings our discussion to the notion of social space. 
According to Foucault, in a disciplinary society there are in 
fact "territories", sites of confinement, divisions within 
the sphere of the social that are separated and marked off.
If we take this model as a starting point, power is 
understood as a flux of forces which "invests" pre- 
established social spaces. Lines of power converge at a
20 Ibid., p. 54.
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"site" which is one territory in the broader social field.
But when these territories (factory, bank, individual, 
school, family, hospital, college), which together compose 
what we understand as the social field, begin to break down 
and an unstable and modulating code of control infinitely 
divides and reconfigures social spaces, the entire geography 
of the social field is uprooted. Capitalism consistently 
deterritorializes localized sites and re-territorializes them 
in such a fashion that the concept of "space" becomes 
outmoded; there is no longer any social space to be invested 
by power; rather, the socius is the overflowing product of 
vicissitudes of modulating functions of control. I will 
directly address this absence of space, particularly with 
respect to the space of the individual, in Line Five.
Deleuze and Guattari envision the schizophrenic process as 
"universal producer". They also attribute to schizophrenia 
the same deterritorializing capacities that capitalism 
utilizes. It is therefore no surprise that they use the 
schizophrenic process as a model for active political 
engagement of the social field.
LINE FIVE: SCHIZOPHRENIC "SPACES"
What will be my concern here is the space which the 
schizophrenic inhabits. It is the space of hallucination, of 
dream, of psychic production; but it is of course much more 
than this. That the space of the schizo supplants, 
overthrows, replaces the space of lived bodily perception 
indicates a certain decentering, an entire calculus of the 
production of the real . To be more specific: it is in fact 
the case that the real is always produced, always 
instituted, by media machines and capitalist fragmentation; 
it is not far off to admit that desire, the very heart of 
subjectivity, is mass-produced within the contemporary order 
and installed sporadically, actually invested, within and as 
society. Under this rubric, the schizophrenic process is an 
investment of produced desire which complies entirely with 
the capitalist model while simultaneously and on all fronts 
operating outside the limits of capital. "The schizophrenic 
is more capitalist than the capitalist". Schizophrenia is 
capitalism without the body of capital, without a marker, and 
therefore it is the antithesis of capitalism. We are getting 
far ahead of ourselves; for now we must at least consent that 
the schizophrenic experience is in fact a production, for we 
are not willing to admit that hallucinations, phantasms, 
paranoias approach the schizophrenic from without; they are 
produced, artificially constructed, by the unconscious 
machine. A break has occurred, and necessarily so. For the 
break between sanity and insanity is the break between
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perception and hallucination, the break between reality 
(whatever assignment such a word implies) and fantasy. It is 
the break, to speak the discourse of nostalgia, between 
language and silence, between truth and folly, between 
science and absurdity. Schizophrenic space is always 
regarded from the frontier of more static, operable, fixed 
spaces. It will be our business herein to disengage this 
constricting paradigm; to do so we will locate schiz-flows 
within all spaces, we will conceive of schizophrenia not as 
(dis) order, but as a typal energy, erratically material and 
very much a part of the constitution of the "real".
The precise regional or psychoanalytic position that 
schizophrenic space occupies is of no concern to us here; we 
are interested, along with Merleau-Ponty, in the significance 
of such a lived space. In the Phenomenology of Perception , 
we are brought to bear with the lived phenomenal body.
Indeed, we uncover a philosophy of the flesh which subtends 
all empirical and intellectualist accounts of the subject.
We are introduced to the subjectless subject, the subject 
which cannot be a dissociate of its world, the subject for 
whom natural, cultural, indeed all physical or psychical 
objects are grafted onto and into the core of his very being. 
This lived phenomenal body invests the world with temporality 
and is in a magnetic flux with all of its perceptions. The 
body's gaze communes with the world, is developed in a nexus 
of call-and-response activity which Merleau-Ponty understands 
as perception . Indeed, his is a metaphysics of perception;
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we are lived fleshy bodies, interrogated by and interrogating 
the world. We inhabit habitual space in which our activities 
make sense to us; I know what it is to be in the store, my 
wife sent me here, I came from our home, I am caught up in 
the act of shopping, and though my ankle is sprained and my 
great uncle is on trial for fraud, right now the green pepper 
is the object of my quest, for the chef's salad at home on my 
table will not be complete without it.
Thus it runs that perception looks upon the world not as an 
assortment of distributed objects, but as an assemblage of 
meaning. All "objects" exist only in contextual realities, 
and these contexts underlie the very possibility of 
perception, i.e., of seeing, understanding, living . 
Perception is the medium by which the subject and its world 
are unified, and reflexively how they are constituted. We 
are reminded that reflection takes place only after 
perception; that the body already has its bearings, is 
already geared into the world through its activities before 
any objective distinction can be made between who sees and 
what is seen.
Now, of course, this lived phenomenal body which belongs to 
perception is not distinct from the withdrawn, autonomous 
consciousness of intellectualist reflection. Merleau-Ponty 
goes to great lengths to show us that the process of 
perception reveals not only a correlation between motor 
response and intellectual assessment; it reveals the
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indivisibility of the two. As we said above, this lived 
phenomenal body cannot be extracted from its experience of 
the world; such a removal establishes degrees of separation 
between consciousness, body, and world. The body belongs , 
with no remainder. We are confronted only with an 
inexhaustible multiplicity of phenomena, layers of 
transcendental significance. Without belaboring the point, 
suffice it to say that perception is the crux of Merleau- 
Ponty' s philosophical vantage point. It is indeed curious, 
then, that he should oppose perception to hallucination in 
his discussion of Space.
Space is a pre-perceptive awareness; it is, according to 
Merleau-Ponty, a precondition for perception. It establishes 
the realm within which significance is invested. We 
understand that there must be a "here" to constitute any type 
of space; Nietzsche recognized early on that a non- 
perspectival vantage point is a "view from nowhere"; God's 
view in fact. It is a useless perspective, an hypothetical 
abstract which serves no purpose other than to entertain the 
metaphysicians. This "here", which is always the root of the 
subject, is not only a physical location; it belongs to the 
order of the bodily historical, to the order of meaning, and 
to the order of the temporal ek-stacy which perception always 
already is. "Here" refers not to geographical/scientific 
position but to existential space, to the lived significance 
and the ongoing activities in which we are subsumed and 
contextualized. Thus we rethink proximity and distance in
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relation to existential space; I am physically very near to 
my philosophy professor at the U of M, relating to me the 
significance of classical paradoxes, and very far from my 
dear mother in Pennsylvania who is suffering a bout with 
dysentery. Existentially, my mother is right with me, for 
nary can I entertain the notion of Meno's paradox when I am 
worried sick over mum. And it is the case that I don't need 
to have my attention drawn to this fact; I am already 
thinking on my sick mother, whether I am explicitly conscious 
of thinking about it or not. While physical distance and 
existential space both have an immediate bearing upon my 
horizon of being, I am always caught up within existential 
spaces and rarely have occasion to ponder objective 
measurements or geographical proximities.
I understand myself as a mobile, situated, embodied self who 
entertains a primordial grasp on reality. While the retro­
spection involved in positing an objective world within which 
I dwell and which conditions my experience is distasteful to 
all but the stout absolutist, there must be something 
tangible, something true, about reality which is given over 
to me in perception and which allows for a certain contiguity 
of experience. A shared pre-articulate world , one which is 
not judged by its correlation with propositional truth values 
and which is inexhaustibly, wonderfully ambiguous, is given 
to us in perception, beckons us and commands our gaze. It is 
this horizonal space, this largely abstract but fundamental 
communion with the natural world, which grounds perception
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and which illuminates all of our related existential spaces. 
Space is, according to Merleau-Ponty, "neither an object, nor 
an act of unification on the subject's part; it can neither 
be observed, since it is pre-supposed in every observation, 
nor seen to emerge from a constituting operation, since it is 
of its essence that it be already constituted."! Space is 
the "positing of a level", and by this we mean a level of 
illumination; it grants a possibility for perceiving and 
understanding. Underlying all conscious perceptions is a 
"system of anonymous 'functions' which draw every particular 
focus into a general project"; this "system" is none other 
than the lived, phenomenal, temporal, spatial body. This 
body is aware of itself; it possesses an image of itself, 
thus it stands in harmonious relation to its world, for it 
understands its own operations and simultaneously relates 
them causally to the functioning of the natural and cultural 
world. Space is always already there, always already 
saturated with significance. The body is the gathering of 
lived spaces, the guardian of significance. This significance 
is a tacit understanding, transcendental in the sense that it 
impregnates our activities with meaning; it is a recollection 
of our past aimed at our future; significance synthesizes and 
unifies thetic experience. We might call this fluid condition 
"sanity".
It is the case that if one is blindfolded and set adrift in a 
pool of water at 98.6 degrees Fahrenheit, the body image
1 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception ( New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul
Ltd. 1962 ) p. 254,
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disintegrates. Such complete sensory depravation induces, in 
the average subject, a sensation that his organs are leaking 
out into the water, that the barriers of the flesh are no 
longer holding. This condition leads to a loss of sanity; 
everyone requires a body image. The body image is our style, 
our succinct awareness of the way the body is already in its 
spaces. Our body image is a prerequisite to our sharing in 
the world competently. We experience the world as if our 
body image has already been there in advance. The loss of 
this facticity does not affect psychical breakdown; it alters 
the psychical schemata. That is, what I refer to as my 
conscious history (the history that I know as my own past 
experiences, recollected in the present), is subtended by a 
bodily pre-history, which amounts to the understanding the 
body enjoys with the natural world. When this understanding 
is frustrated, my conscious history, i.e., my lived reality, 
is upended.
Space is the pre-condition for perception. It safeguards 
difference and distance, for these are the constituents of 
meaning. We have said that the lived, phenomenal body is 
essentially spatial; it is corporeal within physical space, 
it catches up with itself within temporal space, it acts 
within praxis space, it smolders within its moods. These 
spaces are never radically other than each other; what is 
given to us in our experience of the physical world tends to 
comply with our temporal,cultural, and activity spaces; for 
even the experience of what we consider objective space
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relations is always already pregnant with existential 
meaning. Not only this, but they all maintain significance 
for us; they form the content of our experience by co­
existing; it is not contradictory to say that I find myself 
within several spaces at once: I am a student on the campus,
with my good friend, talking about something we did last 
Saturday, walking to a shop to buy supper. All of these 
things represent certain temporal, physical, or praxis 
spaces, all are significant to me and my current experience 
of the "present", and none are isolated or withdrawn from 
each other or from me. At the same time, none of them impose 
such a tremendous tenor of significance upon me that I am 
unable to alter my course of action or think of something 
else; they all "keep their distance". Thus these spaces form 
a comfortable arena, and I am a tacit inhabitor of 
spatiality. Perception is the dynamic which momentarily 
crystallizes experience into its relations of significance.
We have elaborated an account of reality which is fluid, 
intersubjective, and inexhaustible. We can now turn to 
Merleau-Ponty's account of schizophrenic space and hope to 
understand what exactly is revealed in this, the most 
fundamental of all breakdowns.
We have briefly examined the lived phenomenal body, the 
necessity of a spatial body image, the co-existence and 
blending of all lived spaces. And through this, the 
phenomenological subject of perception has emerged, stepping 
out of the spiraling fogs of textbook objectivity and
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revealing to us his own primordial link with his world. But 
as phenomenology is a science of breakdowns, or rather since 
breakdown is t h e  birthplace of phenomenological inquiry, it 
is only proper to approach spaces which do not quite fit the 
tidy package heretofore elaborated. Merleau-Ponty, after 
discussing spatial depth, spatial movement, and spatial 
orientation, approaches the complicated realms of dream 
space, mythic space, and schizophrenic space.
Merleau-Ponty contends that different spaces call up 
different subjects capable of living in them.2 The subject 
and the environment adapt to each other in order to 
facilitate peaceable dwelling. Dream space is a significant 
space? it really "contains its meaning". It is of course 
obvious that so-called "objective space", in the dream state, 
"settle[s] in a different theatre"3? but this space, while 
carrying its own significance along with it, poses no real 
difficulty to the understanding. In the same way that I am 
with my mother in Pennsylvania and not present in the 
classroom, I am not lying in my bed, fast asleep, dreaming; I 
am immersed in a dream space, a space which maintains the 
same transcendental understanding and lived significance as 
any other. We encounter "a space peopled with phantasms, 
just as, in waking life, our dealings with the world which is 
offered to us condition a space peopled with realities."4 
Both spaces precede, condition, and give meaning to
2 Ibid., p. 250.
3 Ibid., p. 284.
4 Ibid., p. 285.
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perception; their objective reality status is no concern of 
ours. All dream spaces resemble real spaces, and have a 
horizonal quality for experience just as real spaces; we are 
immersed within them, and they are endowed with significance 
for us. Dream space is existential space. Similarly, the 
space of myth poses no real detours; primitive peoples simply 
"do not overstep this existential space". They dwell in a 
world where objective calculations do not impose upon an 
existential understanding; whether we reside in the favor of 
the rain god or receive the precipitation from over-burdened 
cloud cover makes no difference; nor whether we go the way of 
the wind or turn right on Fairmont Avenue. The spaces are 
different, but each belongs to a mode of dwelling within 
which inter-subjective significance abounds.
But let us discuss psychotics. For it is in fact 
schizophrenic space which gives us pause. Schizophrenic 
space and the space of hallucination, according to Merleau- 
Ponty, are of a slightly different order. In "normal" or 
"average" experience,
[b]esides the physical and geometrical distance which stands between 
myself and all things, a 'lived' distance binds me to things which count 
and exist for me, and links them to each other. This distance measures 
the 'scope' of my life at every moment. Sometimes between myself and 
the events there is a certain amount of play...which insures that my 
freedom is preserved while the events do not cease to concern me.5
This is to say that the elements of my spaces do not bear 
upon me in such a way that I am surrounded, trapped, or
5 Ibid., p. 186.
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imprisoned by them. We retain a certain amount of "breathing 
room" between ourselves and our involvements which ensures a 
compatible relationship. To take a few examples, when I find 
myself examining a photographer's portfolio, I have an 
implicit understanding that I am looking at photographs; I 
understand that a photograph is a representation of a past 
event, that the portfolio is a composite of the work of a 
certain photographer, who maintains a certain relationship 
with myself. I recognize people or places in the photos and 
can read the contexts well enough to imagine what was not 
captured in the picture, what never came under the scrutiny 
of the lens. All this while turning pages, drinking coffee, 
and complimenting the photographer upon a job well done. I 
am involved in all of these activities, but they do not 
impose upon me in such a way that one of them overpowers the 
others; I am easily able to accommodate all such phenomena. 
Such is not the case with the schizophrenic.
Everyone has had the experience of being preoccupied. There 
are certain events or tasks or conditions which at certain 
times seem so overpowering and immense that one can think of 
little else. When these concerns start to get the best of 
us, we are labeled neurotic. When these concerns are not 
real but imagined, that is, when they are not simply 
overblown perceptions but imagined violations and 
hallucinations, or when significance is not singularly 
overbearing but infinitely and incoherently multiple, we are 
labeled psychotic. Here we enter the realm of schizophrenia.
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Merleau-Ponty describes the space of schizophrenia as an 
imposition, the elimination of the comfortable distance 
between myself and my objects and activities. It is the 
"shrinkage of lived space" which crashes in upon the 
individual, an unbearable imposition of significance upon the 
subject. He calls this existential space of the 
schizophrenic "landscape space", referring to a certain case 
study in which the schizophrenic, out for a walk, is 
confronted by a landscape, interrogated unrelentingly by each 
object of perception. An ominous sky replaces the evening 
sky, perhaps bleeding trees and blissful rocks frolic about 
on the vibrating landscape. This space in which there is no 
comfortable separation between subject and involvements, 
which is the schizophrenic's "way of perceiving the world", 
invades physical space to such a degree that the real 
landscape is subverted and removed; the schizo is dissociated 
from the "objective world as the latter is presented to 
perception", and immersed in this private space. Here the 
schizophrenic dwells; we cannot wake him up, as we could the 
dreamer, in order to give him new perspective, a new space 
from which to reconsider the old. The schizophrenic is not 
drawn towards the world of objects; his gaze is not commanded 
by elements which have significance for him; the "impulse of 
existence towards things has lost its energy, because it
appears to itself in all its contingency and because the
- ^world can no longer be taken for granted."6 The landscape 
before which he stands is incidental; schizophrenic space
6 Ibid., p. 287.
overtakes and negates comfortable lived space.
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The schisophrenic is trapped in an "illusory world" from 
which he cannot escape. His "play-room" has collapsed in 
upon itself, and he cannot enjoy a "virtual space", a 
comfortable space in relation to his body image. All of 
space becomes pregnant with meaning, all spaces are 
essentially filled . His own private, existential space 
intrudes upon him, and he can no longer inhabit the shared 
world. In a condition of sanity, one's existential spaces 
open out onto the shared world of experience, are in 
communion with it, and enjoy a relative harmony with "clear 
space". For Merleau-Ponty, the structure of space determines 
the limits of sanity and insanity; things retain their 
distance in reality. When we feel threatened, we can 
reconcile our unease with the shared world, which all of our 
spaces open onto. The schizophrenic does not have this 
luxury; he is not ekstatic out onto the world, he is imposed 
upon by the very structures of nature.
While Merleau-Ponty takes up the antipode of objective 
analysis, he admits of a certain "clear space" to which 
schizophrenic space occupies a relation. This is not the 
objective world which forms a foundation for the subject; 
this is the incarnate experience of spatiality which everyone 
necessarily experiences. This is the pre-reflective spatial 
and temporal ekstatic condition; Merleau-Ponty wants t o  gain 
this as a guasi-universal, applicable to all lived bodies.
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He verifies this by examining case studies; schizophrenics 
are aware that what haunts them is not real, and can easily 
distinguish between an actual object and a hallucination.
The fact that this is of no consequence to them is an 
important point, one which will be discussed below. For now, 
suffice it sum up: Hallucinatory conditions, like dreams and
myths, take their bearing from real spaces, just as all 
spaces do. The notion of nearness to a sick family member 
iniles away is not of a totally different order than the 
distance which separates two stone walls of a canyon, or the 
proximal vicinity which relates the subject-while-flyfishing 
to the same subject-while-jogging. Space is universal 
experience for Merleau-Ponty, and all experiences of space 
are fundamentally related to our existential, non-thetic, 
pre-objective and pre-articulate spatiality; we are spatial. 
Thus we are assured that while there is no proscription which 
will return to schizo his "comfortable space", at least the 
schizophrenic, as an incarnate lived body, resides in the 
spatial order.
Neither will Merleau-Ponty concede that hallucinations are 
indistinguishable from reality; those who hallucinate know 
that they are hallucinating. While the hallucination may 
possess tremendous weight for the afflicted individual, it 
remains of the order of a sensory or psychical disturbance 
and can always be distinguished from real, lived experience.7 
The experiences of the schizophrenic are recognized as unreal
7 Ibid., pps. 334-345.
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even by him; "there is no definite path leading from it to 
all the remaining experiences of the deluded subject, or the 
experiences of the sane."0 The hallucination is not a member 
of the "geographical world", where we find the stuff of 
knowledge or establish laws. It is, and remains, an 
"individual landscape", in which the victim is confronted and 
violated by the world; the communion is forced, unwarranted, 
and intrusive.
If it sounds strange that Merleau-Ponty must find recourse to 
the "geographical" world in order to understand the 
"individual landscape"* of the schizophrenic, or that the 
space of dream, activity, hallucination or culture must 
necessarily be rooted, so to speak, in a pre-thetic, 
ambiguous, intersubjective clear space, it should. Although 
Merleau-Ponty does his best to avoid any type of 
totalizations, hierarchies, or other definitive statements 
about physical or metaphysical objectivity, he cannot grant 
that the space of the schizophrenic is as viable and all- 
encompassing a lived space as any other, nor can he simply 
chalk it up to relative differences; schizophrenic space must 
be of a certain order; it must be related, in a crucial and 
derivative way, to all discussions of space, or else the 
nasty business of relativism will taint the pages of the 
Phenomenology, re-writing arguments and frightening off the 
tepid reader of philosophy; logical inconsistency cannot be
8 ibid., p. 339.
9 Ibid., p. 341.
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permitted, even when one is attempting to articulate the pre- 
logical. If one cannot find some shared spatiality, to which 
all are accommodated, then the analyticians are given 
recourse to fall back upon the age old objection of 
relativism. Be that as it may, Merleau-Ponty evades wholly 
all objective positing, at least in-so-far as it is possible. 
This speaks in his favor; he paves the way for many modern 
studies of "abnormal" conditions by avoiding the 
objectifications so callously attributed to the afflicted 
(insane, pathological, the patient) and takes up with 
evaluations of relationships ; not the doctor examining the 
schizo in the hospital, but a nexus of involvements from 
which many possible outcomes emerge.
Briefly, a recap:
1. The existential condition is a harmonious communion with 
the world; the subject is a composite of all of its spatial 
horizons, never an autonomous entity.
2. Perception is not the medium which relates subject to 
object, but rather the mystical link which insures all mutual 
interest and intersubjectivity. Phenomenologically speaking, 
the subject lives his world; he does not examine or analyze 
it.
3. Underlying perception is an implicit and necessary 
awareness of one's body image and the way it opens onto the 
perceptual horizon; we call this space and realize that it 
allows for all significant experience. Space is not a
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measurable distance; it is the transcendental awareness of 
distance, motion, perspective, social complexes, etc.
4. We dwell spatially; in so doing, we find that our spaces 
are interconnected and inseparable; they are the latent forms 
of significance by way of which perception is open to the 
world. And although spaces form an interconnectedness and 
enable meaning, they retain their distance from us so that we 
are free to move among spaces, to shift spatialities, and to 
fluidly relate spaces within a "comfortable distance".
5. 'The schizophrenic process, according to Merleau-Ponty, is 
the collapse of this comfortable distance by intrusive space; 
schizophrenia is the annihilation of a "clear" or shared 
spatiality by an oppressive, internal, and subjective 
reconstruction of reality. The schizophrenic is therefore 
spatially understood, but this deficiency in the area of 
spatial structure inhibits the process of the habitual body 
towards its world. The world of common property is usurped 
by an imposing, private, hallucinatory world.
There is more, I believe, to the schizophrenic dynamic than 
has been hitherto elaborated in this discussion. It is the 
case, therefore, that we should examine this issue more 
closely, in order to understand what is meant when we refer 
to "schizophrenic space". Let us take up with this issue, 
and hopefully we will not lose sight of the scope and tenor 
of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology while doing so.
Schizophrenia is the tragic condition par excellence ; the
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afflicted is antisocial, incoherent, at times irrationally 
violent or eerily catatonic, paranoid, confused. We do not 
desire this condition, and most look upon it as an ailment, 
an illness which needs be cured or at least contained. 
Although it has no clear boundaries and can go by many other 
names, few would regard schizophrenia as anything but a 
disorder; as we have seen above, Merleau-Ponty does just 
this. The schizophrenic's experience of space is mutated and 
ominous; he cannot come to terms with his spatiality, cannot 
dwell in the shared spatial world where others have their 
activities; his space is that of the introverted illusion, 
not of the real. But I think the question should be posed in 
a different light, in another space: Rather than seek out
the probable causes for dysfunctional behavior, we should 
understand better why this behavior is dysfunctional at all.
Schizophrenia is a modern affliction; while madmen have 
populated every ville and castle, every country and fairie 
tale in history, there is little resemblance between the 
madmen of the past and the contemporary schizophrenic. In 
fact, as has been effectively argued by Foucault (see Madness 
and Civilization ), madness, like most of our other socially 
constituted labels and objectifications, shows up in 
different spaces, for different reasons, under different 
guises in every discourse, in every age. As elaborated in 
Line Three, Foucault further argues that madness, 
criminality, foolishness, and all other forms of illness or 
affliction are merely empty signifiers; they are invested
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with meanings historically and as it suits the matrix of 
power structures. Whether we agree with this last point is 
unimportant, it is enough to say that in an age of 
psychoanalysis, rapidly advancing technology, complex 
scientific procedures, and accelerated capitalist 
deterritorialization, madness, like all other socially 
established frontiers, cannot possibly retain a constant 
meaning, one that would suit all the cases in history. To 
some extent, Merleau-Ponty recognizes this; he only discusses 
very recent experiments on schizophrenics, for schizophrenia 
belongs to the realm of modern psychology, is given voice 
only as an object of interest and inquiry. Only once 
consciousness has emerged as an object for scientific inquiry 
can anything remotely resembling contemporary schizophrenia 
come into being.
Now, before moving on, an important distinction must be made. 
The schizophrenic condition, as witnessed by the 
psychoanalyst (and everyone else, for we have all 
internalized the shrink's gaze), is of a different order than 
the schizophrenic process. The captured schizophrenic is not 
a representative of the schizophrenic process; by nailing 
Oedipus to the psychotic, we create an artificial 
schizophrenia. Merleau-Ponty examines only the condition, 
not the process. What this amounts to is the difference 
between a free man and a man in chains, for the incarcerated 
schizophrenic that we find behind the walls of the 
institution is a harnessed, constructed entity. The thrust
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of psychology is the fervent and frantic Oedipalization of 
all men; the subject emerges from a context in which the 
father and the mother form the other points of a composite 
triangle. The unconscious is formed through the process of 
"coming into the social" that the child undergoes when he/she 
realizes that he or she is other than mommy/daddy. The child 
sees the penis and realizes that she lacks it, or he is 
afraid that his will be severed. He wants to fuck mom and 
kill dad, or she want to fuck dad and murder mom, but 
gradually each accepts the repression of these natural but 
antisocial desires. The subject is born. And it is the 
case, as pointed out by Lacan and his contemporaries, that 
the child does not have to see the actual penis but only 
needs to "come into language" in order to be Oedipalized; for 
language is the use of symbolism, and the central symbol is 
the penis; it is the stout metaphor for all signification and 
all order. The real is the symbolic, or rather, there is no 
intimation of the real which is not symbolic.
Thus language, while separating the child from its nascent 
state of union with mom, grants to the subject's world the 
enigma of symbolism, which is the birthplace of desire. The 
Other comes radically into view as other, as the necessary 
distance which is the basis for communication; communication 
is lack. This desiring-subject is of course the foundation 
for psychology, so it should not surprise us that when 
confronted by schizophrenia, the psychoanalyst would 
immediately look for a disruptive phase in the maturation of
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the psychological subject (for Lacan, the psychotic never 
comes to grips with phallic symbolism, what he calls 
"foreclosure", what amounts to the phallic never becoming 
symbolic, never finding its place in the symbolism of the 
real; the phallic then resides in hallucination or other 
infringements upon the real). Where did the Oedipal process 
break down? What can we now do to re-invest subjectivity 
into this thwarted schema? Of all the ambiguities 
surrounding schizophrenia, we can be sure of one constant; 
the schizophrenic condition is the absence of the ego. Thus 
the schizo is forced to comply to an order which is foreign 
to him, the already established, pre-given and necessary 
subject. This is the condition of schizophrenia that we read 
about in psychology texts; this is not the schizophrenic 
process.
But of course, it will be objected, schizophrenia in not born 
in the institution; schizophrenics are brought to 
psychoanalysts because they are schizophrenic, because they 
cannot function in their jobs, or in their family life. To 
this we should reply: The schizophrenic is easily
recognizable precisely because he does not fit the mold. 
Psychoanalysis is not the abstract art of head-shrinking; it 
is a lived condition, it is the contemporary subject. We 
are all born of psychology to the extent that we are immersed 
in our own subjectivity; the contemporary subject is the 
Oedipalized subject, the consciousness aware of its own 
activity and capable of questioning its own motives; we are
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able to pinpoint and isolate neurotic or psychotic behavior 
immediately; we readily accept our own individuality, models 
for our development, and proper social conduct. We are each 
one of us shrinks. And this is not the least bit surprising; 
society itself is neurotic, capitalism itself schizophrenic. 
The police state of the mind, awakened at the level of 
individual consciousness; we are ourselves trained 
psychological policemen.
It is for these reasons that we can make the distinction 
between the schizophrenic, who comes into being as the target 
of Oedipalization, and the schizophrenic process, which would 
represent a loss of all location and space, of all judgment 
and subjectivity. These are two very different orders; one 
is brought into being by nature of a forced impotence; the 
other represents foreign and dissociated thinking, a thinking 
which remains outside, a hyper-productivity. It should be 
asked what this thinking can do.
Capitalism is the art of production, the establishment of 
rules of exchange; not only exchange values of goods and 
products, but the exchange values of desires and territories, 
of sexual oddities and virtual spaces. And it is our 
capitalism, what some have termed "Late Capitalism", which we 
must relate to the schizophrenic condition.
Postraodernity witnesses the reckless decentering of all 
structures. Our cultural objects are simulacra; our desires
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are written for us by advertisements, magazines, internets, 
televisions. While the products of capitalism used to be 
tangible goods, we now witness the reproduction of all things 
illusory, everything from company stocks to video tapes (the 
former represents imaginary money, the latter is the 
production and sale of an image). All areas of society are 
fragmented and dissociated; even the subject is fragmentary 
(we are not aware of our own desires until they are 
"revealed" to us by the media, psychology, culture, etc.; we 
become different selves in various situations; we cannot 
reconcile our conscious needs with our unconscious desires 
and with the social order). Advertisements make random 
associations which do not equate (drink Mountain Dew and 
experience treacherous free-falls off of mountain cliffs). 
Many post-modern authors (Jameson, Baudrillard, etc.) have 
equated Late Capitalism with a psychotic or schizophrenic 
state. I do not think this comparison is unwarranted, for
nowhere is there a tangible or transcendental subject,
nowhere do we find grounded reality, and nowhere is anything 
autonomous; all discourses flow together in a disjointed 
association of arbitrary assessments.
This "society of the spectacle" (to borrow from DuBord) might 
be seen as the realm where illusory subjectivity is produced; 
the irony being that the process of production, which Marx 
understood to be synonymous with human nature, is now
producing human nature, producing the subject who desires,
producing desire itself, and establishing the hyper-arenar in
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which these events are played out. This all looks, 
hauntingly enough, like most descriptions of schizophrenic 
thought processes. For the real is synonymous with the 
symbol and the illusion, which are the hyperbolical 
composites of the desiring-subject. Our society is 
constantly re-writing subjects through the production of 
desires. The real is imagery, illusion, hallucination. And 
it does not maintain a comfortable distance; our own 
production always and everywhere reproduces us; it fragments 
subjectivities; there can be no "clear" space to which all of 
our fragmented capitalist spaces refer or relate. Capitalism 
produces the real, produces the desiring subject, and 
produces itself and all of its territories. Its immanence is 
legendary. Capitalism does not care for the real any more 
than the schizo; the schizo knows that his productions are 
not real, but their significance is all-encompassing; the 
modern subject, who is the waste product of capitalist 
production, may know that his desires are not his own, that 
his objects and spaces are always and everywhere fabricated; 
this has no bearing on his life, however, for the experience 
of the simulation is the ground floor of meaning; produced 
simulacra are significant reality.
The post-modern individual is the excess of so many 
decentered discourses; we can rest assured that the subject 
is missing. Capitalism and schizophrenia are inherently 
linked, but how so? Is one the origin of the other? This is 
not likely. It is as much a mistake to assume that
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capitalism causes schizophrenia as to assume that 
schizophrenia is an Oedipal failure; schizophrenia surfaces 
as a contemporary affliction because it is so compatible with 
the capitalist mode of production. Just as material 
production was once the essence of capitalism, so the subject 
was once the essence of social life. It has become the case 
that capitalism frees production from material exchange, from 
concrete values. Now production assumes control of the 
organization of the socius, the complete construction and 
organization of the real. And the schizophrenic process 
removes the bodily/conscious/subjective restrictions which 
once structured the social self. Modern capitalism is a 
deterritorialization geared towards pure production in the 
form of reterritorialization, nothing else. Remember the 
examples offered in the Introduction: Academia, the
teacher/student relationship, information technologies, 
individuals, wildlife refuges, etc. are all uprooted and 
reconfigured constantly with the onset of new connections of 
control like the virtual diploma or the "high-definition" 
television. And schizophrenia deterritorializes as well; 
there are no boundaries and no symbols; nothing means 
anything else (the cigar is never a penis); there is free 
play and multiplicity, infinite layers of chaotic 
significance. But schizophrenia is not exactly akin to 
capitalism; capitalism is self-serving and remains regional. 
This is to say, capitalism is concerned with a recording and 
re-ordering proces which operates according to the logic of 
expansion and gain:
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"Yet it would be a serious error to consider the capitalist flows and 
the schizophrenic flows as identical, under the general theme of a 
decoding of the flows of desire. Their affinity is great...We have seen 
that the relationship of schizophrenia to capitalism...should be 
examined at the deepest level of one and the same economy, one and the 
same production process."10
The economical process is the same; the motivating orders are 
not. Here we see the nature of the difference between the
fcapitalist and schizophrenic processes.
"The language of a banker, a general, an industrialist, a middle or high 
level manager, or a government minister is a perfectly schizophrenic 
language, but that functions only statistically within the flattening 
axiomatic of connections that puts it in the service of the capitalist 
order."11
Capitalism employs the language and the structure of 
schizophrenia (it authorizes what Deleuze and Guattari call 
schiz-flows) in order to invest the whole of the social field 
with "limitless" pure production. Yet it is only a regional 
deterritorialization, for it re-establishes its own limits 
with respect to investment; it establishes entirely new 
boundaries with one hand where it deterritorializes with the 
other. Schizophrenia represents chaos with no remainder; not 
the limitless extension of boundaries, but the annihilation 
of boundaries. Schizophrenic thinking is full-scale 
theoretical anarchy.
Through the retardation process of the contemporary 
intelligentsia (psychoanalytic micro-state), schizophrenia is 
boxed, labeled and shipped. All of its productions become
10 Anti-Oedipus, p. 245.
11 Ibid., p. 246.
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reactive, never active. Its activities are constructed as 
expressions of anxiety and illusion. All of its behaviors 
stem from repression and are not expressive of excess; and, 
fundamentally, the core of desire, the Oedipal subject, is 
always a lack . Desire always lacks its object. The 
schizophrenic always lacks reality. Capitalism is 
schizophrenic, but only to the extent that schizophrenic 
flows (language, thought processes, technologies) multiply, 
divide and accelerate a certain metaphysical capital, the God 
of exchange and value. Schizophrenia threatens this regime, 
for it pushes capitalism too far. Capitalism puts schizo- 
processes in the service of capital; no, the worker no longer 
produces his own alienation (he no longer has that luxury); 
now there is only pure production, a constant re-writing of 
the socius. There is no possibility of alienation; there is 
no comfortable space. The schizophrenic process everywhere 
exceeds the capitalist order, thus it threatens social order 
from within and without. Schizophrenia is the limit of 
revolution; it is revolution not "for the sake of" (equal 
rights, governmental representation, etc.) but revolution 
qua revolution, chaos for the sake of chaos. This 
revolutionary aspect of schizophrenia has also been harnessed 
by capitalism; skinheads selling skateboards, gansta rap 
promoting Osh-Kosh jeans, hippies for Christ, whatever.
Merleau-Ponty approaches the issue of schizophrenia with the 
intention of granting it a certain space. This he does. But 
this space is simply a re-working of his theory of lived
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phenomenal space; schizophrenic space has an imposing 
tendency; it suffocates the schizo with meaning but remains 
spatial. It simply supplants a more comfortable, clear 
space. It seems to be the case, however, that the problem is 
not so simple. For schizophrenic space is not the stuff of 
ill-formed Oedipal processes; it is not an isolated, 
individual, impositional micro-space. Neither is it the 
dilemma of the afflicted schizophrenic, who is in fact merely 
the deposit of so much schizophrenic energy. It is not the 
case that the schizophrenic simply cannot open onto a shared 
world, a world in which things "keep their distance". For 
this world is vacuous, is indeed, at the very core, 
hallucination itself. The clear world, the spatial realm 
which grants activities their significance, is the doctored 
illusion which is ritualistically invested with schizophrenic 
movements under the rubric of distribution of capital. The 
"shared world" is the world of Oedipus, where grafted 
subjectivities are force-fed marketable desires. We are all 
"aware" of our body image because control is only possible 
when limits are established; the subject is constructed as 
desiring-subject because subjectivity is the capacity to 
absorb desire, make it mean something else, and re-invest it 
with interest back into the body of capitalism.
Schizophrenia is not a regional space where intrusive 
illusions overstep the bounds of shared, pre-thetic 
experience. The schizophrenic patient is simply the 
subjectivization of the capitalist schema; instead of
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passively receiving his illusions, he actively originates 
them; he is more efficient than the sane subject, but he is 
also infinitely more threatening. Capitalism, as the limit 
of every society, is reality. We witness nothing that is 
untouched and unchanged by its operations. Schiz-processes 
are the modus operandi of capitalism, the connective 
electrico-social generators of reality. The real is 
synonymous with the illusory, perception with hallucination. 
The lived phenomenal body is the constant restructuring of 
desires, and nothing more. Significance is not born of a 
pre-thetic synthesis, an orienting awareness of body/world. 
Significance is the product of illusion, the simulacra of the 
ideal subject, and variations thereof are the experimental 
adopted samples, the desiring-subjects.
But the myth of the real still dominates, for it is the 
perfect alibi for pure productive processes. "We are 
producing what you want! Technology affords us the luxury of 
being able to expand our world, broaden our horizons, give us 
larger scope and more fundamental access to all areas of 
reality1" We can fly across the Atlantic and marvel at the 
mystery of Stonehenge in just under three hours on the 
Concord. Unfortunately, we bring our history with us; we are 
witness only to what we want to witness; rather, to what we 
are informed that we want to witness. I can read in explicit 
detail the news coverage of Bosnia and be up to date on the 
death tolls, but no one is dying. We believe in the "real" 
just as, for so long, we believed in objective reality, and
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before that God. Without substantial reference, we are 
absent, and no one but the schizophrenic can accept this 
fact. So we comfort ourselves with stories of people and 
places, of presidents and leaders, of conflict and slaughter 
and welfare and academics. We all know we share the same 
world, deep down, for how else could it be?
Merleau-Ponty's description of schizophrenic space sounds 
alot like contemporary capitalist space; a "landscape space" 
of illusion, pregnant with meaning and bearing its own 
significance within itself bears upon the "real" to such an 
extent that the "real" is insignificant, unrecognizable, 
usurped and discarded. Thd difference is that the 
schizophrenic knows his hallucinations are not real and also 
knows that this makes no difference. Meaning is bound up in 
existential illusion, not in any type of shared, 
intersubjective framework. Gunnar, an incarcerated 
schizophrenic, relays his struggle with reality:
"I attempt to structure the world all the time, simplify, generalize, 
find universal symbols, everything to keep a chaotic reign of terror at 
bay; but instead the chaotic pressure and tangled undergrowth of new 
interpretive possibilities increases. Fragmentation finally becomes so 
complete that any meaningful contact with the world outside becomes 
impossible."12
This quote accentuates a dilemma. The schizophrenic is bound 
and gagged by the totalitarianism of the real; the space of 
hallucination, of infinitely multiple meanings, of layers of 
arbitrary significance is relegated in society to occupy the
12 Barbo Sandin Schizophrenic Strategies of Survival in Psychiatry: Interpersonal and Biological
Process August 1993 v56 n3 p. 295.
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realm of literature and film, of the joke world and the world 
of the mystical and magical; but one must draw the line 
between "reality" and these fictional or theoretical spaces. 
Gunnar is constructed to believe that the world is 
structured, that there are universal symbols, and since he 
recognizes none, his hyper-ekstatic condition of free-play 
and association becomes his own personal hell. He has been 
convinced that fragmentation is not 'real', is not of the 
social order. Thus he struggles to attach himself to the 
static world to which everyone else belongs. He is not 
compatible with the myth, and is therefore the object of 
investigation, a curious oddity, a modern Galileo.
Henri Michaux describes a schizophrenic table:
"[I]t was neither simple nor really complex, initially or intentionally 
complex, or constructed according to a complicated plan. Instead, it 
had been desimplified in the course of its carpentering...As it stood, 
it was a table of additions, much like certain schizophrenics' drawings, 
described as "overstuffed", and if finished it was only so in so far as 
there was no way of adding anything more to it, the table having become 
more and more an accumulation, less and less a table... It was not 
intended for any specific purpose, for anything one expects of a table. 
Heavy, cumbersome, it was virtually immovable. One didn't know how to 
handle it [mentally or physically]. Its top surface, the useful part of 
the table, having been gradually reduced, was disappearing, with so 
little relation to the clumsy framework that the thing did not strike 
one as a table, but as some freak piece of furniture, an unfamiliar 
instrument... for which there was no purpose. A dehumanized table, 
nothing cozy about it...A table which lent itself to no function, self- 
protective, denying itself to service and communication alike. There 
was something stunned about it, something petrified. Perhaps it 
suggested a stalled engine."13
This fantastic table, viewed as an abomination of carpentry, 
is revelatory in certain definitive ways. It reveals
13 Anti-O edipus, pps. 6-7.
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something first about the production process of 
schizophrenia. There is no "space" in which such a table 
could function as table. It is nonsensical to the extent 
that it does not relate to a schema or framework where 
"table" has a certain significance or shared structure. Its 
"tableness" is removed; the significance attributable to the 
"tables" of experience gone with it. But this is not to say 
that it is lacking significance; for this table carries its 
own meaning within itself; it is its own meaning. There is 
no separation here between production and what is produced. 14 
While we think of tables as produced for a reason and having 
a certain significant function, this table is its own reason 
and its own significant function. It is a capitalist table; 
its surface has no relation to its framework, its function 
has no relation to general tableness; it is pure production. 
And it does not represent the chaotic state of the artist, 
nor his inability to understand the meaning of objects; it is 
not the unconscious expression of a repressed desire, and it 
is not a useless dead end; it is product and producer and 
production, indistinguishable. It is consumption as 
production. The schizophrenic table works; just like a 
bubble gum dispenser that looks like a Maytag; the difference 
is that "schizos are not saleable"is
In conclusion, there is no such thing as schizophrenic space. 
To make the connection between schizo-flows and the
14 ibid., p. 7.
15 ibid., p. 245.
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fragmented contemporary social being, one has to look no 
further than the modern social order. Merleau-Ponty's 
analysis of schizophrenic space is insightful and lucid, but 
it reveals much more than the latency of the schizophrenic. 
Illusions are very much the status guo; it is not the case 
that the schizophrenic harbors any subjective or isolated 
"landscape space". The functional reality in which we dwell 
is a matrix of production/consumption simulations. If one 
wants to establish barriers between the sane and the 
schizophrenic, it might be possible to regard sanity as the 
condition which is wholly constituted from without. For the 
norm is the passive trade-off of a barrage of imagery for 
reality; schizophrenia is the active internalization of the 
contemporary process of production. The schizo cannot accept 
simulated reality as "shared space", for he knows the 
production process too well. He understands multiplicity and 
fragmentation, and becomes confused wheh language makes 
reference to the "geographical world"; for the schizophrenic, 
significance is not impositional, nor does it overtake the 
"real", it is simply divisible and tangential.
Sanity is the nascent state of insanity; it is the realm 
where desire is invested as subjectivity and then re-invested 
into the illusory realm of the socius as lack, the hollow 
subject who always wants more. The schizophrenic is the 
producer, production, and product of desire; he has no need 
for capitalism, for he has no territory and no objects, no 
location, biography, or geography; he will not be convinced
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that he ever lacks.
CONCLUSION: THE ANTI-OEDIPAL MACHINE
Anti-Oedipus is a great book of fictions. It lies to its 
reader innocently enough; it captures its audience like a 
master storyteller. It "gets up to things behind your back." 
Anti-Oedipus makes use of "bodies without organs", desiring- 
machines, schiz-flows, intensities, deterritorializations and 
reterritorializations, Oedipalization, production, recording 
and immanence. It sees the paranoiac father everywhere, 
confuses words and things, and tries to inscribe, a la 
Kafka's In the Penal Colony, its codes on lived, fleshy 
bodies. It proposes a materialist psychiatry and offers the 
schizophrenic process as the universal producer / producing / 
product.
Many thinkers are content to dismiss the project of Anti- 
Oedipus outright in a simple paragraphi . Others consider it 
a little gem of postmodernism, but quickly add that Guattari 
was the worst thing to happen to a lucid, sobering, and 
clear-headed thinker like Deleuze. The book is, in many
1 “As for the psychic subject and its theories, this is the area colonized by the Deleuze-Guattari notion of 
the ideal schizophrenic - that psychic subject who ‘perceives’ by way of difference and differentiation 
alone, if that is conceivable; of course, the conceiving of it is the construction of an ideal which is, so  to 
speak, the ethical - not to say the political - task proposed by their Anti-Oedipus This is Fredric 
Jam eson’s  sole treatm ent of the Anti-Oedipal project in a  438 page discourse on the nature of Post- 
Modernity ( Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism , Durham: Duke 
University Press 1991 p. 345). Many have mimicked Jam eson in their analyses of this book. Usually, the 
objections are either of an aesthetic nature ( the book is simply intellectual masturbation or a  strangely 
incoherent form of expressionism ) or a  retreat to the charge of idealism ( the bane of all post-modernists ) 
a s  demonstrated by Jam eson. We shall see  below that in no way is the schizophrenic process as 
articulated by Deleuze and Guattari a new ideal, a purely differential unity or som e other such farce. As for 
the account of Anti-Oedipus which looks upon it a s  intellectual masturbation, we can only respond that at 
least something is produced, something is impregnated with meaning by this text, and so  we recognized 
that som eone’s getting fucked.
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places, needlessly complex. It uses and abuses far too much 
theory and far too many texts. What I propose to do here is 
to simply offer an interpretation of Anti-Oedipus that will 
clarify some of its central themes. In keeping with the 
general theme of this essay, I will attend specifically to 
the facets of the book which pertain immediately to political 
thinking.
Deleuze and Guattari begin with a "theory of connections". 
They are informed by a very queer notion of production: 
production is a process which produces itself. Philip 
Goodchild distinguishes between autoproduction and 
antiproduction,2 and I think this is a good manner in which 
to understand the process of production being advanced in 
Anti-Oedipus.3
Everything is subject to and informed by some mode of 
relation (the daughter is related in a familial way to the 
grandmother, and mom is positioned in between; a car is
2 Philip Goodchild Deleuze and Guattari: An Introduction to the Politics of Desire ( London: Sage 
Publications Ltd. 1996 ) pps. 73-105.
3 “Autoproduction” is the process of pure production exhibited in schizophrenia. “Anti-production” is the 
moment that this production “breaks down” ; production ceases  its infernal dynamic and becom es static. 
The authors of Anti-Oedipus catch glimpses of autoproduction in the artwork of inmates at an asylum. A 
schizophrenic builds a  “table” which he continually nails more wood onto. All the sipaces become filled, 
becom e spaceless. “A s it stood, it was a  table of additions, much like schizophrenics’ drawings, 
described as overstuffed, and if finished it was only so  far as  there was no way of adding anything more to 
it...It was not intended for any specific purpose...'” ( Anti-Oedipus, p. 6 .). It is not finished, or rather is 
finished only because no more connections could be made, and when the schizophrenic leaves this 
project he takes up with something else entirely. This process of pure production which is at once 
product, production, and producer is autoproduction, the self-perpetuating production process. Desire 
here produces itself. Something tangible like a  factory, or Ideal like Oedipus, is born of this process, but it 
becom es “fixed” and forces desire ( that which produced i t ) back upon itself. This is “anti-production”, the 
“stalled engine”, the sedim ented social structure which immediately checks desire, channeling and re­
routing the productive tendencies of desire into a  sole purpose or se t of purposes.
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related to the driver, gasoline, and the road; shit is 
related to the anus, the digestive system, its odor, the food 
it once was, etc.). But relation is understood by way of 
connections, and these connections are micro-divisible. For 
example, I am related to my stereo and the sound it 
generates, just as the component parts of the stereo (wiring, 
tubes, speakers, flows of electricity) are related to me and 
to each other. Ordinarily, we establish "levels" of relation 
which facilitate understanding (the table and the computer 
and the couch are distinct objects which co-exist in the 
living room; the living room, dining room, and bathroom are 
rooms which co-exist in the house; the house has very little 
to do with the atoms that compose the particles of fabric 
which form the black stitch that traverses the body of the 
couch, etc.). My organs are connected in a fundamental way
which authorizes the delimitation of my physical body and
(
allows me to fall under the category heading "human being".
These levels of relation and connection are symptoms, for the 
authors of Anti-Oedipus, of a secondary understanding of 
reality, of a sedimentary and rigid "Oedipalized" social 
order. The first thing that they do is to eliminate these 
levels at which connections and relations "make sense". Thus 
instead of an understanding of the body in which eating 
causes growth, the organs function together to animate 
corporeal being, the hand picks the nose, etc., they adopt a 
model of the whole sphere of social life which is immanent 
and within which any thing at any "level" can "plug-in"
(connect) to any other thing at any other level.
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For example, my belly-button extends over a whole city street 
and animates the sound waves which re-route the revolution of 
Pluto around the Sun. In establishing this connection, I 
have taken note of a "desiring-machine", which is always 
already there yet is produced, on the spot, by itself and its 
connections. The capitalist says "What good is this machine; 
it can't be operated, contained, produced, sold, or even 
literally conceived of?". The psychoanalyst says "The belly 
button represents the severed connection with your mother at 
the hollow site of the umbilical cord; the revolution of 
Pluto is a huge, universal circle which represents the small 
circle which is your belly button which represents the 
severed connection with your mother." The schizophrenic just 
giggles, or weeps, or ignores the desiring-machine 
altogether. She is not obligated to "take notice".
For Deleuze and Guattari, desire is immanent within the 
social and constantly produces itself and its machines. The 
above example sounds silly, and of course it is. But all 
that Anti-Oedipus is doing here is exposing a very pragmatic 
attention that we pay to our world. The belly button-Pluto 
machine exists in a very real way, but it doesn't work; the 
listening-machine which is comprised of my ears, a compact 
disc, a stereo, and speakers exists in a very real way as 
well, and according to a contemporary code of social 
existence it works very well. Deleuze and Guattari want only
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to draw our attention to the fact that somewhere, somehow it 
becomes possible to establish which desiring-machines (sets 
of connections) work and which do not. However this comes 
about (most are convinced that it has to do with scientific 
advancements, the laws of physics, practical governing codes 
which inform the way we dwell together socially), it is 
apparent that the process of establishing these levels of 
organization immediately striates and configures the sphere 
of desiring-production. An economy of desire is instituted 
which pre-configures social space and limits the ways human 
beings dwell. In Line Three it was elaborated how just such 
an economy actually writes the codes for what will be known 
as the individual. Of course, limitations are necessary, for 
we are pretty sure that thinking cannot think its way into 
infinite couplings, connections, and programmatics. Authors 
like Deleuze and Guattari are aware that thinking cannot be 
truly unbounded; but they are also aware that it must open up 
upon itself if it wants to operate in the pacings and 
trappings set up by control. The contemporary order is the 
only one which will concern them, specifically the ordering 
process which is the integrated capitalistic social sector. 
What troubles Deleuze and Guattari is not the fact that 
limits exist but rather that the limits imposed by control 
society rewrite the desiring process: deterritorialization
turns desire back upon itself and causes desire to desire its 
own repression, the continuance and acceleration of 
repression.
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This establishing of levels which only permit certain 
connections, certain "assemblages" (body, mountain, telephone 
wire) to make sense is precisely the organic ordering which 
Deleuze and Guattari refer to. The infinite connections that 
are possible in the process of desiring-production compose 
the anorganic, the schizophrenic, universally productive 
motor. In a disciplinary society, institutions such as the 
individual, the family, and territorialized sites of 
confinement such as the school, the factory, and the asylum 
are permissible machines which have become "fixed" or 
sedimented and establish the lines of correct and incorrect 
activity. But desire is always productive, so it must run 
that desiring production has actually produced the mechanisms 
which repress the multitude of desiring-machines.
Before addressing this state of perpetual production, it 
should be noted that some fairly obvious contradictions have 
arisen. It seems first of all that the plurality of 
connections which are possible is a sort of undifferentiated, 
infinite, metaphysical well from which ordering processes 
draw whatever machines suit their purposes. Are Deleuze and 
Guattari drawing us a metaphysical map of the way in which 
the social comes about, or describing a hierarchy in which 
the schizophrenic core of desire (the undifferentiated, 
connective, anorganic body) comes to be tamed and "made 
social"? If so, what distinguishes them from Freud, who 
understood that the social relations of human life require 
that the excessive state of desire (the id) be contained and
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harnessed by socio-psychological legislation? Not only that, 
but if they assert that the entire field of desire which is 
schizophrenic (any connection can be made at any time) is the 
first level, and that the organized socius represents a 
secondary ordering process, are they not establishing levels 
themselves?
These charges need to be addressed. In order to do so, we 
must look to the conception of the socius that Deleuze and 
Guattari are forwarding.
"All laws, rights, values and orders can be created and destroyed by 
society; none can stand outside as an origin or a goal. There can be no 
absolute distinctions or boundaries imposed upon society because these 
would need to be justified by some transcendent order...[D]esire, 
forming relations between heterogeneous terms, can cross all boundaries. 
Similarly, there are no pre-social instincts or drives, whether towards 
aggression or sexual activity, that transcend society. Indeed, the 
fixing of such drives is a corollary of the formation of a fixed order 
of society; the drive can only be formed as a desire for repetition of 
territorial representation. A fixed drive is formed as that which is 
prohibited and excluded from society. The drive only exists as a 
'return of the repressed'; it is shaped by repression in the image of 
the repressing structure."4
The fixed drives which serve psychoanalysis as a blueprint of 
the unconscious are stalled desiring-machines, moments of 
"anti-production" against which all productive capacities are 
judged and moderated. For the authors of Anti-Oedipus, there 
is nothing outside of the social, nothing escapes coding. 
"There is only desire and the social, and nothing else."5 It
4 Ibid., p. 74.
5 Anti-Oedipus, p. 29.
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is incorrect to say, along with Freud, that desire encounters 
the social or the "real" and thereby is repressed, repressed 
into citizenry and autonomy. This type of desire that Freud 
describes, the composite of drives which either want sex or 
aggression, is a desire already bound, already repressed. It 
is desire conceived as lack, and while it operates nearly 
everywhere within the social field, it has nothing in common 
with the productive capabilities of the desiring-machines.
Desire is production, the production process of the real.
When Freud understands the drives of the id as unconscious 
desires which are repressed when they bump up against the 
tangible socius, he removes desire from its immanent 
position; desire inheres in and as the social field. Freud 
situates desire "outside" of the socius and "inside" the 
unconscious. Deleuze and Guattari understand the unconscious 
as the universal producer of the desiring-machines which 
compose social reality. One cannot "come into the social"; 
the socius is all that is the case.
We should be cautious here; it might sound as if the 
framework being offered is yet another idealist metaphysical 
model, a "stalled engine" itself. If any form of mental 
activity (consciousness, pre-consciousness, the unconscious) 
is said to "construct" its own reality, we are face to face 
with rationalist dogma. It is not the case that mental 
activity of any kind is at work here conjuring up the "real". 
Whatever desire is, whatever the productive unconscious is,
146
it has nothing to do with the rational, the self, the ego.
In fact, this is precisely the conception of desire that 
Anti-Oedipus wants to abandon. Deleuze and Guattari admit 
that one of the most outstanding contributions psychoanalysis 
made was the discovery that desire is productive. But once 
the structural components of psychoanalysis are introduced 
into this productive process, desire can produce only 
fantasies, and once Oedipus makes himself known, even this 
fantasy-production becomes a production of sublevels of the 
ego .
Desire is not affiliated with the ego until repression is 
involved; Oedipus is the model of the ego which reverses the 
productive nature of desire and turns production into lack.
If Oedipus is the model employed by psychoanalysis to 
"describe" the genesis of the ego, then this ego is a 
secondary function. It is born of Oedipalization. Within 
the social, Oedipus creates subjects. This does not mean 
that the organization of the ego brought about by Oedipus 
belongs to another "level" than the free-space of desiring- 
production; Oedipus is a connection, a social desiring- 
machine. As we have seen, the possible connections available 
in desiring-production are infinite and can always change; it 
would thus be impossible to pin down from this assertion 
regarding the multiplicitous and fragmentary nature of the
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socius a "metaphysical" position.6 Oedipus is a desiring- 
machine that has stalled; the "ego" that it produces (the 
lacking ego) is a derivative and sedimented tool of 
repression.
But to respond more directly to the charge of Idealism, we 
need to elaborate what is meant by the locution "Oedipus".
The tale of Oedipus the King is well known, and the manner in 
which the Oedipus complex prefigures the way that 
psychoanalysis operates is also generally understood. What 
Deleuze and Guattari are saying is precisely this: Oedipus
has become that which it is not. The productive fantasy of 
the Oedipal triangle may very well be real (that is, there is 
no reason why desire could not organize itself around a lust 
for the mother and take active offense at the threat of the 
father). However, the account this offers of the "passage 
into selfhood" (which informs not only the psychoanalytic 
procedure but which has now infiltrated every aspect of the 
social sphere) is taken to be the model for desire .
When it is asserted that desire must organize itself around
6 Recall in Line One the discussion of the two different “moral” codes elaborated by Nietzsche. It should 
be recognized that the “m achines” that produced the Aristocratic values and the m achines that produced 
the priestly mentality were of vastly different orders. We would not say  that one “evolved” out of the other, 
nor would we attribute the “moralization of existence” to som e type of higher understanding; the 
producing/product/producers were inherently different. There is nothing metaphysical to be found which 
“fuels” cultural shifts. This is why genealogy is a  marvelous philosophical tool; by asking of any empirical 
assem blage “What does it want?”, the genealogist seeks only after the connections which hold values, 
Ideals, beliefs, etc. in place. Deleuze considers himself both a  materialist and an empiricist. He is a 
materialist because the socius is physical; the process of production can be felt, seen, heard in every 
case. He is an empiricist because he writes only what he sees , his own production/recording process 
inscribes the observed couplings and connections that build and re-build politics, texts, shopping malls, 
etc.
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that which it cannot have, then desire is given status only 
as reactive, as a lack, and a conception of the self arises 
which is the Oedipal self, the lacking self.
"The fact is, from the moment we are placed within the framework of
Oedipus - from the moment we are measured in terms of Oedipus - the
cards are stacked against us, and the only real relationship, that of
production, has been done away with. The great discovery of 
psychoanalysis was that of the production of desire, of the productions 
of the unconscious. But once Oedipus entered the picture, this 
discovery was soon buried beneath a new brand of idealism: a classical
theater was substituted for the unconscious as factory; representation 
was substituted for the units of production of the unconscious; and an 
unconscious which was capable of nothing but expressing itself - in 
myth, tragedy, dreams - was substituted for the productive 
unconscious."7
And now Oedipus bursts open upon the entire social surface. 
God, or the priest, or the moral (deontological ethics uses 
the locution "duty") is the paranoiac fathers who tells the 
desiring-believer that she cannot taste of forbidden 
pleasures, cannot enjoy intoxication, or fornicate, or be 
gluttonous, for something larger than herself (her soul, her 
conscious, the welfare of her society) is at stake. The 
State becomes the father who stands between the citizen and 
"his best interests", allowing him whatever falls within his 
rights here, forbidding him whatever does not there. The 
desiring-believer and the desiring-citizen are radically 
situated by the abstract father machines which repeatedly 
remind them that they lack certain possibilities; they are 
taught both what they want and that they cannot have it.
7 Anti-Oedipus, p. 24.
8 See  Line Two for a  treatment of the tyrannical figurehead of the Father.
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Desire as an internalized Oedipalized desire forms the 
cement^like structure of the self or ego. This ego is the 
product of a neurotic desire; it is this neurotic 
manifestation of desire, and it is convinced that it is 
always situated, always limited, always lacking.
Capital is the most pernicious paranoiac father of all.
Capital regenerates itself as it reminds everyone, everywhere 
that they are lacking. And it employs every machine 
available to continue this process of abuse and repression.
It employs media machines to remind us that we don't have the 
best pair of basketball sneakers, the newest stereo system, 
the fastest car or the most attractive lover. It employs 
business machines to remind us that we could always be more 
productive, are never productive enough. It is the body of 
capital, the corporeal father which autoproduces itself 
within the society of control, that abuses neurotic lack to 
the point of lunacy. And most importantly, capital is the 
deterritorializing/reterritorializing father; it is 
everywhere, and it is everywhere constructing new 
connections, new machines which invest the social field and 
(re)produce capital.
Anti-Oedipus defines capitalism in terms of an absence of 
limits and an axiomatic:
"Concerning capitalism, we maintain that it both does and does not have 
an exterior limit: it has an exterior limit that is schizophrenia, that
is, the absolute decoding of flows, but it functions only by pushing 
back and exorcising this limit. And it also has, yet does not have,
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interior limits: it has interior limits under the specific conditions
of capitalist production and circulation, that is, in capital itself, 
but it functions only by reproducing and widening these limits on an 
always vaster scale. The strength of capitalism indeed resides in the 
fact that its axiomatic is never saturated, that it is always capable of 
adding a new axiom to the previous ones. Capitalism defines a field of 
immanence and never ceases to fully occupy this field. But this 
deterritorialized field finds itself determined by an axiomatic, in 
contrast to the territorial field determined by primitive codes. 
Differential relations of such a nature as to be filled by surplus 
value; as absence of exterior limits that is 'filled' by the widening of 
internal limits; and the effusion of antiproduction within production so 
as to be filled by the absorption of surplus value - these constitute 
the three aspects of capitalism's immanent axiomatic."9
When Anti-Oedipus opposes "primitive codes" to the capitalist 
axiomatic, it intends a much deeper division than we will go 
into here. Codes are the markings, for Deleuze and Guattari, 
which actually inscribe the body of the socius, which write 
the territories wherein we dwell. What is really being 
forwarded here is an attack upon the tyrannically repressive 
nature of all forms of signification (we sense the 
possibility here for a whole new philosophy of language).
For the sake of brevity and to preserve the specifically 
political elements of this discussion, the scope of these 
claims should be limited.
In "carving up" the socius, codes have a way of facilitating 
an easily lived in social sphere. As described in Line 
Three, systems of codes assimilate to form the bodies of 
factories, schools, homes, prisons, militaries, public and 
private sectors where the model of discipline is employed and 
internalized. The axiomatic of capitalism, however, is not a 
codifying structure (it does not set up or work within
9 Anti-Oedipus , p. 250.
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sedimentary complexes or "institutions"), rather it acts as a 
deterritorializing agent for all of these sites. Capitalism 
knows that control is more effective than discipline, because 
it divides everything up and makes everything a mobile 
commodity; it shatters the realms of private and public space 
and throws all modes of production into a state of spaceless, 
mobile synergy. Everything is filled.
Capitalism does not have to remind us that we lack; the 
simple fact that three fourths of the world's population 
lives below poverty level alerts us to that fact. But there 
is a lack imposed upon desire by capitalism; we lack none 
other than capital itself, we lack the father, we can never 
have enough money. We crave the very mother of repression, 
the body of capital, the deterritorializing, paranoiac 
father. Here is Reich's answer: What could cause the masses
to desire their own repression? Capital, the force and flux 
of repression, the instrument of internalized fascist 
tendencies.
But more directly, how does Oedipus relate to capitalism?
That is, how does the accelerated Oedipal process from family 
to ego to entire social sphere serve the agenda of 
contemporary capitalism so profoundly that the two are nearly 
indistinguishable?
Deleuze distinguishes between a logic of either/or and a 
logic of both/and in reference to a concept that he borrows
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from Gregory Bateson, the double-bind. i° The model of 
genealogical critique fashioned by Nietzsche is, according to 
Deleuze, an immanent critique. The will-to-power analyzes 
forces, can evaluate events, but only from within the context 
of those very forces and events, indeed as a force and an 
event. As thoroughly immanent critique, Deleuze sees 
Nietzschean critique as a way of thinking motivated by the 
paradoxical logic of an "inclusive disjunction."ii
This means that critique as force remains active, because it 
is not separate from what it can do. indeed, reaction, for 
Deleuze, constitutes the moment of a machine being forced 
back upon itself, made to choke on its own productive 
mechanisms; reactive forces "separate active force from what 
it can do."12 This is precisely where revolution stagnates. 
The moment that a vanguard organizes the masses into a 
revolutionary machine, it strips them of their potency; it 
channels chaotic revolutionary energy into a system of 
logical activities which organize themselves around a set of 
beliefs (We are oppressed and must change the conditions in 
which we live) and a telos (liberation, utopia, the end of 
capitalism). Likewise, the moment that psychoanalysis 
organizes the productive machines of the unconscious around 
the "ego" (the structure of Oedipus) the mode of operation 
for examination, process, problem, and cure is elaborated as
10 Jeffrey A. Bell Philosophizing the Double-Bind: Deleuze reads Nietzsche in Philosophy Today 
Volume 39 4:4 Winter 1995 pps. 371-390.
11 S ee Nietzsche and Philosophy Section 2 ( Active and Reactive, pps. 39-72) and Section 3 (Critique, 
pps. 73-110).
12 Ibid., p. 57.
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well. The product or outcome of the psychoanalytic procedure 
(a "healthy", normalized ego) is prefigured by the 
structurally rigid organization imposed by the Oedipal 
framework.
This is what Deleuze means by the double-bind. In thinking 
on revolution, communist strategy employs the logic of the 
either/or (either we remain oppressed by the upper classes or 
we wage full scale revolution). As does psychiatry: either 
the individual is neurotic or schizophrenic, healthy or sick; 
either she can be cured or she can not, etc.
If the double-bind, which is really a sort of tool used to 
describe the oppositional nature of all binary distinctions, 
can be appropriated within a paradoxical both/and framework 
(the inclusive disjunction), then theoretically revolution 
can happen at any moment of daily life or the schizophrenic 
can live out his days as an active social beings .
Jeffrey Bell describes Gregory Bateson's conception of the 
double-bind:
"Bateson argues that a double-bind consists of two injunctions. The 
first or primary injunction says that one must or must not do so and so; 
the second injunction is more general, or more 'abstract' and conflicts 
with the first. For example, a mother might tell her son not to do so
13 The movement of anti-psychiatry, a  practice championed by David Cooper, Thomas Szasz, R.D. Laing 
and others was an attempt to incorporate the radical ego-loss exhibited by som e schizophrenics into a  sort 
of “anti-model” for dealing with the insane. Laing actually lived for years among a group of schizophrenics 
for whom he had established a  commune, Kingsley Hall. Arguably, his attempt was a  marginal success, if 
judged statistically in reference to how many of the inhabitants were actually “cured”. Laing considered 
the project a failure, however, for the distinction between psychiatrist and patient could never fully be 
broached, and that was his primary task.
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and so, but then might, by her more general behavior - i.e., gestures, 
intonation, or other non-verbal means of communicating - tell him not to 
submit to her prohibitions. Regardless of what the son does, therefore, 
he will be in the wrong."!4
The logic of either/or might here end in paranoia, a constant 
brooding over the fact that neither choice is acceptable. 
Bateson suggests that one can live with a kind of specific 
attention to the double-bind, a "both/and" approach which is 
not caught up in the specifically exclusive mode of choosing 
orte member of a binary pair or another. One can assimilate 
both possibilities artd become creative; it is always possible 
to establish new connections, within the logic of the two 
injunctions, which lead elsewhere. Schizophrenics sometimes 
exhibit this type of reaction to double-bind situations.
Capitalism affixes a type of schizophrenic logic to the 
social order. For example, in the process of establishing 
ever new attractive connections, the mechanics of advertising 
attempt to ascertain how to manipulate the flows of desire 
which both influence and are effects of subjective 
Oedipalization. A commercial for a credit card company 
depicts Bob Dole attempting to write a check (a now outdated 
form of currency) in his hometown in Kansas after a 
homecoming parade put on in his honor. After the counter 
clerk asks him for three different forms of identification, 
Dole stares sullenly into the camera and proclaims: "I just
can't win." Visa is everywhere you want to be.
14 Philosophizing the Double-Bind, p. 376.
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In another commercial for a candy bar, a fake "condition" is 
described in a deathly serious tone by "experts": People who
eat this candy bar suddenly become catatonic, and wear a 
perpetual smile. It is suggested that these people are 
having orgasmic-type experiences which cause them to leave 
their corporeal bodies and party in alternate planes of 
existence aboard alien space vessels. As an advertisement, 
this commercial sells product. Yet it is almost 
indistinguishable from the descriptions of hallucinations 
given by schizophrenics.
Capitalism, as it cpnstantly makes new connections and 
radically deterritorializes social spaces, always sets up new 
limits which redefine the channels through which desire 
flows. It leaves these limits behind almost instantaneously, 
as the schizophrenic leaves behind his table, or re- 
appropriates them for some other purpose. Thus its process 
is one of loosing fixed territories (the double bind, 
either/or), and re-establishing a myriad of alternatives 
(becoming-creative).
in trying to answer how Oedipus relates to capitalism, we 
need to keep this process in mind. Oedipus is the structure 
which locates and defines the contemporary subject. In many 
ways, it is an avatar of an outmoded disciplinary mentality. 
There is a "divisionary" principle in operation in 
disciplinary society, and the family is not excepted from 
this process. "[T]he institution of the family is regulated
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by ...a fixed conjugation between individuated persons, in 
which desire is subordinated to reproduction, [and] leads to 
the filiation of new individuals by exclusive disjunction."15 
The "institution" of the family is localizable, its territory 
marked, within a disciplinary social configuration.16 But 
within a nexus of control mechanics, sites of confinement 
branch out, pour over the social field and vastly expand 
their domains while mutating to encompass new milieus where 
they were previously inactive. The obvious example is the 
site of production, the factory, but the family also becomes 
deterritorialized. As noted above, the father is everywhere, 
the figurehead of Oedipus is no longer confined to a physical 
familial realm, but rather invests the entire social field. 
This familial structure, operating in all realms of the 
socius (business, the military, clinical institutions) is the 
pure representative of the repressive tyranny of 
signification.
"The best example of a purely signifying structure is the figure of 
Oedipus produced in Lacanian psychoanalysis...For Lacan, the unconscious 
is structured like a language; the triangular relationship of the family 
is translated into a symbolic structure devoid of imaginary content. 
The resolution of Oedipus means an internalization of its structure into 
desire, and an acceptance that desire will always lack something, the 
transcendental signified which restores it to reality. By investing 
itself in the search for the transcendental signified, desire lives out 
the Oedipus complex. The solution to this neurotic search is a 
regression from the signified to the structure: when desire embraces the 
oedipal structure as the law of society, it resolves and internalizes 
Oedipus. The resolved and internalized Oedipus can then function as the 
basis of both our participation in society and the way in which we 
think. This structural version of Oedipus is taken by Deleuze and
15 Deleuze and Guattari: An Introduction to the Politics of D esire , p. 88.
16 Recall the discussion in Line Three regarding sites of confinement, where Deleuze noted that in 
disciplinary societies the territories are plainly delineated. At school, the individual is told that he is not at 
home anymore a  and must act differently, in the workplace, he is told that he is not at school anymore, etc.
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Guattari to be the prime agent of repression in our society."17
The operations that this structural family performs upon 
contemporary society are the very operations of control and 
repression; this extended and representational Oedipus 
separates the productive forces of desire from what they can
t
do; the entire socius must be striated and divided to fit the 
Oedipal mold. For Lacan, this internalization of the Oedipal 
triangle marks the site of individuation, the birth of the 
desiring-ego. Deleuze and Guattari understand this model of 
the individual as the origin of all repressive capabilities. 
They see the struggle between desiring-machines and the 
"Oedipal-narcissistic machine" as having primary political 
importance.
"In order to understand the details of this struggle, it must be borne 
in mind that the family relentlessly operates on desiring-production. 
Inscribing itself into the recording process of dtesire, clutching at 
everything, the family performs a vast appropriation of the productive 
forces; it displaces and reorganizes in its own fashion the entirety of 
the connections and the hiatuses that characterize the machines of 
desire. It reorganizes them all along the lines of the universal 
castration that condition the family itself...but it also redistributes 
these breaks in accordance with its own laws and the requirements of 
social production. The inscription performed by the family follows the 
pattern of its triangle, by distinguishing what belongs to the family 
from what does not. It also cuts inwardly, along the lines of 
differentiation that form global persons: there's daddy, there's mommy,
there you are, then there's your sister. Cut into the flow of milk 
here, it's your brother's turn, don't take a crap here, cut into the 
stream of shit over there. Retention is the primary function of the 
family: it is a matter of learning what elements of desiring-production 
the family is going to reject, what it is going to retain..."18
17 Deleuze and Guattari: An Introduction to the Politics of Desire p. 89.
18 Anti-Oedipus, pps., 124-5.
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The first thing that the schizo does is eradicate the ego; 
this is, for Deleuze and Guattari, the moment of revolution 
against the repressive structure of the "Holy Family"*9 . The 
figurehead of Oedipus is abandoned; and since Oedipus is the 
structural model of social organization, the family, the 
State, the self are also foregone. All structure is 
devastated by the purely differential element of couplings 
and connections, productive desiring-machines. And the 
schizo becomes a body without organs, a stalled engine.
In Line Three, a description of control was offered. This 
method of social organization ensures that subjects are 
referenced according to position, are allowed or denied 
access to everything from television programs to buildings to 
administrative positions by distributing a mode of control 
over the processes of gaining education, employment, status, 
or goods. The general model of the politically/economically 
situated subject is the oedipalized subject. This is the 
subject which can be dominated, the subject that knows that 
it lacks, that can be intoxicated, domesticated, controlled 
and compelled by the deterritorializing processes of 
contemporary capitalism. But capitalism can do little or 
nothing with the non-oedipalized or "schizophrenic" 
individual. The logic of capitalism and the logic of 
schizophrenia are very similar, and they "work" according to 
the same processes20. The oedipalized subject is docile; he
19 This notion of schizophrenic rebellion against ego-izing oedipalization was treated in Line Two.
20  The similarities between the logic of capitalism and the logic of schizophrenia were discussed in the last 
part of Line Five, Schizophrenic Spaces.
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is controlled by the logic of either/or, and capitalism 
proffers all of the choices on a smorgasbord of social 
possibilities driven by the abuse of conceptual lack. 
Capitalism understands lack so well and exploits it so easily 
that the capitalist process and the lacking Oedipalized 
subject are forced into a synthetic unity which dialectically 
informs the entirety of social existence. The Oedipalized 
subject lives the perpetual "double-bind" in a passive state 
of political and economic impotence; he is outside the social 
and inside his own head; he lacks immanence; he is separated 
from what he can do.
Capitalism utilizes this lack-*-structure to erect a complex 
socius in which limits disappear and possibilities are 
dangled in front of the faces of executants like the 
proverbial carrot on a string. Buy a TV and experience 
China. Take a pay cut and work in a new sector, and be 
rewarded with an early retirement on seventy-five percent of 
your salary. Have virtual sex on line with a partner that 
you create yourself (masturbation par excellence ). Fly from 
New York to London on the Concord for a business meeting with 
Korean investors and be home for dinner with the family in 
Long Island by six. Capitalism schizophrenizes the sbcius by 
filling in all spaces with infinite connective possibilities. 
All spaces become virtual, all possibilities limitless.
In this accelerated framework, Oedipus lends stability to 
existence. The family is a supportive and comforting
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institution; my senator is looking out for my needs in 
Washington; I know what I already possess and what I still 
need to obtain in order to succeed and thrive. This is the 
comfort of contemporary repression: The world is too large
and at the same time too small; we want localizable fixed 
spaces which will grant to life a pace, a rate of 
progression, goals and dreams, etc. We like to have limited 
choices (either/or) and cannot think what it would be like to 
choose everything and create as well. Capitalism connects 
everywhere and creates new sites of connection for itself; 
it writes the blueprint for desire.
The oedipalized subject is produced and operated by the 
capitalist process; it is a subject which belongs to 
capitalist society, with no remainder. It is the subject 
that capitalism can own and control. But our society also 
produces schizophrenics:
"Our society produces schizos in the same way that it produces Prell 
shampoo or Ford cars, the only difference being that schizos are not 
salable. How then does one explain the fact that capitalist production 
is constantly arresting the schizophrenic process and transforming the 
subject of the process into a confined clinical entity, as though it saw 
in this process the image of its own death coming from within? Why does 
it make the schizophrenic into a sick person, not only nominally but in 
reality? Why does it confine its madmen and madwomen instead of seeing 
in them its heroes and heroines, its own fulfillment? And where it can 
no longer recognize the figure of a simple illness, why does it keep its 
artists and even its scientists under such close surveillance - as 
though they risked unleashing flows that would be dangerous for 
capitalist production and charged with a revolutionary potential, so 
long as these flows are not co-opted or absorbed by the laws of the 
market? Why does it form in turn a gigantic machine for social 
repression - psychic - repression, aimed at what nevertheless 
constitutes its own reality - the decoded flows?"21
21 Anti-Oedipus, p. 245.
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What Deleuze and Guattari mean by decoded flows are the 
connections that outstrip the antiquated social order of 
societies of discipline; Sites of confinement operate 
according to a system of codes which both the capitalist and 
the schizophrenic: processes decode, eroding the autonomy of 
the factory, the family, the church, the school. The pivotal 
question raised here is this; If the processes driven by 
capital and the schizophrenic processes are so similar in 
kind, why does society manufacture institutional 
schizophrenics, why does it fear its own logic, and why does 
it monitor so closely the movements and flows of those who 
participate in capitalist production processes (artists, 
scientists, etc.)?
"The answer...is that capitalism is indeed the limit of all societies, 
insofar as it brings about the decoding of flows that the other social 
formations coded and overcoded. But it is the relative limit of every 
society; it effects relative breaks, because it substitutes for the 
codes an extremely rigorous axiomatic that maintains the energy of the 
flows in a bound state on the body of capital as a socius that is 
deterritorialized, but also a socius that is even more pitiless than any 
other. Schizophrenia, on the contrary, is indeed the absolute limit 
that causes the flows to travel in a free state on a desocialized body 
without organs. Hence one can say that schizophrenia is the exterior 
limit of capitalism itself or the conclusion of its deepest tendency, 
but that capitalism only functions on condition that it inhabit this 
tendency, or that it push back or displace this limit, by substituting 
for its own immanent relative limits, which it continually reproduces on 
a widened scale. It axiomatizes on the one hand what it decodes with 
the other. Such is the way that one must reinterpret the Marxist law of 
the counteracting tendency. With the result that schizophrenia pervades 
the entire capitalist field from one end to the other. But for 
capitalism it is a question of binding the schizophrenic charges and 
energies into a world axiomatic that always opposes the revolutionary 
potential of decoded flows with new interior limits...The flows are 
decoded and axiomized by capitalism at the same time. Hence 
schizophrenia is not the identity of capitalism, but on the contrary its 
difference, its divergence, and its death. Monetary flows are perfectly
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schizophrenic realities, but they exist and function only within the 
immanent axiomatic that exorcises and repels this reality. The language 
of a banker, a general, an industrialist, a middle or high-level 
manager, or a government minister is a perfectly schizophrenic language, 
but that functions Only statistically within a flattening axiomatic of 
connections that puts it in the service of the capitalist order."22
The schizophrenic process is appropriated by capitalist 
machinery in a very strange way; its capacity to loosen all 
constricting parameters of social organization has immense 
benefits, and capitalism seizes upon these possibilities.
But capitalism cannot be totally without form? it is 
schizophrenic only up until that point at which the 
perpetuation of its own economy is threatened, at which point 
it lays out new rules for the game which look, deceptively 
enough, like self-substantiating or pre-given social 
conditions, i.e., axiomatics . The social sphere is invested 
by a logic of connections which has no real limits, a 
schizophrenic logic. This logic is fast and 
incomprehensible, and it mutates quickly. Its differential 
element has the capability to foster full scale revolution or 
integrated Global Capitalism.
The model of representation keeps the social field in check. 
Democracy is born of this tendency towards representation, as 
is Oedipus. Capital needs representation to ensure its own 
preservation. The decoding schizophrenic process serves 
capital only if it assures that new, more seductive, more
22 Ibid., pps. 245-6.
163
complex and valuable images are available for public 
consumption. The model of the consumer is fashioned by 
Oedipus, the ultimate signifier, representation par 
excellence. Thus the schizophrenic process employed by 
capitalism continuously reinvents itself by way of 
representational imaging; new models for desire become the 
axiomatics by which the normalized individual judges his or 
her capacity to perform, excel, compete. Oedipus is not 
static, save in that it operates according to an economy of 
lack. The lacking subject is the structural component of 
representation; capitalism feeds desire its own images.
Line Four makes explicit reference to the repressive 
structure of representative politics. According to the 
critical model put forth in Anti-Oedipus, any political 
agenda established on the premise that any one thing can 
operate in place of another is a politics which serves 
repression. But now it seems as if almost every condition 
save some type of pure schizophrenic state would be an avatar 
of fascistic tendencies; everything is born of lack and 
lacunae. Thus we are left with Lenin's question; "What is 
to be done?"
Even if we buy the central themes here elaborated, questions 
remain; what can we do, what is it good for, what does it 
want? Anti-Oedipus should not be approached with the 
question "Is it True?", for it has no response to this. The 
question then is, what can it do? Where can it prompt
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change, how can it politically affect a control society?
Does it speak to technology, science, or any form of 
progress? And on a meta-level, does it serve well as an 
experiment in theory which "keeps up" with the literally 
blinding speed of contemporary culture and politics?
We should meet these questions on the front where 
revolutionary thinking abandons Marxism. It is not the case 
that capital is here outlined as the form and function of 
social repression. Recall that power as it is appropriated 
in the social field by desiring-machines is purely 
productive. Deleuze and Guattari go as far as to say that 
any form of social "connection" is always productive. Even 
repression is produced. Repression is the result of 
Oedipalization, the stalled engine which is not abandoned as 
the schizo abandons his table, but which is clung to 
relentlessly by the neurotic socius, a socius that has 
internalized the will to its own repression.
Anti-Oedipus draws a compelling picture of modern existence. 
In exploiting the lack-structure of the socius by 
deterritorializing social spaces and re-establishing virtual 
axiomatics, capitalism renders the schizophrenic impotent and 
applies its unique brand of control to the entire social 
surface. There are many places such a theory can go, much 
that it can do. Deleuze and Guattari modestly claim that 
they wanted only to separate the left from structural 
psychoanalysis, for this axis is where they noticed the
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possibilities for a whole new order of fascism.
Schizoanalysis can take down the dominant paradigm of 
structuralist psychoanalysis and serve as a shrewd watchdog 
for any leftist party (it certainly keeps left thinkers from 
straying too close to democracy, which is capitalism's mirror 
image on vthe global circuit). As a project which is 
committed to seeking out all forms of social repression, it 
is also a book of ethics, "the first book of ethics to be 
written in France in quite a long time."23 Anti-Oedipus 
counters dialectics in its insistence that man and nature and 
God and State cannot be part of a larger synthesis, that all 
are machinated cogs working their own little machines in and 
about the socius. It carries Nietzsche into a new era of 
philosophy and revives an anarchist trend in radical politics 
based upon an active way to engage an extremely unstable 
social field.
"Desire never resists oppression, however local and tiny the 
resistance, without the challenge being communicated to the 
capitalist system as a whole, and playing its part in 
bursting it open."24 saying no to Oedipus is the political 
vision; the methodology is yet to be elaborated. But theory 
needs radicals, because radicals keep the majoritarian order 
and all vanguards on their toes.
What does the process of Anti-Oedipalization require? It
23 Michel Foucault Preface to Anti-Oedipus p. xiii.
24 Felix Guattari Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari on Anti-Oedipus in Negotiations p. 19.
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requires speed and depth and cunning, for one thing. The 
possibility for action is lost on armchair political 
activists who really believe that things are bad and that 
change is possible; their effective engagement with the 
social sphere evaporates before their eyes when they step 
into the voting booth. They see the problems of the social 
sphere from well beyond it; they do not approach from within 
but from without.
The problem with political activism is that it has forgotten 
how well it knows its enemy. Capitalism is 
deterritorializing; it manufactures unheard of connections 
which move across the social field and become obsolete almost 
immediately. Oedipus, the site of all representation and 
keeper of the repressed ego, keeps us enthralled by such a 
process, causing us to forget our own deterritorializing 
machines. We forget the wildly schizophrenic elements which 
actually affect our own possibilities. We forget not that we 
can produce, but that we are production; this causes a rift 
in the surface of all productive capacities, a rift which 
causes the ego to cling with all of its might to the "really 
good things" that it produces, we forget to leave our 
productions behind; this would exceed the limit of capital, 
for even the immense production process of capitalism still 
grounds itself by establishing its own axioms, its own 
channels and rivulets of production. In the Prologue to Thus 
Spake Zarathrustra , Nietzsche reminds us that "one must have 
chaos in oneself to be able to give birth to a dancing star.
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I say unto you: you still have chaos in y o u r s e l v e s .25 « But
can the schizophrenic be the new revolutionary?
The schizophrenic process does not offer a guide to political 
involvement; it only offers up a perspective, a unique 
perspective that has remained silent for quite a while. This 
perspective is not critical of capital from outside, from a 
beyond which all too easily delineates its opposition; rather 
schizophrenia is immanent within capitalism; the 
schizophrenic is more capitalist than the capitalist. And if 
this perspective offers up something useful, something which 
might provide active and essential force to the molar 
structure of culture and politics, then all the better. If 
it does not, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that it be thrown 
away:
"What matters is whether it works, and how it works, and who it works 
for. It's a machine too. It's not a matter of reading it over and over 
again, you have to do something else with it...We're not writing for 
people who think psychoanalysis is doing fine and see the unconscious 
for what it is. We're writing for people who think it's pretty dull and 
sad as it burbles on about Oedipus, castration, the death instinct, and 
so on. We're writing for unconsciousness that have had enough. We're 
looking for allies.26 "
25 The Portable Nietzsche p. 129.
26 Gilles Deleuze Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari on Anti-Oedipus in Negotiations p. 22.
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